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I declare that this thesis has been composed by myself, and that the work presented is my
own, with the exception of the focussing algorithm described in Chapter 5, the description of
which is due to Gordon Plotkin.
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Abstract
The work partially reported here concerned the development ot a prototype Expert System for
giving advice about Statistics experiments, called ASA, and an inference engine to support
ASA, called ABASE.
This involved discovering what knowledge was necessary for performing the task at a satis¬
factory level of competence, working out how to represent this knowledge in a computer, and
how to process the representations efficiently.
Two areas of Statistical knowledge are described in detail: the classification of measure¬
ments and statistical variables, and the structure of elementary statistical experiments. A
knowledge representation system based on lattices is proposed, and it is shown that such
representations are learnable by computer programs, and lend themselves to particularly
efficient implementation.
ABASE was influenced by MBASE, the inference engine of MECHO [Bundy et al 79a]. Both
are theorem provers working on typed function-free Horn clauses, with controlled creation of
new entities. Their type systems and proof procedures are radically different, though, and




1.1. Lies, Damned Lies, and ...
sta-tls-tlcs n. 1. (functioning as sing.) a science concerned with the collection, classifica¬
tion, and interpretation of quantitative data and with the application of probability theory to the
analysis and estimation of population parameters. 2 the quantitative data themselves. [C18
(originally "science dealing with facts of a state"): via German statistik from New Latin
statisticus concerning state affairs, from Latin status STATE]
1.1.1. Why Bother?
The goal of my research was to produce an Expert System for Statistics consulting.
The program, called ASA (Automatic Statistics Assistant), asks its client questions about the
structure of his experiment, the nature of his measurements, and what he wants to learn from
the experiment, and then suggests how the data from such an experiment may be analysed.
While I was studying for my BSc and MSc, I did a lot of consulting at the University
Computer Centre. I was appalled to see how often postgraduate students in the human
sciences (psychology, education, medicine, anthropology, and so on) would simply leaf
through the manual of a statistical package until they came to something their data could be
put into, and were happy with whatever numbers the magical computer blessed them with.
Worse still, gross mistakes in experimental design went undetected, not just by the students,
but by their supervisors too. There is no reason to think that University is particularly bad.
When I came to Edinburgh I found the same problems all over again.
Nor is the problem confined to universities. It is said (I cannot recall the reference)
that 70% of "statistics" in published medical research is of dubious merit.
1.1.2. What is Statistics, anyway?
The heading of this section refers to the "facts of a state" mentioned in this entry from
the Collins English Dictionary. Said facts still form part of Statistics, a part known as Sample
Survey Theory [Cochran 77], and despite the best efforts of able statisticians retain their
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potential for deception. Indeed, statistical analysis is fraught with pitfalls for the unwary, and
interpretation is beset with dangers. Why is this so?
A definition of Statistics which some statisticians prefer is that it is the science of
reasoning about inexact data. But Statistics is even more than that. Statistics is just the
scientific method in action. It is about forming beliefs from data, deciding how to investigate
beliefs, designing experiments to test these beliefs or to fill in partially specified models, and
about how you revise your beliefs in the light of results. Of course, there is more to science
than this, as [Kuhn 70] has argued. Statistics is only applicable to "normal science". In order
to design an experiment you need to have a stable paradigm.
Different parts of the scientific process are served by different areas of Statistics. For
argument's sake, let us pretend that the following "algorithm" captures part of the "normal
science" process.
[1] Decide what phenomena to study.
[2] Collect some data relating to these phenomena.
[3] Look for interesting patterns in the data.
[4] Repeat steps 2 and 3 until something emerges.
[5] Formulate a model incorporating the patterns.
If possible, design a model with explanatory as
well as predictive power.
[6] Design an experiment to test this model.
[7] Perform the experiment.
[8] Analyse the data from the experiment.
[9] Repeat steps 6 to 8 until the model fails.
[10] Use the collected data to refine the model, or
to suggest a replacement for it.
Step 1 is necessarily a human activity. Whether to study racial differences, the effec¬
tiveness of psywar techniques, or the improvement of crops is a moral question rather than a
statistical one. Step 2 is pre-theoretic, and would be very difficult to assist. An important
methodological question for research at this stage is whether some datum forms part of the
subject or not. E.g. do reports of stones falling from the sky belong in a study of meteorol¬
ogy? However, people are never really in a state of complete ignorance. They usually have
some theory (however mistaken) to guide their search, so that some of the principles relating
to step 6 can be used. When we come to step 3, though, there is a body of known tech¬
niques which can be used. This is the area of Statistics called Exploratory Data Analysis
(EDA). It is a new area, and one of great interest. Humans are very good at detecting
certain kinds of patterns, and very bad at detecting others. EDA is a collection of hints about
what kinds of pattern to look for, and a body of methods for displaying data to help you see
them.
Step 5 is largely unexplored. [Langley et at 83] have done some work on theory
formation, but they have worked with very restricted "data". Rules of thumb have been
5
published, but they tend to boil down to (1) if it's like something else that already has a
model, try to adapt that one, and (2) try to form models which mean something. Dimensional
analysis is one of our most powerful guides here. [Peters 83] is a fascinating account of
power law models in biology which illustrates this problem.
Step 6 is where the greatest need for statistical consultants arises. There is a body
of Statistics theory called Design of Experiments, which is not actually a general theory of
experiments, but is concerned with structural patterns in a useful subclass. It is an outgrowth
of early work in Agricultural research, and still retains a vocabulary derived from fields and
crops. It is applicable to other problem areas, such as determining the optimal yield point of a
chemical process which is too complex to use exact chemical models. There is another body
of theory called Sample Survey Theory [Cochran 77] which is concerned with how to select
a sample (typically for a poll or census or similar survey, hence the name) so as to get the
most favourable cost-precision trade-off. There is also a collection of anecdotal material and
broad hints about such things as questionnaire design, possible sources of bias [a statistical
term relating to systematic error, not to be confused with prejudice], and usually a repertoire
of "standard" experiments in the researcher's domain. Alas, designing an effective and af¬
fordable experiment requires a great deal of knowledge, much of it real world knowledge. I
am confident that a major Al research project could produce a usable program working in a
limited domain. My research is not directed to this problem, but should be relevant.
Step 8 is where most of the statistical work has been done. There are methods for
testing nearly everything imaginable, and new methods to meet actual needs are developed
nearly every month. The mathematics of this area, called Confirmatory Data Analysis, is
very well developed, and is constantly being expanded. This is one reason why an automatic
consultant such as ASA can be useful: today's best method for some problem may be super¬
seded tomorrow, and the client cannot be expected to keep up with the latest developments.
This is to view ASA as a polyalgorithm, and for an experienced client that would be the only
gain from using it. But for the naive client, a much more important result of using a computer
program is that it will not forget to ask the right silly questions.
The work reported here is directed at steps [3] and [8]. This involves an elementary
attack on [5], in that fitting a statistical model often involves re-expressing the data (perhaps
taking square roots, or logarithms), which is a very basic sort of model design. The assump¬
tions built into the structure of ASA are that
• the client knows a fair bit about what the entities he is studying are like, even if
he does not know all the laws and relationships governing them. He must, in
particular, be able to classify them.
• the client knows something about his "measuring instruments", so that ASA can
work out what kinds of statistical variables they are.
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• the client has either performed his experiment or has a definite experimental
plan in mind, and knows what happened when to which entities, or what he
intends to happen. ASA can sometimes manage with a vague idea of the struc¬
ture of an experiment, but it is assumed that any question it might pose about the
structure has a firm answer decided before the consultation.
• it is the client's job to decide what is "interesting", not ASA's.
In particular, I make no pretence of tackling step [6].
1.1.3. Hair of the Dog.
I have a friend who is intelligent and capable, a highly skilled commercial program¬
mer with an MSc in Operations Research. He had a lot of difficulty with Statistics, and has
never really understood why you have to use different confidence interval for testing a
hypothesis you thought of after seeing the data from the interval you use to test a hypothesis
you were interested in before. For example, suppose you are comparing two brands of paint,
and want to estimate how much more of your house you can cover with a can of brand
A. Surprisingly enough, you get a much sharper estimate if you predicted beforehand that
brand A was the more economical than if you noticed this afterwards. How can looking at the
results make such a difference? Yet you get different precisions because different variables
are being estimated. This is one of the easiest traps to explain: if you thought beforehand
that A was better than B, you are estimating the difference between A and B. But if you
noticed after the experiment that A was better, you are estimating the difference between the
better and the worse paint. If you plan the analysis before you do the experiment, this
distinction will not escape you. But if you do the experiment and then try to analyse it, the
distinction is very often missed. If someone like my friend has difficulty with this concept, how
much more will someone who has little Mathematics and no Statistics? ASA distinguishes
between the goals "check which treatment is better and test whether this is reliable" and
"check whether this treatment is definitely better than that". It cannot ensure that the client
will give the right answer to the question, but at least it can ensure that the question will not
be forgotten.
There are many computer programs available for doing statistical calculations. The
trouble is that most of them are designed for experts: each package "trusts" its users to
ensure that the analyses they ask for make sense. The packages themselves have no
"understanding" of Statistics, let alone of the user's subject area; all they are good at is data
management and complicated numerical calculations.
The problem which motivated the design of ASA, then, Is that automatic computers
make it possible for people who do not understand what they are doing to perform
statistical calculations and come away with the false belief that the numbers mean
something.
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Other researchers have seen the problem. For as long as statistical packages have
existed, statisticians have been urging that they should check their answers. For example, if
a regression line is strongly influenced by a single data point, a package should warn its user.
Statisticians have developed several of these "diagnostics" (extra calculations whose results
can indicate problems with the analysis) and continue to develop new ones. Diagnostic tests
can be added to a statistical package without changing the way that packages are
programmed or used. Al techniques are not needed for that.
But diagnostics only warn you of problems in the data, and even packages which
make all sorts of checks still rely on their user to be doing the right kind of analysis. But that
is precisely where naive users make their most serious mistakes.
My research, then, was
• To discover what kinds of knowledge
• and what kinds of reasoning are needed to work out valid analyses for
simple statistical experiments,
• to determine what Al techniques are needed if a computer program Is to
perform this task,
• and to explore techniques for efficient logic-based expert systems
generally.
1.2. Even Textbooks Make Mistakes
One way of testing the classification of measurements developed in chapter 2 and
the structure of experiments developed in chapter 3, is to take examples from Statistics
textbooks and see whether ASA recommends the same method of analysis as the textbook.
Generally, either ASA does recommend the same method, or else it fails to recommend
anything. But when it recommands a different method, it is usually the case that ASA is right
and the book is wrong. Of course this requires an independent way of telling which is right.
Initially I relied on my own judgement, but a statistician at the University of Auckland and a
statistician at the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research to whom I showed the
results agreed with me and with ASA. (Both of them are practising statisticians with PhDs.)
1.2.1. Inveterate Liars
Here is an example taken from page 52 of [Everitt 77], Since Everitt gives very little
of the experimental structure, any assistance that mechanical methods could give us must be
derived entirely from the types of variables rather than how we got them.
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A sample of 223 boys were classified by age and by whether or not they were in¬
veterate liars. The table he presents is this
Age: I 5-7 8-9 10-11 12-13 14-15 I Total
+ +
Liars | 6 18 19 27 25 | 95
Non-liars | 15 31 31 32 19 | 128
— 1 — H
| 21 49 50 59 44 | 223
The task is to find a model for the proportion of liars in terms of age. ASA is able to
solve this problem.
A standard technique for fitting one continuous variable as a function of another is
linear regression. But it never makes sense to present the client with a model of the form
proportion = a*continuous + b
as there will almost always be reasonable values for the continuous variable for which the
proportion takes on values outside the range [0,1]. The standard transformation for propor¬
tions is logits. In "Exploratory Data Analysis", J.W.Tukey says "... the writer usually tries flogs
[folded logs] even before percents (plain or folded) or pluralities - flogs are the first-aid
bandages for counted fractions." The difference is that if the proportion is measured as M out
of N,
logit(M/N) = log(M/(N-M))
flog(M,N) = 0.5 log((M + l/6)/(N-M + 1/6))
The difference between folded logs (flogs) and logits is a factor of two and the additional 1/6
counts to cope with zeros. They are basically the same thing. We can interpret a logit or flog
as the logarithm of the odds on an event rather than the probability, logit ranges from -infinity
to +infinity and is symmetric about proportion 1/2.
So one model is
logit(proportion) = a*continuous+b [0]
<=> proportion = 1/(1 + bl*alA(-continuous/scale))
A statistician friend told me that this would be her automatic reaction. Logits have the advan¬
tage that equation [0] makes sense for all values of the continuous variable, both positive and
negative. ASA knows about the logit transform, but not about flogs.
If the continuous variable is strictly positive, as in this case, we may be able to
produce a model where the proportion cannot be negative, or cannot exceed one, but the
other limit may still be exceeded. There are two possible transformations which are not too
hard to interpret. They are
log(proportion) = a*continuous+b [1]
<=> proportion = bl*alA(continuous/scale)
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log(1-proportion) = a*continuous+b [2]
<=> proportion = 1 - bl*alA(continuous/scale)
where scale is a constant to produce a dimensionless power.
Clearly b1 and a1 must be positive, but that imposes no restriction on the a and b coef¬
ficients. Now model [1] has the property that the proportion will approach zero but never
attain it, but may fail because the proportion can exceed one. Model [2], on the other hand,
can approach but never equal one, but may turn negative. If the explanatory continuous
variable has a lower bound and "a" is negative, both of the constraints are satisfied. So to
choose between models [1] and [2], we have to ask the client whether he believes that the
proportion should decrease as the continuous variable increases (pick [1]) or decreases (pick
[2]). In this case, the proportion of liars is expected to increase, so the model to pick is model
[2]:
log(proportion(non-liars)) = a*age + b
where a < 0
In this case, [2] actually makes more sense than [0]. What we have is the familiar
logistic curve of population growth up to a limit. Starting at the time he learns to talk (when
log(1-p) = 0), there is a fixed probability per unit time that a boy will become a liar, "a"
measures that probability, and "b/a" measures the time of learning to talk.
Everitt now goes on to fit a linear regression. The model I obtained from GLIM by
doing this was
(proportion of liars) = 0.047 + 0.033*(age in years)
This model fits the observed data very well; the predicted numbers of liars in each group is
only out by 1. However, it has two deficiencies. First, it claims that 5% of newborn infants
are inveterate liars, something I find difficult to believe. How many babies say "Da Da" with
intent to deceive? Second, it predicts that more than 100% of people aged 29 or older are
inveterate liars. (Could this be the otherwise unobtainable justification for "Never trust
anyone over 30"?) The customary reply to this from analysts who do linear regressions on
raw data is "We're never going to apply the model outside its range of validity". To which I
reply, "You mayn't, but somebody else is bound to". For all too often, the model is published
without indicating what range of data it is based on.
What happens if you fit model [2]? GLIM came up with
(proportion of liars) =
1 - 1.101*0.943A{age in years)
Now this model appears to predict that -10% of infants are inveterate liars, which isn't much
better than +5%. However, if we look more carefully, we see that there is an interesting
figure in there. The age at which the proportion of liars is zero is 1.6 years, which is a
plausible sort of estimate of when children might start talking. We can interpret this model
very easily, as "The proportion of liars at ages below 2 years doesn't make much sense, as
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too few of them can talk yet. Otherwise, 5.7% of truthful children become inveterate liars
each year." This model has a definite lower bound, which reflects a genuine lower bound in
the age variable, but it has no upper bound. It predicts that 80% of 29-year-olds are in¬
veterate liars. I have less difficulty believing this than 120% !
How well does the meaningful model perform? Oddly enough, it doesn't do as well
as Everitt's one. For ages 10-11, model [2] predicts 29 liars, Everitt's predicts 29.5, and there
were 31. But it is never more than 1/2 a unit worse than Everitt's model. This is a small price
to pay for having a wider range of validity.
1.2.2. A Knotty Problem.
The second example comes from [Siegel 56]. The experiment was intended to il¬
lustrate a psychological phenomenon called "regression under stress". A sample of about 30
students was divided at random into two groups. All of the students were taught two methods
(call them A and B) for tying a certain kind of knot, but students in the first group were taught
method A first and then method B, while students in the second group were taught method B
first, and then method A. Shortly after this, the students were given a four hour examination.
After the exam, each student was asked to tie the knot, and the method used was recorded.
Anticipating the notation presented in Chapter 31, the structure of this experiment is
select[first_taught;
A -> teach(A) then teach(B),
B -> teach(B) then teach(A)]
then
measure[method_used]
where first_taught and method_used take values {A,B}. Since first_taught is a treatment the
experimenter chose, there is no point in looking for an explanation of it. Since method_used
is a measurement which the experimenter did not control, there is some point in studying it,
and since first_taught happens before method_used is measured, it should be in the explana¬
tion. This is in fact the way ASA works: first consider which variable might need explaining,
and then check which variables should appear in the explanation. So just looking at the
structure of the experiment tells us that a good thing to do is
look for an explanation of method_used
in terms of first_taught
Since both variables take only two values, the results of the experiment can be
reported in a two-by-two table:
11gnore the punctuation; just read the words.
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where Nij is the number ot subjects who were taught method i first and used method j when
they were tested.
Simply deciding that this is the appropriate way to summarise the results of the ex¬
periment is a significant achievement in itself. But two-by-two tables are so common that a
statistician is likely to know a lot about them. To start with, there are at least five ways that
this table could be "simple":
• method_used could tend to be the same as first_taught (Naa and Nbb large, Nba
and Nab small); this is the one we expect
• method_used could tend to be the opposite of first_taught (Nab and Nba large,
Naa and Nbb small)
• method_used could tend to be mostly A (Naa and Nba large, Nab and Nbb
small)
• method_used could tend to be mostly B (Nbb and Nab large, Nba and Naa
small)
• method_used could be completely random (all counts much the same)
There are well known methods for checking each of these possibilities.
However, Siegel doesn't do this. In his description of the experiment, all that is
recorded is one number for each student: whether he used the method he was taught first (1)
or the method he was taught second (2). "Regression under stress" suggests that most
students should use the method they were first taught, so Siegel tests whether the 1s sig¬
nificantly outnumber the 2s.
There are several points to make about this. One is that the test Siegel uses is less
sensitive; if there is a weak tendency to use the first method taught, testing for a
predominance of 1s may fail to detect it, while examining the 2-by-2 table may reveal it.
Another is that if method A is overwhelmingly simpler than method B, it will be apparent in the
2-by-2 table that most students are using method A, while in Siegel's method it will just
appear as "no effect".
But the main point is that the better analysis was easier to find than the worse. Using
the 2-by-2 table comes directly from the fact that the students are first divided into 2 groups
and then a measurement with 2 possible outcomes is made. To obtain Siegel's analysis, you
have to combine first_taught and method_used into one variable.
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1.2.3. Summary
These two examples showed that elementary reasoning about such questions as
• what sort of measurement is this?
• who decided what the value of this measurement would be?
• did this happen before or after that?
could lead to valid analyses. These two examples were chosen because the textbooks they
came from presented inferior analyses. Other examples could have been chosen: one
textbook on regression even has an example where logarithms of negative numbers are
taken! The irony is that the rules which led to the better analyses were taken from the very
textbooks that failed to apply them.
1.3. ASA
ASA's rule base is not described in this document. The reason for that may be a
surprising one. Many authors have stated that "knowledge acquisition" is a bottle neck in the
development of Expert Systems. Indeed, this is often used as the justification for induction
programs. (Which I have also studied. See [O'Keefe 83a] and [O'Keefe 83b].) In the domain
of analysing elementary statistical experiments, however, I found the exact opposite to be the
case.
ASA has a collection of rules that describe statistical methods. They are taken
directly from introductory textbooks. It has a small number of heuristic rules to guide model
selection and transformation of variables. In the past such rules were not stated explicitly in
Statistics textbooks, but even so it was not hard to discover them. With the advent of Ex¬
ploratory Data Analysis, that practice is changing, and several of the heuristic rules I thought I
had discovered are explicitly stated in [Mosteller 78]. When applied to the simple experi¬
ments which ASA is intended to be good at, these simple rules are astonishingly effective.
The planning algorithm that ASA uses is a straightforward one:
• pick a method which is relevant to the current goal
• check that the part of the experiment it refers to has the right structure
• ensure that the entities it refers to have the right types (setting up subgoals to
create suitably transformed variables if necessary)
• set up the method's subgoals
This bears a strong family resemblance to the Marples algorithm [Marples 74] used by
MECHO [Bundy et al76a],
That part of the inference engine which deals with ordinary Horn clauses is based on
David Warren's "Earley deduction" technique [Pereira & Warren 83].
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If the inference engine, major control structure, and rules are either taken from exist¬
ing work or easy to discover, what then was hard?
What mada writing ASA hard was developing a notation In which experiments could be
described and rules stated.
Chapters 2 and 3 describe the classification of measurements and the structure of
experiments because that is the most interesting thing about ASA, and the most innovative.
Three working statisticians with whom I have discussed this material have told me that they
are in basic agreement with it (but haven't checked the details, and are not responsible for
any of the mistakes), that bearing this formalism in mind would help them in their own work,
and even that they have learned something from it.
1.4. Outline of Contents.
When reading this volume, bear in mind that there was never any intention of produc¬
ing a program which could actually be used by naive clients. That would have involved
massive man/machine interface problems. To repeat the end of section 1.1, the goal of my
research was
• To discover what kinds of knowledge
• and what kinds of reasoning are needed to work out valid analyses for simple
statistical experiments,
• to determine what Al techniques are needed if a computer program is to perform
this task,
• and to explore techniques for efficient logic-based expert systems generally.
This volume concentrates on knowledge representation issues. A program, ASA,
was implemented, which was able to find valid analyses for simple experiments. This in¬
volved a planning strategy, a methodology for describing statistical methods, and an in¬
ference engine, none of which are described here as they are not directly concerned with
knowledge representation as such. Many of the algorithms described in this volume are not
used in ASA because simpler brute-force methods were adequate for small problems. They
have, however, been tested.
This work has two major divisions.
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1.4.1. Statistics
This division is about Statistics. It contains two chapters. It describes some of the
knowledge which went into the program ASA. The purpose of this division is to illustrate
some of the problems which face a knowledge engineer working in this area, and to motivate
the techniques described elsewhere in this volume. ASA uses other bodies of information as
well. For example, there is a lattice of goal types, and there are descriptions of statistical
methods. The techniques I developed to handle measurements and experiment structure are
capable of handling them. In order to keep the text to a manageable size, I do not describe
the goal types and method descriptions. The planning component of ASA is not described
because the algorithm is essentially trivial: nothing beyond [Warren 74] and [Bundy et al
79b] was needed.
1.4.1.1. Chapter 2
Chapter 2 describes the structure of the Statistics world (not the structure of
experiments) which should be useful for any sort of mathematical modelling. We have
• objects, classified by "descriptions"
• with components (other objects) and properties
• processes applied to objects and values produce measurements of properties
The approach is similar to frames, or to the Entity-Relation model in data base theory.
The bulk of the chapter describes the lattice of value spaces, the fundamental way
that measurements and variables are classified.
1.4.1.2. Chapter 3
Chapter 3 describes the structure of experiments. The approach taken in the chapter
is to treat an experiment as a process operating on streams of subjects, and to model this as
one would model a programming language. Each particular part of the notation is motivated
by an example showing a statistically meaningful distinction which must be made.
A practically important aspect of the notation is that if the substructure of part of an
experiment turns out to be unimportant, it can be left vague. So ASA can start with an
unspecified experiment, and refine it only as necessary.
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1.4.2. Al
This division contains four chapters. It describes techniques which were developed
for the "shell" which ASA runs under, called ABASE. (Pronounce this as "ay base".) The
major theme of this division is that lattices are a good basis for descriptions. Other aspects of
ABASE (such as the use of Earley deduction and annotations) are summarised in Chapter 8.
The point of this division is to answer the questions "How can I represent the kinds of
knowledge described in the first division? How can I interpret these representations
efficiently?"
1.4.2.1. Chapter 4
Chapter 4 is about "descriptions".
This chapter starts by pointing out some of the deficiencies of simple type systems,
and of MECHO. "Descriptions" are developed from a very primitive basis: the idea that there
are entities, there are descriptions, and there is a primitive relation "entity satisfies
description" between them which is defined by the knowledge engineer. Sets of descriptions
possessing some desirable properties turn out to be lattices.
I argue that "vague descriptions" may be a better approach to uncertain reasoning
than "certainty factors", as they attribute imprecision to perceptions rather than predications.
I show that a form of negation is available using descriptions which does not rely on
the closed world assumption, nor does it require an inference engine capable of handling
anything but Horn clauses.
This form of negation can be used to provide a logically consistent approach to
"defaults".
1.4.2.2. Chapters
This chapter presents a known learning algorithm, the "focussing algorithm". It is
relevant for three reasons.
• It would be useful if the conditions for using methods could be learned. Apart
from descriptions, ABASE uses function-free Horn clauses, and they can be
learned from examples, so it is interesting to know that descriptions can be
learned from examples as well.
• The fact that descriptions form a lattice was arrived at by considering specialisa¬
tion. The focussing algorithm is concerned with generalisation. It is interesting
that this route also leads to lattices.
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• Chapter 4 introduces description-to-description rules, and shows that the closure
of these rules again yields a lattice. This means that the focussing algorithm can
handle background information in the form of description-to-description rules,
which was not previously known.
1.4.2.3. Chapter 6
This chapter presents an algorithm for finding fixed points, and shows that its cost is
proportional to the size of the problem. This means that description-to-description rules can
be applied efficiently, provided the lattice of descriptions has finite depth. This approach is
also applied to forward chaining in sets of function-free Horn clauses.
1.4.2.4. Chapter 7
Chapter 4 argues that a single type tree is not adequate, and proposes a lattice
based approach with however many "aspects" the knowledge engineer finds convenient.
While type trees are not capable of bearing the whole burden of description, they are excel¬
lent for some aspects, and ASA has several of them (object types, goal types, method types).
It is therefore useful to handle type trees efficiently.
This chapter presents a dynamic node numbering method which makes it possible to
test whether one node in a tree is an ancestor of another node in constant time. This can be
used to perform some simple but useful inferences fast.
The method can also be combined with AVL trees or priority search trees to yield an
efficient data structure for multiple context data bases.
1.4.3. End Matter
1.4.3.1. Chapter 8
Chapter 8 summarises the contributions of the work, and presents directions for fu¬
ture research.
In order to keep this volume to a reasonable size, and to avoid distraction from the
main theme, several aspects of ABASE are not described in detail. These aspects include
the use of Earley Deduction (due to D.H.D.Warren) as the basis of the inference engine, the
treatment of negative information, the use of MECHO-like annotations on predicates, depen¬
dency maintenance, and "natural language" output generation. Chapter 8 summarises these
aspects. Negative information and dependency maintenance are also touched on in the main
body of the work.
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1.4.3.2. Appendix A
Appendix A describes how experiment structures are actually handled in ASA.
1.4.3.3. Appendix B
While doing the research which resulted in chapter 2, I discovered a new kind of
scale of measurement. Appendix B presents this scale, and a statistical method which uses
such measurements as explanatory variables.
1.5. Notation
The notation and terminology I use when talking about lattices are standard math¬
ematics. In particular,
X /\ Y is the greatest lower bound
X \/ Y is the least upper bound
I use 0 and 1 for the least and greatest elements of a lattice. (This comes from definition 1.8
in [Gierz 80].)
Some algorithms are written in the programming language C, and that code can be
typed into a computer and compiled as it stands. Others are given in a sort of "pidgin" which
is based on Algol 68 and on Dijkstra's notation. In particular,
X, Y, Z := el, e2, e3
if Test then True else False £i
while Test do WhileTrue od
are the forms of (parallel) assignment, of conditionals, and of loops respectively.
Statements of ordinary logic are written using the connectives '&' (and), T (or), '=>'
(material implication), '<=>' (biconditional) and (not), and the quantifiers '(Vx)' (for all) and
'(3y)' (there exists).
Other logical formulas appear in the text, using the connectives (and), (if-
then), and 'not'. Another connective is used which has no proper logical reading; the
formula
Hypotheses -?-> Conclusion
is to be read as "if the Hypotheses are true, it may be worth assuming that the Conclusion is
true as well, but be prepared to retract that assumption." Variables start with a capital letter,
and are universally quantified unless introduced by the quantifier 'yA' (there exists). These
are examples of the forms that ABASE interprets. The notation is to a large extent based on
Prolog, especially the rather odd notation for existential quantification.
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For typographic reasons, I use X «/« Y in text to state that X is not equal to Y.
The form "X Y" is to be read as "X is defined to be Y".
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This chapter describes part of ASA's basic representation structure. The next chap¬
ter describes how the structure of a statistical experiment is represented. This one is about
objects, measurements, and statistical variables, and what we might want to say about them.
It is important to realise that these two chapters are talking about statistical knowledge, about
the kinds of statements that an Expert System in this domain should be able to represent.
ASA also represents several things not discussed in this volume (such as goals and plans).
There are still other things (such as measurement and treatment processes) which ASA does
not represent, but which should be represented in a more capable program. Variable types
and experiment structure seem to be the irreducible minimum for reasoning about experi¬
ments.
The point of value spaces in ASA is to have method of classification from which all
the necessary statistical distinctions can be derived, yet which can be defined in terms that
make sense to the client irrespective of whether he intends to perform statistical calculations
on the results or not.
Chapter 4 develops a theory of descriptions which is based on the conventional Al
notion of a type hierarchy. The approach presented there may seem unnecessarily complex,
until you realise that it is needed to handle the approach to classification used in this chapter.
2.2. Objects, Properties, and Components




Statistical experiments are performed on material objects, or on related groups of
material objects. For example, a quality control experiment to determine the state of a bolt
manufacturing process will examine real bolts, or collections of bolts made at the same time.
My interest in Expert Systems for Statistics was awakened by seeing how often "social
scientists" misuse statistical packages; their experiments almost invariably work with human
beings. Census data deal with households, that is, with groups of human beings logically
related by having the same dwelling place.
It is not always the case that the objects which are studied have an independent
existence. A medical experiment might involve taking several blood samples from a patient
and doing different things to them. Before the samples were taken, they were all part of one
continuous stuff, and it would be nonsense to suppose that a particular millilitre of blood could
have been identified in advance. The distinction between "natural individuals" and
"selections from a continuum" is important both physically and practically. However, for the
elementary experiments and methods I have studied, it is acceptable to treat both kinds of
objects the same. From now on, the unqualified word object will always mean material ob¬
ject, irrespective of whether the object in question is a natural individual or a selection. The
word entitywill include material objects and individual objects of thought.
ABASE makes the unique name assumption. That is, it assumes that every entity
which must be considered in any particular experiment either possesses a name which the
client can supply or may be assigned a unique name from which a description can be
recovered which will enable the client to recognise the entity. A consequence of making this
assumption is that ABASE can check whether two entities are the same or distinct by check¬
ing the names it uses for them. It is up to the knowledge engineer using ABASE to formulate
his axioms so that this assumption is valid. For ASA this was no problem.
Objects belong to object types, which are arranged in an object taxonomy. For the
elementary experiments and methods I have studied, it is sufficient for the object taxonomy to
be a simple type tree (see Chapter 4 for a definition of this term), that is, a Linnaen style of
classification is appropriate. An object taxonomy is useful because objects belonging to the
same class (taxon) share many properties. They are said to inherit the shared properties
from the class. For example, it is obviously useful if a statistical Expert System needs only to
be told that the subjects of a particular experiment were dogs, and can then use general
knowledge about the properties of carnivores, mammals, animals, living things, and material
objects generally, to deduce that dogs can engage in a process calling running (of which
speed and distance covered are properties with known characters), that they have an inter¬
esting body temperature (again, a property with known characters), that they have ages,
weights, densities, and so on.
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Note that dogs inherit the property "body temperature" from the class "mammal".
They do not inherit the value of this property. Each mammalian species has its own charac¬
teristic body temperature. But different individuals, or the same individual at different times,
may have different body temperatures. ABASE does not distinguish between attributes
which are inherited and attributes which are not, but leaves it to the knowledge engineer to
formulate his axioms so that the right inheritances are made.
2.2.2. Samples
A sample is a finite collection of objects (called cases or sampling units), all belong¬
ing to a common object type, and having to some extent a common history. An experiment
may involve a single sample, or it may involve many samples of many kinds of objects. The
cases which were actually studied are the only ones that an experiment can yield definite
information about; extrapolation to other objects involves an act of faith. Chapter 3 describes
samples more fully.
2.2.3. Populations
A population is a possibly infinite set of real or potential objects. We very commonly
perform statistical experiments on small samples of objects in order to draw inferences about
larger sets of the same kind of object. A large part of Statistics is concerned with how such
inferences may be drawn and how unreliable the results are.
Establishing the validity of a generalisation is a subtle matter. Suppose we have a
sample of 30 psychology students from Edinburgh University, and we measure their average
"aggressiveness" according to some standard procedure. We can extrapolate this result to
the whole population of psychology students at Edinburgh University with some confidence,
provided we took care to take a random sample of students. But if the population we wanted
to generalise to was all of the students at Edinburgh University, our estimates are likely to be
biassed to an unknown amount in an unknown direction, and no amount of statistical reason¬
ing or calculation will help. Only studying a more broadly based sample will help.
The elementary statistical methods built into ASA fall into three classes:
• those which refer only to the sample actually studied (such as the "exploratory
data analysis" methods, which are basically tools for summarising the data)
• those which are valid inferences about the population provided the sample
studied was a random subset of the population of interest
• those which only use the sample as a probe to study the treatments, and require
the assignment of sampling units to treatments to be random
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ASA takes the client's word concerning randomisation. Chapter 3 shows how we can
represent the process of selecting the sample, that can sometimes reveal when the sample is
not a random sample, and also discusses some varieties of randomised treatments.
Reasoning about populations can be quite subtle. When we have a random sample,
one interesting population is the set of cases which could have been selected. Another
population is the sets of cases we want to make inferences about. There are other distinc¬
tions which can be made as well.
The main points of interest about a population are
• what kinds of objects are in it
• how many objects are in it; if the population has several kinds of object, how
many of each kind
• do the objects in the population exist regardless of whether we study them or not
• how do we find cases? Does the likelihood of our finding a case depend on its
properties?
ASA represents populations only in the very weak sense that it asks the client what
kind of object the sampling units are, and whether the sample constitutes the whole of the
population of interest, or several other possibilities. It does not represent populations as
explicit entities.
A full-scale Statistics Advisor should do so, especially if it were to help with census
problems, which are notoriously plagued by sampling problems.
2.2.4. Properties and Components
Objects have (at least) two kinds of attributes. I distinguish between attributes whose
values are other objects, which I call components, and attributes whose values are not ob¬
jects, which I call properties (simply for the sake of having some name). More precisely, let
T1 and T2 be object types, V be a value space (described later in this chapter, but think of it
as something like "temperature" or "mass"), and let R1 and R2 be two binary relations.
if Rl c Tl x T2, Rl is a component.
if R2 e n -> v, R2 is a property.
This distinction is in principle a difficult one to draw: do numbers "exist" or do they just
"describe"? There are two reasons why this is not a difficulty for ASA. The first is that it is
not ASA's responsibility to decide. The second is that conventional kinds of measurement
are always properties. A very important difference between components and properties is
that it is possible to identify a component without error while it is not possible to identify
properties without error. That is, for most practical purposes it does not make much dif-
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ference how we determine which breeder a particular white mouse came from, we will get the
same answer, and if we are wrong we are completely wrong, not just 5% out. While three
different methods of measuring the animal's length could give three different answers (not
converging no matter how often repeated) and yet agree quite closely.
When we provide a statistical expert system with "general knowledge", we want to be
able to say things such as
every object has a weight
every mammal has legs
every vertebrate has a head
Since we also want to say that
variable w measures the weight of entity3
the typical_member of sample7 is
the head of the typical_member of sample6
it would be natural to use second-order logic (as we want to use weight and so on as func¬
tions, and also to make statements about them as if they were individuals).
However, second-order logic is much harder to compute with than first-order logic.
Indeed, the logic supported by ABASE is function-free Horn clauses for the most part, which
particularly lends itself to efficient implementation. In the representation language, therefore,
we do not treat "weight" as a function, but as a constant of type "property". Nor do we treat
"head" as a function, but as a constant of type "component". Although properties and com¬
ponents are really functions and relations, treating them as individual objects of thought has
many advantages. For example, a client of ASA could request it to list any properties which it
can deduce a sample might possess but which have not yet been mentioned as being
measured in this experiment.
Treating functions as constants is a standard trick for getting some of the expres¬
siveness of second-order logic without leaving first-order logic. To make this work one has to
introduce a new form which expresses the application of a function to its argument. In ASA
there is an "application predicate" for properties, and one for components. For example, we
would write
X is an object -> YA(
property(X, weight, Y) &
Y is a physprop(mass,type_of(X))
) •
X is a vertebrate -> YA(
component(X, head, Y) &
Y is a head
) •
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The predication property(X,P,Y) represents the statement "Y is the P property of X". The
predication component(X,C,Y) represents the statement "Y is a C component of X". Now
there are some objects which are "components" of others in a sense, but are not physical
components. For example, you brother, if you have one, acts like a component of you (is
accessible through you, and is likely to share many properties with you), but is not physically
contained in you. The predication part(X,C,Y) represents the statement "Y is a C component
of X, and more than that, it is a physical part of X." 'part' is a specialisation of 'component',
expressed by the rule
part(X, C, Y) -> component(X, C, Y).
For a given component constant, say 'limb', we can tell ABASE that all such components are
parts by writing a rule like
X is an animal -> (
component(X, limb, Y) -> part(X, limb, Y)
) -
The fact that one object is a physical part of another object is important in Statistics.
There are two reasons for this. One is that the mass (or volume) of a part is bounded above
by the mass (volume) of the whole, so that the ratio of the two masses is a proportion. We
tell ABASE about these ASA rules by writing
physical_property(weight).
physical_property (volume) .
part(X, _, Y) &
physical_property(P) &
property(X, P, WX) &
property(Y, P, WY)
-> bounded_above_by(WX, WY).




quotient(MX, MY, Pr) % Pr = MX/MY
-> Pr is a proportion.
Logical containment is important for counts for the same reason. The second reason is that
parts of an object are typically subject to the same environmental influences as the whole
object. If, for example, we are examining the effectiveness of three treatments for baldness,
we would ideally like to apply each of the treatments to a different area of the same scalp.
ABASE could have provided a special notation for those components which are proper physi¬
cal parts, but since the description system in ABASE is based on lattices, and parts form a
lattice, it was possible to represent containment using existing means.
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2.3. Introducing Value Spaces
The bulk of this chapter is concerned with Value Spaces, that is, with the range of
properties. Thus length is an individual property, and so is height; both map an object into a
distance measure value space. Objects are arranged according to an object taxonomy.
Value spaces may be arranged into a taxonomy of their own. But I have found no need to
classify attributes per se in this way.
ASA's basic view of the world is that objects have attributes, and that statistical
variables are measurements of these attributes. The distinction between an attribute and a
measurement of it is not a purely philosophical one, important though the distinction is
philosophically. It has an important practical aspect as well: an experiment (such as a
calibration) may contain several variables measuring the same attribute of the same object.
In fact this view is astonishingly close to the Entity-Relation-Attribute [Chen 76, Chen
83]data model. Considering that the ERA model was developed to give a more natural
semantic description of data than other data base models, perhaps it should not be so
surprising. The coincidence of the names "entity" and "attribute" is just that, I only encoun¬
tered the ERA model while writing this volume.
Inheritance is quite important in the entity/attribute/measurement model. Entity types
are organised into a type system, and the knowledge engineer can specify attributes and
their characteristics at whatever level of the type system is most appropriate, with more
specific descriptions overriding less specific ones. (See Chapter 7.) For example, all and
only physical objects have weight, and this can be stated just the once. We say this in
ABASE by writing
X is a physical_object ->
YA (property (X, weight, Y) & ????).
where ???? stands for some statement about Y. Starting with section 2.5, this chapter ex¬
plains the (symbolic representations of) value spaces which fill in this blank.
Value spaces correspond to types in programming languages, or more accurately to
"dimensions" in physical equations. They describe two sorts of objects: attributes, and statis¬
tical variables. One of the most important rules in ASA is
measures(Attr, Var) ->
(the value_space of Attr is VS <->
the value_space of Var is VS).
whereby a statistical variable inherits a value space from the attribute it measures. When
and if ASA represents measurement processes, this rule will have to be replaced by some¬
thing which takes the approximate nature of measurement into account. And of course not all
variables measure intrinsic attributes of entities.
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An important thing to note is that (the symbolic representations of) value spaces in
ASA are not objects in their own right. They can be be combined in various ways, and
compared. They are elements of an infinite lattice. This in fact is the main reason for
ABASE's seemingly complicated type system. It is intuitively obvious that the "type" of a
variable is "like" the "type" of an object, even though the two do not overlap, and there are
infinitely many variable types and typically only finitely many object types. The benefits of
using a single mechanism for both are obvious. What was not obvious was that it could be
done. Finding out how the types of statistical variables could be handled was vital to ASA.
The lattice of value spaces is computed from the lattice of object descriptions. To
give a trivial example, count(<description>) is a value space for any obyecf-description, and
the lattice relation between two count spaces is the same as the relation between the two
descriptions they are based on. Thus count(species=orange) and count(species=apple) are
two different value spaces, neither of which subsumes the other. ASA will add apples to
oranges, and the result is count(species=fruit), not because this is built into a table of value
spaces, but because "fruit" is the common super type of apples and oranges in the object
taxonomy.
The impossibility of expressing this sort of relation in MBASE held me back for quite
some time.
2.4. The Traditional Classification of Value Spaces.
Statisticians commonly distinguish between six different "levels of measurement".
The original scheme, presented in [Stevens 46] had four. Other classifications are some¬
times used. The point of distinguishing between these different levels is to determine which
statistical methods make sense; a statistical method should never be used if the calculations
it performs (such as comparisons or additions or square roots or whatever) do not make
sense on the data.
One of the major reasons for having a package front-end such as ASA is that present
packages do not know what level of measurement their variables attain. To quote [SPSS 75]:
"The computer does not know what level of measurement underlies the numbers it receives,
and will process whatever numbers are fed into it. Thus, it is up to the user to determine
whether a particular technique is suitable for his or her data." I do not mean to imply that
SPSS is a bad package, on the contrary it is well thought of. But all too often the users of
such package do not understand the jargon of Statistics well enough to classify their vari¬
ables according to the traditional scheme. And I found to my surprise that the traditional
classification is not adequate to discriminate between many methods.
The traditional scheme is based on the question "under what mathematical opera-
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tions is this scale invariant". The scales which are commonly identified are nominal scales,
partially ordered scales, ordinal scales, ordered-metric scales, interval scales, and ratio
scales. We shall now examine each of these in turn.
2.4.1. Nominal scales.
The mathematical structure here is a finite set. That is, there are no order relations
between the values and no operations on them. All we can do is to tell whether two values
are the same or not, or to count the number of measurements with a particular value. Some
examples are
• gender (male, female)
• political party (National, Labour, Social Credit, Values, NZ)
• which programming language a program was written in.
2.4.2. Partially ordered scales.
The mathematical structure here is a finite partial order. The direction of the order is
of course arbitrary. My research for this chapter found that partial orders whose Hasse
diagram is a tree are often mistaken for ordinal scales. Appendix B discusses these scales,
and proposes the name "multi-metic scales" for them.
As an example of a partially ordered scale, consider Polynesian archaeology. There
is a "centre" to Polynesian culture, with migration of people and ideas outward. The various
Pacific islands can be regarded for some purposes as points in a partial order, where X<Y
when there was communication from X to Y. As we traverse a chain in this partial order, we
expect to see trends (e.g. pottery at all sites up to one, and on none thereafter). But the sites
cannot be arranged into a linear order.
2.4.3. Ordinal scales.
The mathematical structure here is a total order. The SPSS manual cites social class
as an ordinal scale (though I would regard it as a partial order). A common type of ordinal
scale is a human judgement of the intensity of some phenomenon, such as the severity of a
disease. Note that this is distinct from what the intensity is: the Beaufort Scale and the wind
speed have quite different properties.
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2.4.4. Ordered-metrlc scales.
These are usually explained as being scales where we can not only compare the
values, but we can compare the differences in the values. This is not strictly accurate, be¬
cause the differences as such are not explicitly represented. What we have is a total order
on the values together with a total order on the intervals, that is, given any two intervals [A,B]
and [C,D] we can tell whether one is "wider" than the other. Given any total order, inclusion
defines a partial order on intervals. The novelty of an ordered metric scale is that this partial
order can be refined into a total order.
Suppose we have an ordered metric scale with n values vv..vn. We can embed this
scale into the interval [0,1] by solving the following set of inequalities:
vi - 0
v1+1 = for i = 1.. .n-1
d± > 0 for i = 1. . .n-1
vn = 1
when [v^Vj] is bigger than [vp,vq] :
d±+. . .+d^ > dp+. . ,+dq_1
The distinction between an ordered metric scale and an interval scale is that these
inequalities may have more than one solution for an ordered metric scale.
Examination scores are sometimes cited as an example of ordered metric scales.
There is a ranking A,B,C,D,E, and one sometimes encounters claims that say [A,B] is a
narrower interval than [D,E]. Here of course there is usually an original mark in the range
0..100, and the letter score is an approximation to that mark. This seems to be characteristic
of ordered metric scales: they are (or are approximations to) numeric scores which the ex¬
perimenter cannot persuade himself are interval scales.
It is always valid to treat an ordered metric scale as if it were an ordinal scale.
2.4.5. Interval scales.
Interval scales are the weakest scales on which it makes sense to do arithmetic.
That is, as well as a total ordering relation, we have a difference operation, and the dif¬
ferences can be added and compared. Interval measurements can be well represented by
numbers, but a statistic computed on such a scale should be invariant under linear transfor¬
mations (f(aX+b) = f(X)) or covariant (f(aX+b) = af(X) or af(X)+b).
In thermodynamics, internal energy is an interval measure, because the zero point is
arbitrary. Temperature is more than an interval measure, because there is an absolute zero.
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2.4.6. Ratio scales.
Ratio scales are interval scales with a natural zero, so that we can take ratios of
values as well as differences. However, the size of the units (such as feet or metres) is still
arbitrary, so statistics computed on these scales should be invariant under change of unit
(f(aX) = f(X)) or covariant (f(aX) = af(X)).
2.4.7. Deficiencies of this scheme.
An obvious deficiency is its incompleteness: counts do not fit in anywhere. Counts
are even stronger than ratio level, because the size of the unit is fixed. And yet it is not true
that all the operations applicable to ratio scales are applicable to counts: the mean of the
counts {1,5,2,3} is 2.75 which is not a count. Or rather, it would be fair to say that this
classification does not distinguish between operations being applicable to a scale and a scale
being closed under those operations. Absolute scales are sometimes added to the list; but
counts and proportions are both absolute, yet means make sense for proportions but not for
counts.
Another distinction which this classification fails to capture is the distinction between
strictly positive scales such as the weights of physical objects and differences of such scales.
This is a very important distinction. Anyone taking the logarithm of a statistical variable
whose values might be zero or negative is asking for the trouble he will certainly get. Yet
there is a text book on regression which does this very thing! I have no doubt the author
checked scrupulously that the variable in question was a ratio variable, but that is not
enough. A commonly assumed distribution is the Normal or Gaussian distribution, but a
strictly positive variable cannot possibly have that distribution. Yet you'll see it used very
often for just such variables. Indeed, Physics students being introduced to the topic of errors
in measurements are all too often taught to assume that instrument errors follow the Normal
distribution. (Assuming that the logarithms of the measurements follow the Normal distribu¬
tion would make mathematical sense, would in many cases simplify the calculations, and
would give much the same results.)
Another distinction which is not made is the distinction between linear and periodic
measurements. For example, the current time measured as the number of seconds since
1/1/70 is a linear measurement, but the time of day as reported by a clock is periodic. If one
takes the definitions above, clock time belongs to none of the scale types, as 1pm is both
before and after 2pm. However, it is very easy to forget this, and to look at the clock time as
seconds since midnight and think that of course this is ordered, whereupon one mistakes
clock time for an interval scale, or even, should one forget that starting at midnight is ar¬
bitrary, for a ratio scale. The temptation to make this kind of mistake is very great if one is
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presented with the above list of six types of scale and told that this is how statisticians class¬
ify variables. Of course statisticians have studied periodic scales, and several useful
methods dealing with them are known.
An omission which is unfortunate for the human sciences is that permutations are not
considered, probably because they are not normally represented by single numbers. Yet a
common "measurement" in psychology is to ask the subject to rank a set in order of
preference, and what you get out of this is precisely a permutation. There are not many
methods for working with permutations, but there are some, in particular there are methods
for combining permutations from several subjects to obtain an overall preference scale. The
fact that we are dealing with permutations is often disguised by saying that we have a mul¬
tivariate problem, where each subject reported the rank he assigned to each of the k objects,
instead of saying that each subject reported a single permutation of the k objects. This fails
to take into account the strong relationship between numbers in the same row (reported by
the same subject) and the weak relation between numbers in the same column (pertaining to
the same object). There's another problem: ranks do not fit into the classical scheme either.
They are certainly ordered, but they're stronger than that. There is no transformation you can
apply to a set of ranks that makes any sense other than leaving them alone or reversing them
all. So ranks seem like counts. On the other hand, there is no arithmetic you can sensibly do
with ranks either; while you can sensibly divide by a count you cannot sensibly divide by a
rank.
Another missing distinction is between unbounded measures such as the distance
between stars, "naturally" bounded measures such as the height of human beings (where
there is a bound but we may not know it with any precision), and "formally" bounded
measures such as proportions and probabilities.
The worst problem with the conventional scheme is that it is difficult for clients to
apply it themselves. It is easy enough to tell whether a variable is quantitative (the numbers
mean something as numbers) or qualitative (the numbers are just labels), or is it? What if the
numbers are coarse approximations? If we have people's ages measured to the nearest 10
years, can we still consider that a ratio scale, or must we consider it as an ordinal scale? It
does not help that the answer can be different for different methods.
The point of ASA's value spaces is to have a method of classification from which
these distinctions can be derived, and which can be defined in terms that make sense to the
client irrespective of whether he intends to perform statistical calculations on the results or
not. The physicist's notion of "dimensions" is an obvious place to start.
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2.5. Classes of Value Spaces.
The rest of this chapter describes some classes of value spaces. The basic idea is
that the set of value spaces forms a lattice. Many of the lattice elements are incomparable
(e.g. counts and classifications have nothing in common). This lattice has a very rich math¬
ematical structure.
An important aspect of this lattice is that it is built using a small number of functions.
In particular, there are several (partial) functions from the object taxonomy (itself a lattice) into
the value space lattice, such as
count : object_type -> value_space
mass : object_type -> value_space
age : object_type -> value_space
These generalise physical dimensions.
There are also functions for combining value spaces.
Each value space is represented by a logical term. I define the lattice operations A
and V on these terms as each type of value space is introduced. The top of the lattice has
changed around as different abstractions have proven more or less useful. The current
scheme has four top-level classes:
• value_space: the top of the lattice of value spaces.
• discrete: all categorical measurements, including approximations. A subclass of
this, ordered_discrete, has been present or absent depending on whether I in¬
cluded ordinal scales or not. Currently ordinal scales are not represented, and
ordered_discrete is out.
• numeric: all value spaces on which arithmetic makes sense.
• positive: all strictly positive value spaces. Counts are a subclass of this.












I += [gorder (N) ]
I I
| +=approx (VS, N)
(Note 1)
(Note 3}
)-= [gorder (Description, N) ]
I
















| +=physprop (Attribute, Description)
I I























{Note 1} The [bracketed] lattice elements are just place-holders; ASA makes no actual use of
them. In particular, approximations are currently treated as if they were unordered.
{Note 2} An extremely important fact about this lattice is that it is determined by the data.
For each distinct subtype of "object", there is a corresponding distinct count(J value space,
and the count(J sublattice of value spaces is isomorphic to the sublattice of object types
(count(O) being defined as 0).
{Note 3} The recursion here is only apparent. An approximation to an approximation is an
approximation. Specifically,
approx(approx(VS,M) ,N) = approx(VS, min(M,N))
Note that this is not a rule expressed in ABASE, but is done by Prolog code which is "part of
the machinery". The whole lattice of value spaces is managed by Prolog code. ABASE
supplies some routines to manage lattice computations, but the fact that the knowledge en¬
gineer can supply his own computation rules is important.
{Note 4} countL) appears twice, under "positive" and under -count(J- This is because it is a
subtype of both types, neither of which is a subtype of the other. Each of the positive
numeric value spaces is a subtype of positive and of -(itself). See the description of the -
function.
{Note 5} The recursion here is real. The lattice of value spaces is therefore infinite.
Four points deserve stress:
• this is a lattice, not just a tree. It cannot be flattened into a tree without losing
information. This was the biggest problem with the first prototype of ASA, which
used MECHO's type system.
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• the lattice is generated from the lattice of object descriptions, which is partly
provided by the knowledge engineer and partly acquired at run-time.
• the lattice is infinite. The physicists' system of dimensional analysis is em¬
bedded in this lattice. Any "type system" for mathematical modelling needs to be
able to cope with dimensions.
• it can be shown that any particular consultation will only deal with a finite set of
lattice elements; calculations on lattice elements are not handled by general
rules but by special code which means that the calculations are efficient and
terminating.
2.6. Discrete Value Spaces
Recall that value spaces describe the range of properties in themselves, not our
measurements of them. Age is a continuous property; if we choose to record an approxima¬
tion of it with five levels that does not affect what an age is.
This may seem like quibbling, but in fact there are quite a number of statistical tests
for discrete variables which assume that there is an underlying continuous property. In order
to select appropriate methods for such variables we have to recognise that the property being
measured is continuous, but to avoid selecting /nappropriate methods we have to recognise
that the variable is discrete. These methods work on the discrete variables as variables. It is
not the nature of the calculations which demands an underlying continuous property. No, the
question is whether the results can be interpreted.
2.6.1. Classifications
The most fundamental kind of measurement is to take a look at something and say
what sort of thing you think it is. This is classification. Classification properties give rise to
nominal variables.
The clearest case is when we have a simple type tree, and we are given some
objects known to belong to a particular Taxon. If this Taxon has N immediate subtypes,
Sub-1 Sub-N, then classification will yield the name of one of these subtypes as the
measurement. Some examples, taken from [Everitt 77], are
attribute gender (male, female).
class(gender) is a binary value space.
attribute handedness (sinister, ambi, dexter).
class(handedness) has three unordered values.
35
attribute voting (voter (national, labour, socred),
abstainer, unregistered).
class(voting) has three unordered values.
The lattice of classifications
The basic description of a classification value space is
class(Description, Attribute, SetOfValues)
where Description is a consistent description2, Attribute is the name of an attribute, and
SetOfValues is a set of values belonging to that attribute, such that
for each V in SetOfValues,
"the Attribute of X is V" is consistent with
"X is Description".
for each V, W in SetOfValues such that V + W,
"the Attribute of X is V" is inconsistent with
"the Attribute of X is W".
That is, each of the values must be a possible value of the attribute for objects already known
to satisfy the description, and any object satisfying the description should be classified in at
most one class. This generalises the definition given above, in that the Values (subtypes)
need not be at the same level of the hierarchy. That is, if we have a full zoological taxonomy




as specifying a classification, despite the fact that they are
rabbit: infra-class = eutheria, order = lagomorpha,
genus = oryctolagus;
horse: infra-class = eutheria, order = perissodactyla,
sub-order = hippomorpha, genus = equus;
pig: infra-class = eutheria, order = artiodactyla,
sub-order = suiformes, genus = sus
respectively.
This raises a problem. The well-formedness condition requires the values to be
consistent with the description. It does not require them to be exhaustive. It might so happen
that in a particular experiment we have sampled three populations; one of rabbits, one of
horses, and one of pigs, so that each subject in the combined sample must fall into one of
these three classes. The representation of experiments used by ASA is such that in this
particular case there is enough information to deduce that the classification is exhaustive for
that experiment. Often, though, the classes listed will be exhaustive only because the ex¬
perimenter means to discard any subject which does not belong to one of these classes, so
zsee Chapter 4 for an explanation of what this means; for now think of it as a type in the usual sense
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that the population he has in mind is just the three types. My representation language is
incapable of representing this fact; if you say that the population contains rabbits, horses, and
pigs, the whole point of the lattice-based type system is that it will generalise to infra-
class-eutheria.
We have a lot of freedom in designing the lattice of classification value spaces. The
lattice I present here seems to work, but I do not claim that it is more than convenient. There
are three levels of description:
1. gclass(D, N)
is the weakest. It describes any classification of an object satisfying description D
into one of N values. We have
gclass(Dl, Nl) \/ gclass(D2, N2) =
gclass(Dl\/D2, Nl) if N1=N2
'discrete' otherwise
gclass(Dl, Nl) /\ gclass(D2, N2) =
gclass(D1/\D2, Nl) if N1=N2
0 otherwise
2. aclass(D, DA, V)
is the next weakest. It describes any classification of an object satisfying description
D, where the attribute being inspected is not named, but satisfies description DA, and the
range of possible values is V. This is useful for considering several similar classifications of
the same individual. We have
aclass(Dl, Al, VI) \/ aclass(D2, A2, V2) =
aclass(Dl\/D2, Al\/A2, VI) if V1=V2
gclass(Dl,#V1) \/ gclass(D2,#V2) otherwise
aclass (Dl, Al, VI) /\ aclass (D2, A2, V2) =
aclass(D1/\D2, A1/\A2, VI) if V1=V2
2b<0> otherwise
where #V is the number of values in the set V.
3. class(D, A, V)
is the strongest, and was described near the beginning of this subsection. A is an
attribute name. We have
class(Dl, Al, VI) \/ class(D2, A2, V2) =
Class(Dl\/D2, Al, VI) if A1=A2SV1=V2
aclass(Dl, §A1, VI) \/ aclass(D2, @A2, V2)
otherwise
class(Dl, Al, VI) /\ class (D2, A2, V2) =
Class(D1/\D2, Al, VI) if A1=A2&V1=V2
0 otherwise
where @A is the description that attribute A satisfies. (Since A is a constant at the time the
knowledge base is built, @A can be determined then, rather than during a consultation.)
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2.6.2. Approximations
For any continuous value space VS (even periodic ones like time of day), and for any
integer N greater than 1, there is a value space
approx(VS, N)
If we were being really strict, we would want to know not only how many classes
there were, but where the dividing lines were drawn. For example, the two measurements
• if more than 5 cigarettes smoked per day then 2 else 1
• if more than 20 cigarettes smoked per day then 2 else 1
are clearly different. Including the category limits in the description would lead to a lattice
very similar to the lattice for classifications.
However, for the experiments I studied, the choice of category limits had no effect on
which analysis method should be chosen. The number of categories does influence which
analysis method is chosen: if there are more than say 20 categories treating the variable as if
it were continuous is unlikely to lead to serious error, while if the number of categories is 2
there are several specialised techniques applicable.
approx(VSl, Nl) \/ approx(VS2, N2) =
appro*(VS1\/VS2, Nl) if N1=N2
'discrete' otherwise
appro*(VS1, Nl) /\ appro*(VS2, N2) =
appro* (VS1/WS2, Nl) if N1=N2
0 otherwise
appro*(appro*(VS, Nl), N2) =
appro*(VS, min(Nl,N2))
These equations, like the other equations defining lattice operations in this chapter,
are not presented by the knowledge engineer in the form of general rules, but as Prolog
clauses. Here are the actual clauses:
lub(approx(VSl,Nl), appro*(VS2,Nl), approx(VS,Nl)) !,
lub(VS1, VS2, VS) .
lub(appro*(_,_), appro* (_,_), discrete).
gib(appro*(VS1,N1), appro*(VS2,Nl), appro*(VS,Nl)) !,
gib (VS1, VS2, VS) .
normalise(approx(appro*(VS,N1),N2), approx(VS,N)) !,





There are some global defaults: if glb/3 fails, the gib is taken to be 0, the result of lub/3 or
glb/3 is always normalised, if normalise/2 fails, the result is taken to be 0. You are to under¬
stand all the rules for V and A and so on in this chapter as standing for Prolog clauses like
this. Prolog seemed at least as clear as any special ad-hoc notation for this task.
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Note that it approx(Dom, L1) and approx(Dom, L2) appear in the model, where
L1 =/= L2 we are entitled to ask the client what he thinks he is playing at. An example of this
happening in practice is a biological experiment that a friend of mine analysed. As blackbirds
grow up, their eye-rings and beaks change colour. The yellowness of a blackbird's beak was
measured on a five-point scale, while the yellowness of its eye-ring was measured on a
3-point scale. This meant that the two variables could not be compared! Simply taking a
colour photograph of each bird, and comparing the relevant parts with a standard colour chart
would have given a common scale for both.
We can express this check as a "negative rule" or demon:
<- VI is an approx (VS,N1) &
V2 is an approx(VS,N2) &
VI is not an approx(VS,N2).
That is, if there are two statistical variables which are both approximations to some VS and
they do not have exactly the same type (the third conjunct can only succeed if N1 and N2 are
unequal), this demon will fire. In fact the rule should not be quite so strict, because the client
may in fact have such data, so we would write
<- VI is an approx(VS,N1) &
V2 is an approx(VS,N2) £





write('You have two different approximations'), nl,
write('to the same underlying value space.'), nl,
\+ yesno('Did you really mean this').
Curly braces enclosing a conjunct mean that it is a Prolog goal. Such a goal is invoked once
all its "input" arguments are known and type checked. Prolog escapes are very useful, but
they are unfortunately invisible to the dependency maintenance subsystem.
I originally built this test into the normalise(approx(... clauses, but this was a bad idea,
because it was not possible to correct the problem by modifying the description of the older
variable, and it didn't allow the analysis of the blackbird experiment. One of the design goals
of ASA from the start was to permit the specification of advice for the client like this.
When L1 = L2, we assume that approx(Dom,L1) and approx(Dom,L2) are the same.
This is not necessarily true, but a problem where it is not is probably beyond mechanical aid.
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2.6.3. Ordered Value Spaces
I have not been able to think of any ordered discrete value spaces (apart from
counts, vide infra) which are not really approximations to some stronger value space. A day
may be described as rainy, drizzly, or clear. But that is an approximation to "the amount of
rainfall", and is not really a classification at all. A patient may be described as "well, poorly,
sick, very ill, dangerously ill", but there is clearly something like "degree of risk/probability of
unaided recovery" going on here which we would measure if we could. Some very popular
human sciences properties are of this sort. Socio-economic status (class) is a portmanteau
property which gives you a rough guess at the subject's schooling, nutrition, exposure to
disease, ... all of which the researcher would rather have if only he could measure them.
The ever-popular "number of years in secondary education" is another. A common feature of
this sort of measurement is that it is a combination of several aspects of the subject, weighted
no-one knows how, and has between 3 and 7 levels.
Here is an example from [Everitt 77], The subjects are people, and the measure¬
ments are Age (a time) recorded as under/over 40 years, and the number of cigarettes
smoked (count(cigarettes)/time) recorded as less/more than 20/day. These values can
clearly be ordered, and if there were more classes it would not make much difference. In
fact, it is almost certain that the age was recorded to the nearest 5 years or even more
accurately, and the cigarettes/day recorded to the nearest 5/day or so, and the dichotomisa-
tion has been done for the benefit of the analysis. If we had the raw data, we might be able
to fit a more specific model and make stronger conclusions.
An extreme case of this is where some feature of the subject is recorded as present
or absent. Again from [Everitt 77], psychiatric patients were classified as psychotics or
neurotics, and examined to see whether or not suicidal feelings were present. The first
variable is clearly a classification, and the second variable a dichotomisation of "degree to
which suicidal feelings are present". At first sight, it looks as though we have an illustration of
the fact that class(X) variables are plausible explanatory variables. Unhappily, the presence
or otherwise of suicidal feelings may well have been used to diagnose these patients, so it is
as legitimate to treat it as explanatory and "diagnosis" as that to be explained.
The best way to treat so-called "ordinal" variables that I can think of is to explicitly
introduce the value space being approximated, and to include in the model the fact that the
property being investigated has values in that value space, then to introduce approx(Domain,
Levels) as the value space of the outcome of the measurement process. Some properties
should be inherited from Domain, but others from the fact that the approximation is discrete.





points in the lattice, where SetOfValues is just a list of words. The reason that 'order' is not in
the current version of ASA is the difficulty of finding an interpretation for the SetOfValues. In
'class', the SetOfValues is a set of taxa, a concept already in ABASE. But with 'order', the
SetOfValues has no other connection with ASA's knowledge.
In the experiments I have studied, omitting 'order* has only caused trouble with socio¬
economic status.
2.6.4. Locations
If we define a "place" as being a compact3 subset of the three-dimensional universe,
it is clear that places cannot in general be arranged in a linear order. They can however be
ordered by inclusion; Hope Park Square is included in Edinburgh which is included in Scot¬
land. So locations are an instance of partially ordered scales. In fact they are something
stronger: taking union for V and intersection for A, it is a theorem of topology that places form
a lattice. This is not to say that any particular list of named places is a lattice; some of the
unions and intersections might not have names. So places in general are lattices, a set of
named places is a partial order.
At first sight, experiments are seldom concerned with overlapping places. We might
record which of three districts a particular rat was trapped in, or which of several schools a
class came from. It might seem that locations were basically just a form of nominal variable.
However, a great many experiments are vitally concerned with overlapping places. Agricul¬
tural experiments often have this character. We might have three experimental farms in
different parts of the country. In each farm, we might have a dozen fields. In each field, we
might have 50 plots, viewed as 10 columns by 5 rows. The inclusion relations between these
places are important.
place(Description) is a value space provided "X is a place" is consistent with "X is
Description".
place(D1) A place(D2) = place(D1 A D2)
place(D1) V place(D2) = place(D1 V D2)
We've now finished with discrete value spaces.
3closed and bounded
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2.7. Numeric Value Spaces
2.7.1. Counts
Counts are very important indeed. Even in an experiment where counts are not
explicitly mentioned, they turn up during the calculations. For example, if we calculate the
sample probability of something, that is a ratio of counts.
For any description, count(Description) represents the value space of counts of en¬
tities satisfying that description.
count(D1) Acount(D2) = count(D1 A D2)
count(D1) V count(D2) = count(D1 V D2)
Counts are quite strange in many respects. They are discrete yet numeric. They are
positive, yet unlike most positive attributes a count of 0 makes sense and may actually be
measured. There are methods (such as the double root transform or taking square roots) for
transforming counts into general numeric measurements with pleasant properties (such as
approximating the normal distribution).
Counts are fundamental in the analysis of discrete data.
2.7.2. Physical Properties












Thus one measurement might be described as having dimensions
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[(baryon number)/(solid angle) (time)],
and another as having dimensions
[(mass)(length)/(time)A2] .
Many of these dimensions are fairly exotic, such as "spin". Electric current can be
regarded as derived from electron flux, so can be described in my notation as
-count (unit_charge) /physprop (time, true)
The dimensions of main interest in Statistics are mass, length, time, and temperature. This is
not a fundamental characteristic of Statistics as such, but a reflection of its origins and
present use in the study of biological systems. Psychological experiments are much con¬
cerned with constructed scores such as measurements of "aggression", "orality", and the like,
each of these scores constitutes another dimension.
An interesting thing is that physics (and conventional descriptions of statistical
measurements) fail to distinguish between basic physical measurements and differences of
physical measurements. In fact, the only reasonably direct measurements I can call to mind
which yield negative as well as positive values are measurements of voltage, current, and the
like. If we measure the mass of some object, we never ever obtain a negative number. But
the difference between the masses of two objects may be either positive or negative.
Similarly, if we are measuring radioactive decay, we might use a Geiger counter, and no
matter how long or short a time we operate the counter it will never indicate a negative
number of events. No human being has a height of -72", not even dead ones.
It is very important to distinguish between measurements which are strictly positive
(such as heights, masses, ages) and measurements which can take either sign. It makes
sense to take logarithms of the former, but not the latter. The latter may be modelled by a
Normal distribution but not the former.
To allow for the fact that it may be convenient to take some other measurements as
primitive dimensions, I have a class of entities called "physical_dimensions". In ASA, only
'mass', 'length', 'time', and 'temperature' belong to this class. For any object description D
and physical_dimension P,
physprop(P, D)
is a value space containing only positive values. The order relations are
physprop(PI, Dl) \/ physprop(P2, D2) =
physprop(Pi, Dl\/D2) if P1=P2
'positive' otherwise.
physprop(PI, Dl) /\ physprop(P2, D2) =
physprop(PI, D1/\D2) if P1=P2
0 otherwise.
Like all the value space constructors, physprop is strict in its description argument. That is,
physprop(P,0)=0 for any P.
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ASA does not really understand time. Time as a measurement is treated exactly like
length as a measurement, and the only distinction currently made between the duration of
some activity and the interval between two events is that one is strictly positive and the other
is a difference. Time within an experiment is represented only as structure; ASA does not
reason about the time it takes to perform an experiment. If we are measuring the heights of
children, it makes a difference whether the children are in the experiment for five hours or five
years. ASA is blind to this difference.
2.7.3. Directions
An extremely important class of measurements, which is missing from the classical
set and is totally ignored by most packages, is directions. A direction is simply a point in Sn,
the n-dimensional sphere. In the plane, a direction is an ordinary angle. An experiment
recording the direction in which various pigeons from the same cot fly would produce such a
measurement. In space, a direction might be recorded as angle and elevation, but it is
nevertheless a single entity, and analysing the two recorded numbers separately would be a
mistake.
ASA does not know any methods for handling directions. But that is not the point.
The point is that treating a direction (a cyclic measure) as if it were a linear measure like a
distance is totally wrong. The idea of ASA is not to analyse every kind of experiment, but to
analyse some experiments, never to produce an invalid analysis, and to have at least been
useful as a preliminary screening when it cannot handle a problem.
In fact there are several methods known for handling cyclic data, and the only reason
that no such methods were added to ASA's method base was that no new knowledge
representation or inference principles seemed to be required.
Directions are continuous, and arithmetic operations are definable on them, but they
are not ordered.
2.8. Derived Scales.
We can do arithmetic on numeric measurements. However, the results may have
different properties from the original measurements. Indeed, we often perform transfor¬
mations to exploit this.
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2.8.1. Addition
A basic assumption that I have made is that the sum of two measurements of a given
type belongs to that type. This is expressed as the rule
the value_space of Sum is VS <-
sum(A, B, Sum) &
the value_space of A is VS &
the value_space of B is VS.
This is not always strictly true. For example, if V1 is the length of a subject's left leg,
and V2 is the length of the subject's right leg, then this would ascribe the type "length of
(some) leg" to V1+V2. This of course is not right; we might have a rule that says that the
length of human legs is bounded above by 1m (or whatever), but the sum of two such num¬
bers could easily exceed this bound. The answer to this is that bound information should be
inherited from properties to the variables that measure them, and not from one variable to
another. In fact ASA does not handle bounds, so the problem did not arise. If it did handle
bounds, we would have to interpret a type such as "length of leg" not as meaning the length
of some particular leg, but as standing for any weighted combination of such measurements
with positive weights. Indeed, we have to use such an interpretation if we are to regard the
mean or standard deviation of a variable as having the same type as the variable.
2.8.2. Differences
If D1 is a positive value space, -(D1) is the value space of differences, obtained by
taking two variables over D1 and subtracting one from the other. The interesting thing about
-(D1) is that the 0 point is meaningful. So if D1 is a general numeric value space, -(D1) is
also defined. Even if D1 has no meaningful 0 point, -(D1) has. The question is, whether
there are any numeric value spaces without a meaningful 0 point. It is customary to cite
temperatures as a counter-example, but they are not. The Celsius temperature scale does
have a meaningful 0, it just happens to be -273.16 degrees C. So interpreted, temperatures
are in fact strictly positive. Other seeming counter-examples are usually better regarded as
ordered things that have been arbitrarily mapped to numbers. We must be careful to treat
cyclic numeric value spaces (angles and dates) specially: they have no zero point, but neither
is addition defined on them. (Differences are.)
The sum or difference of two differences is a sum of differences, so we do not need
to iterate the difference constructor.
-(Dl) /\ - (D2) = -(Dl /\ D2) .
-(Dl) \/ - (D2) = -(Dl \/ D2) .
Differences are the first example where we see operations on value space represen¬
tations other than the lattice operations. There is a unary function, -, which satisfies
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- (D) « -(D)
- (-D) - -(D)
for D a positive value space. (The notation is similar to arithmetic, where -2 is a negative
number, as -(D) represents a value space of differences, while - -2 is the unary minus applied
to the negative number -2, as - (D) represents the operator - applied to the value space
D.) The "differences of" operatoris obviously monotone in its argument.
We still have to work out what the lattice relations between a positive value space
and its differences are. Fortunately, inclusion gives us the answer. If D is a positive value
space, then
D /\ -D = D
D \/ -D = -D
That is, is something is both strictly positive and a difference, then it is strictly positive, while if
it is strictly positive or a difference, it is at least a difference.
This lets us say what the type of a difference is in one rule:
difference(A, B, Diff) &
the value_space of A is VO &
the value_space of B is VO &
VS < -VO
-> the value_space of Diff is VS
If we have the following variables:
the value_8pace of kl is count(species=pig).
the value_space of k2 is -count(species=hippopotamus).
difference(kl, k2, k3).
it follows by the definitions of A and V given so far, together with the axioms of lattice theory,
that
the value_space of kl is -count(species=artiodactyl) &
the value_space of k2 is -count(species=artiodactyl)
is true, from which we can deduce that
the value_space of k3 is -count(species=artiodactyl).
We would obtain the same result even if k2 was not a difference.
The fact that we can write this rule so simply is pleasant. But it might look as though
it does something strange to our type system. It forces us to regard -D as being vaguer than
D, that is if we deduce that the value space of some variable is -D at one time, and D at a
later time, that's ok and the answer is D. Yet when people write experiments up in textbooks,
we generally find the physical dimensions of a variable mentioned first, as the more general
information, and only learn that it is a difference when we see how it is calculated. So it
would appear that being a difference is a more specific property.
46
However, the paradox is only apparent. For a difference could well be positive.
Indeed, if we consider the expression V1+V2-V1 where V1 and V2 are both strictly positive,
the expression must be strictly positive, yet it will be given a difference type. Less trivially, if
V1 (say the body weight of an animal) is necessarily greater than V2 (say the brain weight of
the animal), it is obvious that V1-V2 must be strictly positive, yet it requires greater reasoning
power than ASA possesses to detect this.
There is an unfortunate consequence of this. If a variable follows the normal distribu¬
tion, it must be capable of taking on both positive and negative values. So if a variable is
known to be strictly positive, it cannot possibly follow the normal distribution, and it would be
a good idea to apply some sort of transformation. But the representation presented here
provides no way of saying that negative values are known to be possible. We simply cannot
say in ABASE:
if the value space of V is -D and
the value space of V is not D then
the normal distribution is a possible distribution for V
Instead, we have to code this as a default rule
the value space of V is numeric -?->
candidate_distribution(V, normal).
(if the value space of V is numeric, it is worth assuming that V might follow a Normal distribu¬
tion, but more information may contradict this assumption) and a negative rule
the value space of V is positive &
candidate_distribution(V, normal) ->
false.
(it can never be the case that V is strictly positive and might have a Normal distribution).
This would be a serious defect, were it not for the fact that the normal distribution has
to be a default anyway. There are lots of other things which can make the normal distribution
a bad assumption. Nor is the assumption always indefensible: if the bulk of the measure¬
ments are concentrated far enough away from 0, the normal distribution may actually be quite
a good numerical approximation to the true distribution of a positive variable, and the prob¬
ability it assigns to negative values may be negligible.
If this proved to be a serious limitation, we could simply extend the lattice, having
below -(VS) a subtype ~(VS) of variables which are known not to be strictly positive.
2.8.3. Products
The basic dimensions of physics, M(ass), L(ength), T(ime), and l(current) correspond
in my analysis to difference value spaces, -physprop(mass,true), -physprop(length,true),
-physprop(time,true), and -count(charge)/physprop(time,true). Physical dimensional analysis
considers products and powers of dimensions. So must we.
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If D1 arid D2 are positive value spaces, so is D1*D2. The laws are
(D1 * D2) /\ (D3 * D4) - (D1/\D3) * (D3/\D4)
(D1 * D2) \/ (D3 * D4) - (Dl\/D3) * (D3\/D4)
(-D1) * D2 « -(Dl * D2)
D1 * (-D2) « -(Dl * D2)
D1 * D2 «= D2 * Dl if and only if Dl = D2.
The last rule looks very strange. Unfortunately, if we try to make the product of value spaces
commutative, we do not obtain a lattice. For consider
count(species = horse) * count(species = pig) /\
count(sex = male) * count(sex = female).
Is this to be
count(species = horse & sex = male) *
count(species = pig & sex = female)
or
count(species = horse & sex = female) *
count(species = pig & sex = male) ?
When D1 and D2 are incompatible, as when we have lengtlTtime, then they could commute,
but when the client can give us vague descriptions we may never have enough information to
decide whether they can commute or not. This is not particularly pleasant.
We can use DAk, where k is a known non-negative integer, as an abbreviation in
source code for D*...*D.
At first sight it looks as though there would be something to gain by representing
powers differently from products. For if k is even, DAk must be positive whether D is or not,
while D*D might represent the product of two variables, one of which happens to be positive
and the other negative. In practice, there is not all that much to gain; the main reason for
being interested in powers is that taking the Nth root is often a useful transformation, and we
are only interested in doing that when the result must be strictly positive. (Nth root is a
function from positive numbers to positive numbers; it is not a function from positive numbers
to reals.) Furthermore, if we cued "taking the square root" off lengthA2 and not off
lengttTlength, we would seldom or never consider taking the square root of an area.
2.8.4. Ratios
If D1 is a numeric value space, and D2 is a positive numeric value space, D1/D2 is
also a value space. The idea that miles/gallon is a different value space from feet/second is
an old and useful one. The practice in physics is to take feet/second as length.time"1 and
miles/gallon as length-2. I take this approach a step further, and do not cancel the dimen¬
sions. So instead of regarding miles/gallon as length-2, I would regard it as length/length3,
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and would not consider the floor area of a house (length2) as belonging to the same value
space as the number of gallons of aviation fuel consumed per mile flown by an aeroplane
(length3/length). Furthermore, because the different amount(Js are distinguished,
distance/volume(petrol) is a different value space from distance/volume(water).
This is particularly important when we consider proportions, which have the general
pattern D1/D2 with D1 and D2 being specialisations of the same value space. Thus we do
not regard count(sheep)/count(sheep) as being the same as count(goats)/count(goats),
though both are specialisations of count(herbivores)/count(herbivores). And a proportion
based on counts can be distinguished from a proportion based on continuous measures,
such as weight/weight. This is important because the two kinds of proportion have dif¬
ferences which may be vital: if we have a sample of N sheep, and are concerned with the
proportion of the sample suffering from foot-rot, the statistic can only take the values
{0,1/N,...,(N-1)/N,1}, whereas if we have the lung weight/body weight for a sheep, it may take
on any value within a range I am not biologist enough to quote. If N is big, the difference can
be ignored, but there is another effect. A proportion based on counts may well be measured
without error. If the counts are rounded to multiples of say 10, we might as well treat them as
continuous (but approximated), but it is not uncommon for counts in the hundreds to be
accurate. On the contrary, it is rare for a continuous variable to be measured with more than
1% accuracy, and we should make it a general rule to ask what the accuracy is.
The calculation rules for ratios are similar to the rules for products. There is an
interesting point. We would like to warn the client whenever there is the possibility of division
by zero. But we cannot do this by looking at the value space: it is not possible to distinguish
between (-VS1)/VS2 and VS1/(-VS2). Instead, the demon involved notices whenever a divi¬
sion is called for rather than when a ratio exists:
<- quotient(X, Y, Z) &
Y is not positive &
{warn_about_zero_divide (X, Y, Z) }.




write(Z = X/Y), nl,
write('Watch out for division by zero.'), nl,
fail.




The proportion of subjects who are in favour of cruise missiles is obviously a ratio:
count(humanswants_cruise=yes)/count(human).
So is the concentration of hydrochloric acid in a solution:
mass(fluid£substance=HCl)/mass(fluid).
But knowing that these values belong to these ratio types only tells us that they are
positive. Proportions are bounded above by 1. They are very important in Statistics, as
probabilities are proportions. There are transformations which one would only apply to
proportions.
The difference between a proportion and a ratio is that the numerator of a proportion
is contained in the denominator; whatever the numerator measures is part of what the
denominator measures. There are many cases where the form of the experiment makes it
easy to detect this.
As the second example shows, whether something is a proportion or not is relevant
to attributes, unlike the distinction between continuous attributes and measurements which
approximate them discretely.
So for any two "amount" value spaces D1, D2 where D2 includes D1,
proportion(D1,D2) represents a value space. The rules for combining proportions using the
lattice operations have to maintain this property of the numerator D1 being a special case of
the denominator D2, hence all the extra As in the first argument of proportion. The rules are
proportion(D1,D2) \/ proportion(D3,D4) =
proportion((Dl\/D3)/\(D2\/D4), D2\/D4)
proportion(D1,D2) \/ D3/D4 =
(D1\/D3)/(D2\/D4)
proportion(D1,D2) /\ proportion(D3,D4) =
proportion(D1/\D3, D2/\D4)
proportion(D1,D2) /\ D3/D4 =
proportion(D1/\D3/\D4, D2/\D4).
Similarly, when we calculate
D := proportion(D1,D2)
D gets bound to proportion(D1AD2, D2).
It is possible to handle solid angles by regarding them as proportions. For example,
instead of saying that a measurement was 1.5pi steradians, one can regard it as 3/8 of a
sphere. This dodge works in any number of dimensions. In particular, there are two senses
of "angle" which need to be distinguished. An angle which measures a direction is a cyclic
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measurement; adding any multiple of 2pi to it leaves its meaning unchanged. But the angle
subtended by some object is bounded below (by 0) and above (by 2pi) and so is best
regarded as a proportion. As an example of the non-triviality of the difference: the directions
0 and 2pi are identical, but an empty sector and a full disc are dramatically different.
2.9. Pattern Matching and Lattices.
The simplest way to state a rule about addition is to say that the sum of two variables
belongs to the same value space that they do. So one might write
sum(A, B, Sum) £
the value_space of A is VS £
the value_space of B is VS
->
the value_space of Sum is VS.
Given the following facts:
sum(v21, v37, v49).
the value_space of v21 is count(species=apple).
the value_space of v37 is count(species=orange).
we would expect to be able to deduce that
the value_space of v49 is count(species=fruit).
However, implementing this in the obvious fashion is not going to work. What we have to do
is to take each repeated description, generate new variables for all the occurrences on the
left hand side, and add a least-upper-bound function. Thus the rule as coded would be
sum(A, B, Sum) £
the value_space of A is VSa £
the value_space of B is VSb £
VS = VSa\/VSb
->
the value_space of Sum is VS.
Why did this problem fail to appear in MECHO? For the simple fact that MECHO
rules could not contain variables whose values were descriptions, or at any rate were not
supposed to.
2.10. Examples
This section presents two examples. They show how knowing exactly what sort of
measurement you have can be useful.
ASA is meant to provide assistance to naive clients. While it lacks the linguistic and
instructional skills necessary to cope with real clients, my main concern is with knowledge
representation and use, so that is not currently a problem. One of the tasks consultants have
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to perform is to assist the client to formulate his goals. Very often the client has no clear idea
of what he expects to learn from his experiment. That is not always stupidity.
The current design of ASA provides a limited amount of assistance merely by having
a taxonomy of goals, and letting the client walk through the taxonomy to find something he
thinks useful. I have stated elsewhere that ASA is intended to eliminate the practice of blindly
searching through the SPSS manual looking for a Procrustean bed into which the data may
be forced. This appears to be re-introducing that very practice. In a sense it is, but the space
of goals from which the client may choose is very small, and the nature of the goals should
be intelligible to the client. When the client picks a method from the SPSS manual, he may
be totally unaware of what goal the method is intended for.
One of the high-level goals which ASA recognises is fitting a model. This means
expressing one of the client's variables in terms of other measured variables and an uncon¬
trolled error. Naive clients are particularly likely to need help formulating such a model. A
model must have two properties: there must be a statistical method which can be used to fit
the model, and the model should make sense. The client is unlikely to know what models
can be fitted, and it is amazing how many Statistics textbooks fit models which make no
sense.
Of the two examples, one involves "modelling" (summarising) a single variable, and
the other involves explaining one variable in terms of another.
2.10.1. Rain-drops Keep Falling on my Head
This example comes from page 51 of [Velleman 81], where the authors are explicitly
describing the use of transformations to reshape a data set. The data are the amount of
rainfall at Minneapolis/StPaul during March for 30 successive years. The goal is to sum¬
marise the data, and it happens that data are best summarised when their histogram is
symmetric.
The task, then, is to find a "suitable" transformation for the data. Now the data are
volumes, that is, the value space of the measurements is
length(water) * length(water) * length(water)
There are three rules relevant to this task. Simplified, they are
candidate_power(X, 1) <-
candidate_power(X, 0) <-
the value_space of X is positive
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candidata_powar(X, P) <-
the velue_space of X is D £
is_power(D, K) £
reciprocal(K, P)
(This is not the place to discuss power transforms, or what the numbers mean. Suf¬
fice it that they are a standard family of transforms widely used in Statistics.)
The first rule says that the raw data are always interesting.
The second rule say that taking the logarithm (that is what power transform 0 does) is
interesting when the data are strictly positive. Here "positive" does not stand for a particular
measurement class; "length(water) is positive" is true even though the left-hand side is not an
instance of the right-hand side. Chapter 4 explains how this works. The possibility of having
generalisations like this which are not just syntactic generalisations is one of the major
reasons for my new type system.
The third rule says that if the physical dimensions of some measurement are ex¬
pressible as a Kth power of a simpler kind of measurement, taking the Kth root is interesting.
The "is_power" calculation has to be programmed by hand; the possibility of integrating such
calculations into the type system without destroying its monotonicity is also one of the great
benefits of my new type system.
These three rules suggest summarising the raw data, the logarithm, and the cube
root. It is important to realise that these rules were not created for this example, but are
general rules applying to all transformation goals, and were first added to ASA to handle
other examples. There are several other transformation methods known to ASA which are
specialised for measurement types such as counts and proportions. They do not apply in this
particular case.
It turns out, when applied to the data, that the cube root transform does very well
indeed, the cube roots of the rainfalls being very close to a Normal(1.14,0.23) distribution.
It is interesting to quote from [Velleman 81]. We reached these three transformations
by looking at the type of the measurement, not by looking at the numerical values. In
[Velleman 81] the authors are describing how to pick a transformation by performing certain
calculations on the numerical values. Presented with this problem, they "fire a transfor¬
mational shot-gun" at it, trying about 6 different commonly useful transformations in the hope
of finding a good one. They say
We might try a power between [square-]root and log, such as the 1/4 power, but this batch
has only 30 data values - too few for such fine discriminations. If we had to choose among
re-expressions listed in Exhibit 2-4 [the L-V displays], we might select the square root for its
simplicity. (Some meteorologists have found the 1/3 power quite desirable.)
The point is, we got to the 1/3 power straight away, without being seduced by square roots or
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retarded by reciprocals. We would certainly have looked at the tog transformation, but might
not have bothered fitting the raw data. So with 2 expressions to check, we would have found
a transformation that meteorologists apparently like, while [Velleman 81] examined 4 expres¬
sions without finding it.
2.10.2. Weisberg's Brains
This example comes from [Weisberg 80], a well known text-book. The subjects are
animals (in fact "typical" individuals from some 60 mammalian species), and the two
measurements are the weights of these animals' brains and the gross weights of their bodies.
The two measurements, Brain and Body, both have type
physprop(mass, a brain of a mammal)
Since both variables are continuous, the kind of model we are looking for has the form
f(Brain) = a*g(Body) + b + Error
where f and g are some transformations, to be decided on by us, and a and b are numerical
coefficients to be estimated by regression from the numerical results of the "experiment".
The same rules that were presented in the previous section apply again, though this
time neither measurement is a power of anything. (If brain volume had been measured, that
would have been a different story!) Accordingly, there are four models suggested:
(1) Brain = a*Body+b
(2) Brain = a*log(Body)+b
(3) Brain = bA(a*body)
(4) Brain = b*bodyAa
Only two of these models (1 and 4) are at all attractive. We can eliminate (2) and (3) by
insisting that when two variables of similar type appear in a model they should undergo the
same transformation. Variables of similar type will always have the same candidate transfor¬
mations , so there is no difficulty in finding similar transformations.
We are thus led to models (1) {always try the raw data) and (4) quite directly. It
happens in this example that model (4) is exactly the right model to took for. Indeed, there is
a rule of thumb in biology [Peters 83] that in animals of the same general type and develop¬
mental stage, the size of two body parts will usually be related by a power law
<size of part 1> = b*<size of part 2>Ab
There was no need to add this specific rule to ASA since it falls out of the general principle
that taking the logarithm of strictly positive measurements is interesting.
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2.10.3. Comment
Note that the information we needed in these two examples was the kind of infor¬
mation the client is likely to be able to supply. Instead of asking "is Rainfall a discrete/ratio/...
variable", the client can say (clumsily) that it is a volume of water. All the statistical infor¬
mation we need about the variables can be deduced from this client-oriented specification.
2.11. Back to the Classics
There are three important facts about my classification of value spaces.
1. It is client-oriented. That is, the classification is not phrased in terms of statis¬
tical words or concepts, but is a simple extension of everyday dimensional
analysis. The kinds of measurement are sufficiently distinct (which one out of a
classification, approximations, counts, direct physical measurements, dif¬
ferences, products, ratios, proportions) that a client can easily identify the ap¬
propriate type.
2. It is lattice-based. This means that the methods of chapter 4 for reasoning with
descriptions can be applied to value spaces. In particular, we can record vague
information about a value space initially (such as the fact that it is numeric) and
only ask for more detailed information when it is useful to know. This helps the
client further, as he does not have to supply a complete description of a value
space in one step.
3. It is adequate. That is, the usual classification can be recovered from it, as can
distinctions (such as a discrete variable being based on an underlying con¬
tinuous scale) which the usual classification does not make.
The third point is easy to demonstrate.
2.11.1. Nominal Scales
These are class(_._._) and its generalisations.
2.11.2. Partial Orders
ASA currently knows no methods for such variables. Textbooks do not commonly
describe such methods, and while it is possible to adapt other methods (by techniques such
as considering each chain of the order separately) the reasoning required is beyond ASA's
capabilities.
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This establishes that my lattice of value spaces is incomplete. There would be no
difficulty in extending the lattice to include something corresponding to partial orders, if only
there were methods that could benefit from it.
Nor does ASA have a representation for multi-metic scales.
2.11.3. Ordinal Scales
These are approxf . ). In versions of ASA with order(_,J in the lattice, they cor¬
respond to ordinal scales as well.
2.11.4. Ordered Metric Scales
ASA currently knows no methods for such variables. As I have yet to encounter an
experiment with a credible ordered metric variable, this has been no handicap.
2.11.5. Interval Scales
Interval scales are numeric. None of the numeric value spaces understood by ASA
corresponds to an interval scale; all of them are at least ratio. In a positive value space, the
zero represents a real lower bound. In a difference, zero represents "no change", which is
again a real possibility.
If you have an interval scale, the differences of pairs of values from that scale con¬
stitute a ratio scale. So an interval scale is pretty close to a ratio scale anyway. What kinds
of measurements manage to be interval scales yet fail to be ratio scales?
One example is internal energy in thermodynamics. But you cannot measure internal
energy, only changes in it.
A popular example is temperature measured on the Celsius scale. But temperature
is a physical property, hence is strictly positive. Where have I gone wrong?
The answer is; nowhere. A variable which records temperature really does measure
a physical property, and really does have a natural zero point in its scale. It is therefore
meaningful to take quotients of temperatures. But that doesn't mean you can do it with the
raw numbers! If you want to take the ratio of variables T1 ,T2 where both record temperature
in the Celsius scale, you have to calculate
(Tl+273.16)/(T2+273.16)
The lesson here is that there is a distinction between the properties enjoyed by a
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variable because of what it is and the properties enjoyed by the numbers because of the way
they have been encoded.
ASA never deals with the actual data, so it fails to make this distinction. It is only
concerned with the abstract properties of measurements and variables, not with the
properties of encoded numbers. A full-scale "intelligent front end" would need to make this
distinction, and others.
So ASA has no value spaces which correspond to interval scales, because such
scales either apply to unobservable properties or are an artefact of encoding, which can be
avoided.
2.11.6. Ratio Scales
All numeric value spaces except counts and proportions correspond to ratio scales.
2.11.7. Absolute Scales
Counts and proportions are absolute scales.
2.11.8. Summary
Each definite value space in ASA can be assigned to exactly one of the conventional
levels of measurement. There are scale types (partial orders, ordered metric, interval) to
which no ASA value space is assigned. If and when ASA is extended with methods specific
to those scales, the lattice can be extended.
The point for the client is that if ASA needs to know whether a variable is measured
on at least an ordinal scale, it can instead ask for a description in client-oriented terms, and
can deduce that an approximation or a numeric value is ordered.
2.12. Summary
This chapter presented and criticised the conventional classification of statistical vari¬
ables. In its place, I offered an approach extending the idea of physical dimensions. The
algebra which results is also a lattice: some measurement types are instances of more
general measurement types.
Two examples showed the relevance of this information.
My search for a way to handle this knowledge in ASA led directly to the type system
described in chapter 4.
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Chapter 3
The Structure of Statistical Experiments
3.1. Outline
In this chapter I argue that an Expert System for Statistics needs a way of represent¬
ing and reasoning about the structure of experiments, as well as the varieties of measure¬
ments. I give examples to show that information which can easily be deduced from the
structure of an experiment is vital to the synthesis of a valid analysis.
I present a specific notation for describing the structure of experiments. This notation
is incomplete. There are many kinds of experiments it cannot handle, and many subtleties
that it fails to depict. This would be a serious deficiency but for two things. The first is that
the notation as presented is adequate for the limited simple experiments which I intended to
cover. Note that even statistical textbooks sometimes make mistakes with just such simple
experiments.
The second reason why the incompleteness of the notation is not a serious
deficiency is that the notation presented is merely an example. The point of the chapter is to
present and illustrate an approach to the development of such a notation. The notion that an
experiment can be described as if it were a mathematical function on sequences is the key to
the whole chapter. Each particular element of the notation was developed to handle a class
of experiments or methods. The notation had to be expanded, the foundation needed no
such revision.
This chapter contains many examples of the notation. The details of punctuation are
borrowed from mathematical computer science, but are not important. ASA does not use this
notation directly; appendix A explains the way that the structure of an experiment is stored in
ASA. The really important thing in this chapter is the idea that an experiment can be given a
compositional "semantics" in much the same way as a computer program (see [Gordon 79]).
Currently, formal descriptive notations for limited classes of experiments are known,
particularly for so-called "factorial" designs. (See [GLIM 78].) But there is no notation avail¬
able for even such simple experiments as one finds described in [Velleman 81]. The very
idea of such a notation, as well as the approach and the specific examples in this chapter,
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appears to be original. I can testify that the discipline of writing down a formal experiment
description is an excellent method for ensuring that ambiguities and omissions do not go
un-noticed.
The notation permits us to start with a vague description of an experiment and refine
it as we need to. Accordingly, the notation should be good for designing experiments as well
as analysing them.
It is useful and traditional to distinguish two kinds of variables, treatments and
measurements, depending on whether the experimenter controlled the value of the variable
or not. I show in section 3.12 that there is yet a third kind of variable, identifiers. This was
not something I put into the notation to start with, but a discovery which was forced on me by
trying to be clear about the relation between experiments and data sets.
The contribution of this chapter to Artificial Intelligence is that it presents domain
knowledge which should be represented. It serves as motivation for the knowledge represen¬
tation techniques presented in the second half of this volume.
Here is a summary of the notation introduced for describing experiments. What we
have is both a recursively defined lattice of steps and a structure of functions. Each generic









3.9 +=separate[C1->S1, ..., Cn->Sn]
I
3.10 +=assign[C; V; K1->S1, ..., Kn->Sn]
I
3.11. +=select[V; K1->S1|P1, ..., Kn->Sn|Pn]
I
3.12 +=disperse [C; S]
I




Cx is a component name (often the name of a set)
Sx is a step, which is why the lattice is recursive
Vx is a variable or a set of variables
Kz is a constant, a possible value of its associated V
Px is a probability
Tx is a test (boolean function)
Rx is a set of constants
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Arguments are separated by commas when their order doesn't matter, by semicolons when
the order does matter. In one view, names like 'observe' or 'disperse' denote functions from
component names, variable names, constants, and steps into the lattice of steps. In fact,
they are the generators of the lattice. In another view, these names denote higher-order
functions, which is why their arguments are enclosed in square brackets. If you think of a
step as a node in a graph, with arcs labelled by constants Ki or component names Ci to its
substeps Si, and the node itself labelled by its type and associated variables, you won't go far
wrong. The point about this being a lattice is that we can take a vagueO step and refine it
without disturbing any of our existing conclusions.
It is important for you to realise that the particular lattice that ASA uses isn't all that
special. Most of these step types should be included in any plausible algebra of experiments.
However, the catalogue was developed as need dictated. Far from the catalogue being
closed, it is of the utmost importance that this approach facilitates the graceful expansion of
the catalogue. In the present system, each step is a function which takes a single stream of
units to a stream of "investigated" units. This limitation is not fundamental: there are experi¬
ment structures where it is useful to consider steps which combine two or more streams.
ASA's data structures can handle that. What is really vital here is the idea is that an experi¬
ment is made up of streams of "units" with "steps" which map a definite number of input
streams to a definite number of output streams, that the structure of functions can be
regarded as a point in a lattice, and that this structure can be incrementally refined in an
inference-driven way. The metaphor of the Little Man with his medical history cards (section
3.3) is almost the entire point of this chapter, "the rest is commentary".
3.2. Why do we care?
The first thing to discuss is why we need a formal representation of the structure of
experiments at all. The previous chapter showed that just knowing what sorts of things the
variables measure is often enough for an analysis. What more is there one might need to
know?
The first thing that comes to mind is the distinction between variables which measure
the type or level of some treatment (that is, they are under the experimenter's control; he gets
to decide what the values will be) and those which are the result of some observation (the
experimenter has no control over the values). Consider the following three experiments:
A. We distribute a number of identical cars among a dozen drivers, and at the end of a
week find out M, the number of miles travelled during the week, and G, the number of
gallons of petrol consumed during the week.
B. We take the same cars and drivers, fill the tanks, and get the drivers to drive the cars
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over a course of Known length. For reasons that are not important here, it is helpful if
they travel different distances, so we ask some of the drivers to drive once over the
course, some twice, some thrice, and record the distance they travel in miles as
M. Afterwards we measure G, the number of gallons of petrol consumed.
C. We take the same cars and drivers, and fill the tanks to possibly differing levels G. We
then get the drivers to drive around the course until they run out of petrol, and record
the distance travelled.
In all three cases, the variables are of exactly the same type; G is an amount of liquid
(by volume), and M is a distance. Yet the models we should fit are different in each case:
A: (G-errorG) = a + b*(M-errorM)
B: (G-errorG) = a + b*M
C: G = a + b* (M-errorM)
This example shows that knowing the types of the measurements is not enough. But
in this particular case, it is enough to know which of the variables are determined by the
experimenter, and which by nature, so perhaps we could manage with just one more fact
about each variable. But there is still more. Consider the following experiments, where the
point of the experiments is to determine the effect of watering (different amounts of water
being added to equally sized pots equally dry initially) on the amount of water lost by certain
plants during a one hour interval.
D. The experimenter first applies the 0ml treatments, then the 1 ml treatments, then the
2ml treatments, and so on.
The obvious snag here is that the amount of water added is confounded with the time
of day. That is, since the time of day determines the amount of water added, it is
impossible to tell whether a plant was affected by the amount of water, or by some¬
thing else controlled by the time of day, such as the amount of sunlight. A statistical
consultant should ask whether treatments were applied according to a fixed plan in
order to warn about the danger of such confounding.
E. The experimenter applied a 0ml treatment, then a 1ml, ... then a 10ml, and kept
repeating this cycle until there were no pots left to treat.
This is a more subtle form of D.
F. The experimenter applied the treatments in any old order that came into his head,
("haphazard" order)
This is an all too common practice. The experimenter is likely to be conscientious in
avoid direct connection between the treatment and any obvious environmental vari-
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ables, so that the obvious errors of D and E are avoided. But all this means is that
there could be other factors operating, and the haphazard assignment ensures that we
shall not know what those factors might be. Maybe we are safe, but we cannot be
sure.
G. The order of the treatments was randomised.
This is very helpful, because we can apply statistical tests of significance (called
"randomisation tests") even if the plants themselves do not form a random sample
from any population.
H. The time of day and the amount of water were considered (and recorded!) as two
factors, and the treatment plan was set up as a Latin square or some such.
This is even better. We can evaluate the time of day effect as well as the watering
effect.
The analysis proceeds quite differently in cases H and G and the rest. So it is not
enough to know that the treatments were under the experimenter's control, we must also
know how that control was exercised.
But still, this amounts to more knowledge about single variables. Why should we
care about the structural ways in which the variables are related?
The reason is that there are relations between variables which are important. One
extremely important relation is whether two variables were measured on the same subjects
or not. Another is causal flow. Yet another is statistical independence. We could indeed ask
the client about each interesting combination of variables, but very often the questions will be
unintelligible to him or her. The structure of the experiment, referring as it does to the
brute question "and then what did you do", does lie within the client's competence, so
deducing inter-variable relations from the structure is worth doing.
This is a key point! The client is in all probability ignorant of Statistics. He is most
unlikely to understand clearly what the relations mean; confusing statistical independence
with lack of (known) causal connection is a very common mistake. Simply asking the client
about each of the relations between the variables is a very good way to confuse him and to
obtain incorrect answers. But the client does know what he did. The reason for developing a
notation for the structure of experiments regarded as planned procedural activities is simply
that we can obtain reliable information about them using that view.
First let's consider statistical independence. Clearly, if the experimenter has chosen
a treatment level at random, it will be independent of all the other measurements made on
that object up to that time. However, it will not be independent of subsequent measurements,
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in the normal sense of the word, and its statistical independence of them is something we
might be interested in checking but in general must not assume. Consider the following little
experiment:
I. The experimenter has a sample of apples. He measures the sugar content of each
apple by testing some of the flesh. He then divides the apples at random into five
equally sized groups, storing them at five different temperatures for four days. He
measures the sugar content of each apple again.
Here we have three variables:
sugarO : measured amount of sugar by weight
(before treatment)
temp : randomly assigned temperature
sugarl : measured amount of sugar by weight
(after treatment)
Clearly temp and sugarO are necessarily independent, though in any one particular
instance of the experiment they might be correlated in that sample, but it is most unlikely that
sugarl and sugarO are independent, or that sugarl and temp are. In fact we might fit a
model
sugarl = f(temp)*sugarO + error
where (Vx) 0 < f(X) <1
But if we only look at what the variables measure, and whether they are observations or
treatments, we will have no way of telling that this model is a reasonable one while
sugarO = g(temp)*sugarl + error'
is less reasonable.
It might be argued that this is the client's job; it is up to him to say which variable he
wants explained and which variables he wants to use in the explanation. Clearly a program
which prevents a client performing an analysis which he deliberately chooses to do is a bad
program, but a program which fails to comment on the strangeness of trying to explain an
observation in terms of the experimenter's later decisions is also a bad program.
From the mere fact that these variables are observations and those are treatments, it
follows that it is never sensible to look for an "explanation" (model) of those variables4. But
that is not enough to tell us which of the treatment variables it makes sense to include in a
model for one of the measurements. For that we need to know the order in which the
treatments were applied, as it makes sense to include only those treatments which were
applied before the measurement was made. We can and usually should include other
4this does not mean that it is never useful to perform the calculations that are normally associated with
constructing such a model. It is often a good idea to double check that the treatments were in fact independent of
the data, as this can uncover recording errors (e.g. the coding form and the program disagreeing about which
variable goes in what column) or faults of procedure. But while the form of the calculations may be the same, the
purpose and interpretation are different. A simple-minded program such as ASA does not bother with such checks.
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measurements in a model as well. If we measure A, apply a treatment, and then measure B,
it makes sense to include A in a model for B. Including B in a model for A is much less
sensible, though sometimes it is necessary.
Continuing example I, then, these two rules [Rule 1] never look for an explanation of
a treatment
[Rule 2] when forming a model for a measurement, exclude subsequent treatments and
measurements following subsequent treatments produce the following behaviour:
(a) there are no other variables we could include in a model for sugarO. Therefore a model
for sugarO is a distribution, which we might report as a standard distribution name
together with its parameters, or as a cumulative frequency table, or as a graphical
display. sugarO is necessarily positive, so displaying
(a1) the raw data (stem-and-leaf)
(a2) the logs of the raw data with a smoothed curve
(a3) a quantile-quantile plot of the logs against the normal distribution
seems like a good idea.
(b) temp is a treatment, so needs no explanation
(c) temp and sugarO are available for use in forming a model of sugarl. When there is one
variable to be explained, and there are N variables we could use in the explanation,
there are 2N sets of explanatory variables we might try. Here N=2, and it makes sense
to try all 4 kinds of model:
(c1) sugarl alone, as for sugarO
(c2) sugarl -vs- temp
(c3) sugarl -vs- sugarO
(c4) sugarl -vs- sugarO and temp
Since sugarl is continuous and temp has five levels, a one way analysis of variance on
log(sugarl) with temp as the factor is suggested. In this case it is actually a silly thing
to do, because sugarl is a fraction of sugarO, and so obviously depends on it. To
block this model, we need another rule
[Rule 3] if V1 measures some property of an object, and V2 measures a property of part of
that object, V1 must be used in any model for V2
This leaves (c3) and (c4) as sensible models to try.
There is a subtle point: it is always a sensible thing to display each observed vari-
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able. So a good statistician would also do (c1). But not in the expectation of seeing a simple
model. Instead, the statistician would want that plot to help him took for mistakes. There is a
distinction between tables and graphs designed to make a model apparent, and diagnostic
tables and graphs designed to show up problems with a model. Here I am not concerned
with diagnostics.
So from considering what order the variables were measured in, and which variables
are measurements, we've come up with four models to think about, (a), (c1), (c3), and (c4).
These weak models can be refined into forms such as (a1-a3) by using our knowledge of the
types of measurements. I've not bothered working all the way through this example. The
reason is that even with the space of weak models pruned from 12 (analogues of (c1-c4) with
each of the three variables on the left) to 4 (it only makes sense to took for an explanation of
sugar!) we end up with a tot of things to try for each weak model.
If we were to work out all the plots that would be useful, there would be at least 24 for
this example. (Raw and transformed data for each of the weak models, plus raw and trans¬
formed residuals from the fitted models.) Now a good statistician might well ask for and took
at all of them, and what is more he'd understand all of them. But ASA was originally intended
for non-statisticians. 24 graphs for what looks like such a simple problem really is far too
much for a naive client to cope with, at any rate without a tot of hand-holding from the
program explaining why each graph is useful and what the client should took for in each. At
the very least, a program which naive clients really could use should keep track of what kinds
of graphs and analyses the client can make sense of, and should avoid recommending other
kinds of analyses until the client can handle them.
To use Robert Glass's term, ASA is "a success that failed". That is, the statistical
reasoning is surprisingly easy. The classification of value spaces presented in chapter 2, the
further classification of variables presented in this chapter, and the algebra of experiments
presented in this chapter, are indeed adequate for presenting the statistically relevant infor¬
mation about an experiment. It is easy to find and formulate rules about statistical methods
and computations, and the planning task is straightforward. The failure is that there is an
enormous man/machine interface problem to be solved before a consultant which is truly
usable by naive clients can be written. Fortunately, solving that problem fell completely out¬
side the scope of this research. The goal of my research was to investigate the represen¬
tational and inference needs of statistical reasoning, and to find efficient data structures and
algorithms for such representation and inference, and that was the "success" part.
Probably all that a client presenting this experiment would really be interested in (or
able to use) would be the average after/before ratios for each of the five temperature levels,
and an indication of whether they are significantly different from each other. The ideal display
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for this would be a "box and whisker" plot5 of the log before/after ratios side by side for each
of the five levels, with a total box-and-whisker as well. 1 is much less than 24, and the client
could probably cope with it. Without a client model, it is unclear how to filter out the other
plots, as they do make sense and could very well be useful.
A really usable Statistics Advisor would also have elements of an "Intelligent Tutor".
For example, the way to determine whether a client could profit from a particular kind of plot
is not to ask him whether he knows what it means, but to show him some examples of such
plots and ask questions designed to test whether he can see the significant features in the
plot. The client should also have the option of entering a teaching mode where the use of
such plots is explained.
What is described above is the generation, in an "exploratory" manner, of weak
models. But knowing that one variable measures a certain property before treatment and
another measures it after treatment is useful for some "confirmatory" analyses as well. One
wants to know which variable to plug into the "before" slot of the method and which to plug
into the "after slot, and the temporal order of the measurements tells us this.
Returning to independence, it is possible for a treatment to be neither before nor
after a certain measurement. Consider the following experiment:
J. A random sample of cans of paint is obtained. The density of the paint (VO) is
measured for each can. Then the contents of each can are divided in two, the first half
being mixed with a randomly chosen type of thinner (recorded as T1) and the viscosity
measured (V1), and the second half being painted on a board and exposed for a
randomly chosen length of time (T2) and the water permeability of the surface being
measured (V2).
Now it makes sense to include VO and T1 in a model for V1, but it does not make
sense to include T2 (as it does not precede V1). Including V2 in such a model would be a bit
dodgy as it depends on a treatment not preceding V1. Yet T2 does not follow V1 either. Can
we include V2 in a model for V1 or not? Clearly, V2 does give us some information about the
paint which might be relevant to V1. But it is heavily contaminated by T2.
This example shows that one rule for excluding a variable V2 from a model for
another variable V1 has to be
[Rule 4] if the measurement of V2 is preceded by a treatment T which does not precede the
measurement of V1, V2 may not be included in a model for V1.
5see [Mosteller 78] for an explanation of this term
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3.3. How to Develop a Notation for Experiments
Experiments are planned activities. So we look to planning and to computer pro¬
gramming for something to imitate. Graphical notations are common in both areas, and the
graphs are generally some sort of flow chart.
The key to my approach here is a metaphor. I call it the "little man" or "little patient"
metaphor.
Imagine a little man entering a hospital. He is given a piece of paper, on which his
medical history is recorded. He is then shunted from room to room, and at each step some¬
thing new is added to his piece of paper. Sometimes he is sent to "any available doctor", and
the name of the doctor is written on his piece of paper. Sometimes bits of him (in bottles,
with his name and the date attached) are sent to various rooms, and back come other pieces
of paper which are affixed to the main one.
In this metaphor, the little man represents a recording unit6. The hospital's com¬
puter sees only his card, just as a statistical package such as GLIM [GLIM 78] or SPSS
[SPSS 75] sees only the cards that make up (the representation of) a case. A room in the
hospital represents a step in the experiment. The X-ray machines and pathology lab
represent measurements, and the operation theatres and wards represent treatments. When
the little man is assigned to any available doctor, that represents random assignment. A
biopsy, or a blood sample, which has its own little piece of paper and undergoes processing
which has no effect on the little man himself nor is affected by his experiences after the
sample is taken, that represents a treatment unit, and reflects the fact that a treatment unit
(the thing to which a treatment is applied) can be part of a larger unit.
One more refinement: Consider the Accidents department of the hospital. People do
not arrive in it one at a time. They can arrive in car-loads, in bus-loads, or even by the
factory-full. Yet each of the people in such a group gets his own medical card. This
represents the fact that sampling units (the things that are selected) can be groups of
recording units. If one member of a group is accepted, all are, and the members of one
group tend to be more alike than members of different groups. (A bus-load might ail be from
the same club, or school. A car-load might all belong to one family. In any case, the people
tend to be suffering from the same kinds of problems.)
This metaphor, of a little man in a hospital, is where I started. The distinction be¬
tween sampling units, recording units, and treatment units is standard in Statistics. It is very
important when the purpose of the experiment is to estimate characteristics of a population
®The terms "recording unit", "sampling unit", and "treatment unit" are standard statistical terminology
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rather than checking whether two treatments are different or just fossicking around for any¬
thing interesting that might turn up. But the metaphor makes vivid another distinction:
(i) what kind of thing is coming into this room? (bus-ioad of injured people, one man, a
biopsy, a urine specimen,...)
-vs-
(ii) what has happened to this thing so far in this experiment? (what is written on the little
man's card so far?)
Generally speaking, the same kind of thing comes out of a room as went into it (this
is the case by definition in my notation), but something has happened to it in the meantime;
we now know more about it than we did before, and as a result of what we have done to it, it
may react differently from the way it would have reacted if we'd done something else.
The second factor which influenced the way I decided to describe experiments is
formal semantics of computing systems. My semantics for statistical experiments and my
semantics for an extension to logic programming [O'Keefe 85] share the same style. In fact
the latter followed the former in time.
The third factor which influenced much of the detail is that despite my disbelief in
numeric certainty factors, I do believe that it is important for Expert Systems to be able to
handle vague information. So I saw it as important that ASA should not demand, in con¬
sequence of an overly precise notation, information which is not necessary for selecting a
method of analysis. If we can select a model entirely on the basis of types, we should do so.
If we do not need to know in which order two measurements are made, we should not ask.
This third factor works another way, of course. If we can start with a completely
vague "experiment" and refine it as we need to, then it is plausible that the notation could be
used for designing experiments as well. I have not tried this.
3.4. Signatures
The approach I settled on is that the "processing" part of an experiment is a function
from streams to streams, where a stream is an ordered sequence of "units", all of the same
type, each with its own history. To keep things simple, and not because I believe this to be
the best way to go, a "history" is merely a set of the names of those variables which have
been measured or determined to this point. The "type" of the units is a "description", as
discussed in Chapter 4.
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Examples
Recall that experiment I took a sample of apples, measured their sugar content,
stored them at different temperatures, and then measured their sugar content again. An
input stream for part of that experiment might be characterised by the following facts in ASA's
data base:
typical_individual(atream_l, subject_l) . % unit
subject_l is an apple. % type
known(stream_l, sugar0). % history
known(stream_l, temp). % history
The output stream for that part (the measurement of sugar!) might be characterised by the
following facts:
typical_individual(stream_2, subject_l) . % unit
subject_l is an apple. % type
known(stream_2, sugarO). % history
known(stream_2, temp). % history
known(stream_2, sugarl). % history
For the simple experiments I studied, this was adequate. A richer description of
histories, perhaps including events which were not measured in any way but which were
known to have occurred, may be necessary for some experiments.
Borrowing from semantics of programming languages, every part of an experiment
structure is assigned a signature, analogous to the type of a function [Gordon 79, Gordon et
al 79]. This signature describes its input and output.
The signature of part of an experiment is thus a triple
(D, B, A)
where D is a description of what sort of objects are the "units" for this part of the experiments,
B is the set of variables known Before a unit enters this box (this includes measurements
pertaining to larger units of which this unit forms a part), and A is the set of variables known
After a unit leaves this box. B is necessarily a subset of A.
The signature of a whole experiment is (D, {}, V) where V is the set of all the variable
names, which ASA asks for when we start, and D describes the recording units. Note that
this does not conflict with my claim that the variables are only known after the experiment is
completed: what ASA asks for at the beginning of a consultation is the names of the vari¬
ables, and those names are what appear in the set V.
The rest of this chapter describes some particular kinds of steps (boxes, parts of
experiments) and notations for them. A step is named by a term
Cclass name>[<parameters>]
and the fact that a step has a particular signature is written
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<class name>[<pararoetera>] : <signature>
See the end of section 3.1 for a summary of this notation.
3.5. The Identity step
For each D and V there is an identity function
identity : (D,V,V)
which does nothing at all to the units. This is not a very exciting experiment, but it is some¬
times needed as part of a composite treatment.
3.6. The Vague step
For each set O of observations, T of treatments, and V of other variables such that O,
T, and V are disjoint, there is a vague "function"
vague [0,T] : (D, V, V u O u T)
which indicates that during this step the treatments T are applied and the observations O are
made, somehow. No amount of reasoning or calculation will let us look inside this box; to find
out how to refine a vague step we have to ask the client what he did.
3.7. The Observe step
When it does not make any difference which order the observations O are made in,
whether because the process of measuring one of them genuinely makes no difference to the
other variables, as measuring someone's age does not change his weight, or for whatever
reason, we can use
observe[O] : (D, V, V u O)
instead of the corresponding vague[0,{}] step. Strictly speaking, this means rather more than
vague[0,{}]. vague[0,{}] means that the variables are measured somehow, but the act of
measuring one might influence another, and they might take place in any order, while
observe[0] means that we can regard the variables as being measured simultaneously. ASA
lacks any rules that care, so it does not actually bother distinguishing between the two.
Similarly, ASA doesn't bother distinguishing between "identity" and vague[{},{}].
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3.8. Composition of Steps
If stepl : (D, B, X) and step2 : (D, X, A) are steps, then
(stepl then step2) (D, B, A)
is a step.
In fact, ASA works this the other way. Suppose ASA has a vague[-,-] step of sig¬
nature (D.B.A) which needs refining. When it asks the client what kind of step it is, one of the
answers he can give is that it is a sequence. For simplicity, ASA only considers a sequence
of two steps. It invents a name for each sub-step (stepl and step2, say) and asks the client
which variables are determined in the first step. If the answer to that question is the set V,
then X is B u V.
Example.
Suppressing the description argument for now, we now have enough of the notation




This leaves us wondering about the treatment, but we can work out what the inter¬
esting weak models are with just this much.
3.9. Processing Components in Parallel
This section and the next discuss two ways that components of a unit can be
processed in parallel. With the experiment steps described so far, we can represent a se¬
quence of treatments and observations. But consider the following experiment:
K. We are given a sample of households, each of which contains exactly one adult male
and one adult female. (Most likely we had a bigger sample and discarded the ones
which did not fit this picture.) The man is made to do as many push-ups as he can and
the number is recorded. The eyesight of the woman is tested, and recorded.
There are two important things about this: the identity of the components is deter¬
mined beforehand, and there is no time sequence between the testing of the man and that of
the woman. There is no causal flow between them, and it is reasonable to suppose that any
relation between the results of these tests is due to the nature and history of the couples
before their separate tests. We may regard the experiment steps working on the man and on
the woman as parallel processes in the sense of computer science, they may be interleaved
in any fashion, or performed simultaneously. In order to reap the maximum benefit from this
separation, the experimenter should ensure that the man and woman should not communi¬
cate until both have been tested, and then both may be tested together subsequently. For if
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the woman could sometimes communicate her experiences to the man, there could be causal
flow from one experiment step to another.
The general picture, then, is that
• the treatment units entering this step of the experiment have components of
various different types
• the components exist and the question of which entity corresponds to which
component name is settled before the step is begun, typically before the experi¬
ment is begun
• the step has several substeps
• the components of the treatment units are routed to the substeps according to
which component they are
• only after each substep is complete is the original treatment unit reassembled
and subjected to further processing
More formally, suppose that we have k substeps, each of signature
substep[j] : (D[j], B, A[j])
and that an object described by description D has components C[j] each satisfying descrip¬
tion D[j] (it may have other components as well). Then we write down the fact that these
substeps are done in parallel as
separate[C[1] -> substep[1], ... C[k] -> substep[k] ]
which has signature
(D, B, a[1] v ... v a [k])
Pronounce the arrows as "is routed to".
Note that the C[j] are names of components ("field selectors"), not types. We might
choose to say just that
X is a household ->
has_one (X,man,M) & M is a human & M is a male &
has_one(X,woman,F) & F is a human & F is a female.
Despite the man and woman components of such a household being given the same descrip¬
tion, we can separate them because they are different components.




(Pronounce this as "the household is separated into a man component and a woman com¬
ponent. The man is routed to a stage where endurance is measured and the woman is
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routed to a stage where eyesight is measured.") This emphasises that what we have
measured is not the endurance of the household or the eyesight of the household, but the
endurance of the man component of the household and the eyesight of the woman com¬
ponent of the household.
By my conventions, each object has only one component for any given component
name, so each substep processes a stream of treatment units containing exactly as many
units as the whole step. That is, the substeps substepjj] inherit the sample size from the
containing step.
What is the point of representing this kind of structure? After all, we could invent a
fictitious sequence and use that. The point is that we come up with different weak models. If
we said that we always measured the woman's eyesight and then measured the man's en¬
durance, ASA would never think of using the man's endurance as an explanatory variable in
a model for the woman's eyesight. (Unless of course both were measured in the same
observe[] step, which is the client's promise that the order of measurement does not matter,
indeed his claim that a structure like this underlies the observe[] step.) While if the two are
measured independently, then since neither depends on any intervening treatment, both are
estimating properties belonging to the same state of the same units, so either variable could
sensibly appear in a model for the other.
There is also a difference in interpretation of some tests. Suppose the client in¬
dicates an interest in testing whether pushups and eyesight are related. We perform a test of
independence. Suppose we measure the woman's eyesight first and the man's endurance
second. Then failing to reject the hypothesis of independence means that measuring the
woman's eyesight has not been shown to affect the man's endurance. (We have no idea
what the man's endurance would have been if the woman's eyesight had not been
measured.) If we have processed the components separately, however, failing to reject the
null hypothesis means that the woman's eyesight and the man's endurance have not been
shown to be associated. This is perhaps a rather tricky point. What if we do reject the null
hypothesis? In the sequential case, we cannot tell whether we have evidence for an associa¬
tion between the two variables in the population, or whether the association is an artefact of
the experiment.
To make this clearer, here is a mechanism that might produce such an artefact. In
order to obtain greater relative accuracy, the test of eyesight takes longer as the subject's
eyesight is worse. The longer someone's eyesight is tested, the more distressed they be¬
come. The more nervous or aggressive someone becomes, the more ready he becomes for
fighting, and so the more pushups he can do. The man and woman being allowed to com¬
municate, the man is made nervous or aggressive in proportion to the woman's distress. So
the endurance figure for men coming from the same household as a woman of poor eyesight
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is higher than it would otherwise have been, while men coming from the same household as
women of good eyesight are not affected this way. Clearly, if there was no real connection
between the two properties, this experiment will report a negative correlation between
eyesight and endurance. But if we test the two people separately, there will be no such
effect.
Generally, sequences of measurements are undesirable, and if we can make our
measurements separately we prefer to do so.
3.10. Random Assignment
There is another way that we can have components processed in parallel, and that is
when a unit has a component which is a set of objects. For example, we normally regard a
household as having a set of people as one of its components, as well as things like its
address, number of books, number of telephones and so on.
Consider the following experiment:
L. We have a sample of pairs of identical twin calves. For each pair, we flip a coin, and
assign one calf to be given hay with Supplement H and the other calf to be given hay
with Supplement T. The weight of each calf is measured before and after a week on
this feed.
Anticipating the notation presented below, we have
observe[weight before] then
assign[twins; feed; H->identity, T->identity] then
observe[weight after]
What we have is a stream of treatment units all of the same sort D (here "twin-pair"), each
having a component C (here "twins") which is a set of at least k objects (here k=2). All the
members of this component set have the same sort Dm (here "calf"). There is a variable V
(here "feed"), and k values X[1..k] (here X1=H and X2=T)which this variable may take, and
there are k substeps each having the signature
substep[j] ; (Dm, B u [V), A[j])
where the A[j] are disjoint.
Then
assign[C; V; X[j] -> substep[j]]
is an experiment step of signature (D, B, A[1] u ... u A[k]). Note that the value k does not
appear explicitly in this notation, but is implicit as the cardinality of the range of the variable V.
What is meant by this is that whenever a D unit arrives at this step, we select a
random subset of k elements of the set C, and assign the k elements to the k substeps in a
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random order. The effect of this is that each of the elements has an equal chance to go in
any of the substeps.
We can readily generalise this in various ways to represent factorial experiments.
The distinguishing feature of a factorial experiment is that the steps are all essentially the
same, differing mainly in the order in which treatments are made. Any particular factorial
experiment can in fact be described in the notation of this chapter; the advantage of notations
such as that used in [GLIM 78] is that they are compact and irredundant.
There is an obvious equivalence between
assign[C; V; X[j] -> step[j] then finally]
and assign[C; V; X[j] -> step[j]] then finally
The normal form is the latter. Unfortunately, in order to acquire information incrementally,
ASA puts the experiment structure in the data base (the implementation is discussed later in
this chapter), and so it cannot change the way something has been encoded. I have to rely
on asking questions in the right order so that the user enters the normal form. This is un¬
satisfactory, but has not been a problem with the very simple experiments I've been using as
test cases. The commonest case is that all the substeps are the same (though this may
imply very different real-world activities!), so the client can be asked if all the substeps are the
same, and then instead of refining
vague (M, T u {V}]
to assign[C; V; X[j] -> ....]
ASA can refine it to
assign[C; V; X[j] -> identity] then vague[M,T]
This is a very important structure. The reason is that it introduces a controlled
amount of randomness into the experiment so that we are not dependent on random sam¬
pling any more. Let's take the example a little further. Suppose we have fitted the model
weight_after = K[feed]*weight_before*error
where K[feed H] and K[feed T] have been estimated, and we are interested in checking
whether the two are different. We do not have to depend on the assumption that we had a
random sample of twin calves. We do not have to depend on any assumptions about the
distribution of weight in the population of calves. If there were N pairs of twins, we have
made N binary random assignments, so there were 2N possible experiments. If the two kinds
of feed do not differ, then the after/before ratios go with the calves, not with the feeds, so we
can look at all 2N possible outcomes and how likely it is that the two feeds would have looked
this different just by chance. This is called a random assignment method, and there are lots
of them. Indeed, in psychology random sampling is almost entirely unknown (so we know
much more about the kind of people who volunteer for things than about the other sort) and
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random assignment is of extreme practical importance. Nor is random sampling feasible in
much agricultural research; an agricultural research station has a fixed set of fields, which in
no sense constitutes a random sample of the fields in its nation. Once again, random assign¬
ment comes to the rescue.
This section presented random assignment, which is a way of processing similar
components of a unit in parallel. The previous section presented separation, which is a way
of processing possibly dissimilar components in parallel. In separation, a treatment unit is
broken up into components (generally of different types) and these components are
processed by substeps. Which substep a component is routed to is completely determined
by which component it is. We can tell before the experiment is performed what will be done
to a component. In contrast, random assignment breaks up a set of units all of the same
type, and there is no possible way of telling before a particular unit is considered which
substep will process it.
What the two kinds of substep have in common is that the several components are
processed in parallel: if we separate a couple into a man and a woman, or if we randomly
assign one twin calf to one treatment and the other to a different treatment, there are two
treatment processes in each case proceeding in parallel. Not only in parallel, but there is no
communication between the processes. In either case, variables measured in one of the
parallel branches may be used in models for variables measured in another of the parallel
branches.
3.11. Random Selection
Random selection is like random assignment, except that instead of allocating say 5
rats out of a litter to 5 treatments all happening at the same time, we allocate one whole unit
to one of a number of treatments.
Consider the following experiment.
M. We have a sample of school children. They are all given the same personality test,
then half of them watch a violent film and the other half watch a non-violent film, after
which another test is done. The decision as to which child watches what film is made
at random.
This is not the same as the previous kind of random assignment. Here units are not
broken up, but each unit is routed to one of several possible substeps. There are two ways
we could do this. Either each case could be assigned on its own, with the probability that a
case would be assigned to each treatment specified (e.g. probability of watching the violent
film 0.4, probability of the other 0.6), or we could stipulate the total for each treatment. The
latter is generally preferred, as in the former case it could happen that all the subjects
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chanced to receive the same treatment. For this reason I have not bothered representing the
former possibility.
I represent the latter as
select[V; X[j] -> substeptj] I prob[j]]
Read this as "a value for variable V is determined at random. The value X[j] is selected with
probability prob[j], and units with that value of V are routed to substep[j]." Note that this has
no C parameter, as it is not elements of a component which are being routed to the substeps,
nor components, but entire units.
The implementation leaves the frequencies vague, as we can generally leave it until
the analysis is actually done before we care. In fact each experiment step has a vague
frequency associated with it, so the frequency information labels the substeps rather than the
arcs to them. What matters is that (a) the assignment of units to steps is random, and (b)
each step will have at least one unit routed to it.
This is not as useful as random assignment of components of the same unit, as
variables measured in the different substep do not refer to the same objects. However, they
do refer to the same kind of objects, and to objects from the same population. Suppose we
have an experiment concerning the feeding of calves containing the following step:
select[feed; H->observe[x], T->observe[y]]
(Read this as "a value for variable 'feed' is selected at random. Calves with feed=H are
routed to a step where 'x' is measured. Calves with feed=T are routed to a step where 'y' is
measured.") Now a calf assigned feed=H has not had its y variable measured. We do not
know its y property at all, and it might not coincide with any of the measurements we did
obtain for y. But we can assume that the distribution of the y values is similar in the two
groups.
This could be a big problem, the fact that a variable can be measured on one branch
of a selection but not another. There are statistical packages which simply cannot handle the
case records from such an experiment, not just cheap packages but major, high-priced ones.
There is a hack around the problem, and a reason why it is not that much of a problem
anyway. The hack is that if a variable y is measured on one branch but not another, then on
the other branch it is recorded as "missing". This means that when we look at the relation
between y and other variables, a package will only look at the cases for which y was
recorded.
The reason why it is not that much of a problem anyway is that the main use of




1 -> "teach method A" then "teach method B"
, 2 -> "teach method B" then "teach method A"
3
then "determine method used"
Indeed, as here, the different branches often measure no variables at all. Another common
case is where the substeps are all identity.
3.12. Dispersing Component Sets
Sometimes we want to look at all the elements of a component, and want to treat
them all the same way. For example, suppose we have a sample (random or otherwise) of
21 secondary schools, and assign the school at random to either of two groups, where one
group is to use textbook A and the other to use textbook B for a certain form 3 class, and we
test all the pupils of each class at the beginning and end of the year.
We have
select[textbook; A->identity, B->identity] then
something




for the pupils. It is important to note that while we might have a random sample of schools,
we do not have a random sample of their pupils, and we cannot even control how many
pupils there will be.
Each school actually has some components, one of which is the set of pupils in¬
volved in this experiment. We need some way of notionally breaking up the groups so that
we can take the pupils as the units. What we want to say is "Here is a stream of schools.
Take the "form 3" component of each school, and disperse its components into a common
stream of pupils."
Formally, suppose each object satisfying description D has a component C which is a
set of elements satisfying description Dm, S is an experiment step of signature
(Dm, B u {C_id}, A). Then
disperse[C; S]
is an experiment step of signature (D, B, A). It takes a stream of D-objects (here the
schools), takes the C component (here "form 3") of each, forms a stream of Dm-objects (here
the pupils) and routes that stream into experiment stage S. So in this example we have
select[textbook; A -> identity, B -> identity] then
disperse[pupils; observe[x] then wait then observe[y]]
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3.12.1. Identifiers
Something to note about this is that we get a new variable, CJd. In this particular
example, each pupil gets labelled with the nsame of the school he or she came from. We
saw that with the assign[] form as well. But now we discover what it is good for. There are
several ways that we might represent the data from an experiment like this. Suppose we
have measured one variable on the whole objects, WV, and one variable on the components,
CV. We have the variable CJd which exists because this is a dispersal, and every subject
comes with a unique subject identifier SJd (which corresponds to the "case number
automatically generated by some packages). One way of representing the experiment in a
package is to have a data set with four variables,
S_id, WV, C_id, CV one record per component





This is a fairly wasteful thing to do. If one of the objects has 27 components, its WV value will
be recorded 27 times. And of course that is an invitation to mistype one of those replicates.
Another way is to have two data sets:
S_id, WV one record per whole object
S_id, C_id, CV one record per component
In GENSTAT7, we might have
'SCALAR' NSCHOOLS
'VARIATE' SCHOOLTYPE(NSCHOOLS) (S_ A1■0"J WV}
'SCALAR NPUPILS
'VARIATE' EXAMRESULT(NPUPILS) (C id -> CV}
'FACTOR' SCHOOLNO(NPUPILS) $ NSCHOOLS (C_ id -> S_id}
Readers who know about data base theory will recognise third normal form. See [Maier
83] section 6.2. The reason for recording the CJd is that if we then do a further dispersal on
components of the components, we can introduce a third data set
S_id, C_id, new_C_id, morejneasurements
The result of having all these "identifier" variables is that if it is possible for more than one
object to go through a given step, those two objects have distinct identifiers, so we can keep
their measurements straight. Also, and this is just a practical point, the identifier variables
very often indicate the order in which the objects were considered, or have some other or¬
dinal significance, so that plotting some variables against identifiers may be useful in detect¬
ing unexpected systematic errors. In the watered-pots example, if we plotted evaporation
7the syntax has been simplified
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against pot number (within watering level), that might reveal a systematic effect due to time of
day.




The own_name case is when the components come with names of their own. This is the
case in the school example. All of the pupils have their own names, which could serve as
component identifiers (because all that matters is that no two components of one object have
the same CJd). These names do not correspond to any interesting order.
The rank case is when there is a natural ordering on the components, such as age of
children in a family, or initial weight of piglets in a litter, and the component identifier is the
rank in this order. The Attribute is an attribute of the components, not of the whole objects,
and the client should be warned if the substep which examines the components does not
measure this attribute properly. If the attribute is measured properly, we can look for relation¬
ships between it and the other variables in the usual fashion. If the attribute is not measured
properly, we cannot do quite as well. There are two cases here. The first is when the
components are dispersed in random order. That is the good one. There are statistical
methods which can exploit that. The second is when the components are dispersed in a
systematic order related to this attribute. That is the bad one, because we then run the risk of
systematic error. If we disperse herds of cows by age of cow, and we are giving them an
injection of some drug, and that drug is decomposing as time goes on, then the effect of the
drug decomposing will masquerade as an effect of cow age.
The serial case is when the experimenter assigns component identifiers in order of
treatment, whether the numbering starts again at 1 for each parent object or distinguishes all
the components makes little difference. This is the one we can use to detect unanticipated
systematic effects that are correlated with time.
The same classification applies to the top level "case numbers". Even when we have
a random sample, it is useful to know whether the cases are studied in random order or
whether this order is correlated with some attribute.





I have never seen this distinction made in a Statistics textbook.
3.13. Filtering
Ideally, the routing decisions in an experiment are random. The benefit of this is that
a random decision is guaranteed to be independent of the other variables. But sometimes
moral or practical considerations mean that we have to base routing decisions on charac¬
teristics of the units. For example, a medical experimenter does not have the option of giving
a placebo to a seriously ill patient when there is a treatment which could reasonably be
expected to be more successful at curing that particular patient. Less obviously, some treat¬
ments may not be possible for some patients. If we want to measure the milk yield of a cow,
there is no point in milking the bull!
I call the operation of routing a unit to a treatment based on its already measured
characteristics "filtering", because it is most often used to select a subsample for further
study. For example, we might test all the cattle in a farm for tuberculosis bacilli in the blood,
then filter out the bulls to test for tuberculosis bacilli in the milk of the cows. Such filtering is
legitimate and useful. The rejected part of the sample gives us information about the rest of
the target population. In this example, we learn two things: the prevalence of tuberculosis in
the herd (from the blood test) and the degree to which the milk is affected.
Other uses of the operation are possible but regrettable. An example of such a use
would be a medical experiment where patients with severe illness were always routed to the
experimental group rather than the control group. This is excellent medical ethics, but it is
regrettable Statistics, as it confounds the effect of the treatment with the effect of being
severely ill. This operation was included in the catalogue so that ASA could recognise such
statistically regrettable experiments and print a warning. None of the experiments which
were described to ASA needed this operation.
The notation is based on decision tables.
Let S[i] be steps whose signature is (D, {V} u B, A). Each incoming unit is to be routed to
one of these steps.
Let T[j] be logical expressions in the variables B. These expressions will decide which of the
S[i] a unit is to be routed to.
Let V be a discrete variable with values V[1]...V[k], This variable will record which of the S[i]
a unit was routed to, e.g. a unit routed to S[2] will have the value V[2] assigned to its V
variable.
Let R[j] be a subset of {V[1]...V[k]j for each j.
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Then
when[V; T[j]->R[j]; V[i]->S[i]] : <D,B,A)
is a step.
When a subject enters this step, the logical expressions are evaluated. The union of
the R[j] corresponding to true T[j] is taken, and one of the values in that set is selected as the
value of V. The subject is then routed to the corresponding substep as for "select'.
This is not a pleasant thing from a statistical view-point, as it means that any dif¬
ference between the treatments in the substeps is confounded with the difference between
the subjects going through those steps. But consider a medical experiment to determine the
effectiveness of some new risky technique. We might have





true -> Treat, false -> DontTreat] then
observe[degree of recovery]
What this means is that if the severity of the disease is observed to be "high", the value of
whether_treated will be selected at random from the set {true}, if "low" from {false}, or if
"medium" then {true,false}. If whetherjreated is selected as "true", the patient will be routed
to the step "Treat", while if it is selected as "false" the patient will be routed to the step
"DontTreat". So very ill patients will certainly be treated, mildly ill patients will certainly not be
treated, and the rest will have a 50-50 chance of treatment. This example should go some
way toward explaining why the form is so complex.
This form of step is not included in ASA, as the simple experiments I've looked at
have no use for it. Also, I started out with the idea that non-parametric statistics were a Good
Thing, but that Statistics was all about significance tests, and that I was entitled to forget
about anything that interfered with that. Since then I have learned better. If we are just
looking for anything interesting that might turn up, we can ignore the difference between a
"when" step and a "select" step, provided we remember to warn the user that any "significance
levels" that may come out of a package will be meaningless.
A particularly important special case of this is when some class of subjects is dis¬
carded:
include[T; S] = when[included;
T -> {true}, not T -> {false};
true -> S, false -> identity]
An experiment where we select a large sample, make a number of tests, and then systemati¬
cally select a subsample, would be described this way. Some packages would have difficulty
handling the data from such an experiment. We would like to represent it as two data sets:
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one for the variables measured on all the subjects, and one for the variables measured on
the included subjects. In SPSS, for example, we'd have to supply dummy values for the
latter variables.
The reason I include this form here, despite its omission from ASA, is to point out that
this approach to describing experiments can handle such things naturally.
In actual medical and biological experiments, an important version of this general
form is called censoring: sometimes a subject just does not live long enough for a measure¬
ment to be made. For example, suppose we intend to measure a rat's body weight 2 weeks,
3 weeks, and 4 weeks from the beginning of an experiment. If a rat dies after 22 days, we
cannot make the 4 week measurement. The paradigm case of censoring is when the
experiment does not last long enough. For example, in comparing the merits of 3 different
treatments for lung cancer, we might want to record how long each patient lived after treat¬
ment was started. But some of the patients (ideally all of them!) may still be alive when the
experiment runs out of money. The general nature of censoring is that some event occurs
which makes further observation of a subject impossible. This does not fit well into the
experiment structures outlined here.
Another form of censoring is when the measuring instruments are incapable of
registering the entire range of a variable. For example, the temperature of a patient might be
recorded with a thermometer which can only register the range 36 to 38 degrees Celsius. In
that case, the reading "38" actually means "38 or greater". This could be represented with
the utmost ease by extending the lattice of value spaces with a new generator
censored(ValueSpace, LowBound, HighBound)
The reason that this was not done for ASA is that ASA doesn't know about any methods for
dealing with censored data. Such methods were left out of ASA because they did not appear
to add any interesting problems.
3.14. Sampling
A lot of experiments, and a lot of "exploratory" studies, take all the subjects they can
get. But other experiments, such as surveys, have a sampling step which selects the sub¬
jects for the experiment. The structure of this step is all-important, and the experiment proper
is just a single measurement step.
The same kind of approach works for sampling as for treatments. We have a func¬
tion which is applied to a population and delivers a sample as a result. This is then supplied
to the experiment proper, so we have
experiment(sample(population)).
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I have only considered five kinds of sampling procedure, and two of those are no
longer represented in the current version of ASA. The five kinds are:
1. exhaustive : all the members of the target population were studied
2. haphazard : a sample was taken, but following no sensible procedure
3. random : what Statistics texts call "simple random sampling with replacement".
4. subsampling : having obtained a sample by some other method, a set com¬
ponent of the subjects is selected, and a simple random sample taken of those
components. Each subject thus comes with a pair (or more) of identifiers,
naming the object itself and its parent. Subsampling can be nested.
5. stratified sampling : the population is divided into "strata" based on the value of
some attribute, then a simple random sample is taken from each stratum. If we
have a population of 1000 people containing 900 men and 100 women, a
simple random sample of 100 people could contain 93 men and 7 women. A
stratified sample would contain 50 men (out of 900) and 50 women (out of 100).
The last two types of sampling have been left out of the current version of ASA since
reasoning about sampling does not seem to be interestingly different from the other kinds of
reasoning that ASA does, and because rules relating sampling structures and experiment
structures are hard to come by. Statistics texts concentrate on one kind of complexity at a
time, and this is Al research, not Statistics research. See [Cochran 77] and [Hajek 81] for
more about sampling. As a matter of fact, the idea of using a algebra of functions over
streams of units came from studying sampling, and was then applied to the body of experi¬
ments.
So we have a single entity - the sampling plan of the experiment -- with its single
type. That entity determines a single identifier variable.
3.15. Limitations of this Notation
The experiment structures covered by the classical topic "design of experiments"
(see for example [Cochran 57]) can be handled by this notation, but the result is bulky and
tedious. The random assignment and selection forms could be augmented with formulas
such as GLIM [GLIM 78] supports, and no new theory would be involved.
Most of the difficulties with this notation concern time. There are many experiments
where the progress of Newtonian time is important, and the present notation cannot handle
them. There is an experiment reported in[Velleman 81], for example, where a radio ther¬
mometer is attached to a cow, and the temperature is recorded every 10 minutes. Here the
"subjects" are not physical objects such as cows, but events. There is obviously a very
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strong tendency for the temperature at one time to be much the same as it was 10 minutes
before. In such experiments, it is the way in which the values at different times are related
which is of interest. But this notation is based firmly on the idea that subjects are essentially
unrelated.
Nor can the notation handle experiments whose structure changes with time. If an
experiment is performed twice, once as a pilot study with few cases and many variables, and
once as the main study with many cases and few variables (selected according to the results
of the pilot study), We could get by using the "when" form:
(common part of experiment) then
include[(sampled in pilot study);
(part which is only in pilot study)]
It would be better if the relationship between the two studies could be explicitly stated, espe¬
cially as there might be several studies, perhaps a pilot study and slightly different variants of
the main study in different regions. The notational approach presented here appears to be
adequate for the separate pieces; what is needed is an "analogy mapping" layer on top, so
that a Statistics Advisor can see the several studies as instances of a common plan.
3.16. Relationships Between Variables
There are several important relationships between variables which can be deduced
from or defined in terms of the structure of the experiment.
An extremely important (and also obvious) relation between two variables is whether
or not they are measured on the same units. In fact this relation does not appear explicitly in





-> measured_on(Result, Sample) &
where the requirement that the two variables be measured on the same units is stated
implicitly. If the only benefit of ascertaining the experiment structure was the ability to pose
this question, it would still be worth while.
If we were given complete explicit experiment structures to start with, the primitive
relation would be that a variable is determined in a particular step, and a variable would be
measured on a particular sample if that sample flowed into a step containing as one of its
substeps the place the variable was measured in. But in fact we start with a vague descrip¬
tion and refine it only when necessary, so the measured_on facts are primary, and there are
rules in ASA to ensure that substeps inherit the measured_on relation.
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Another relation is follows.
We say that V2 follows V1 when every determination of V2 follows in time a deter¬
mination of V1 for the same subject. "Determination" means either finding out the identifier of
something, deciding which level of a treatment to apply, or measuring an observation. The
point of "follows" is to track "causality". Clearly, V2 can be influenced by V1 in at least three
ways.
• If V1 is a treatment, any causal connection between V1 and V2 can only flow
from V1 to V2, simply because that is the way we have constructed the experi¬
ment, not because of the variable types or anything else. If we divide 50 people
into two groups at random, kick the 25 people in one group in the shins, measure
everyone's blood pressure, and find that the kicked group have an average
blood pressure 5 points higher than the unkicked group, it is reasonable to pos¬
tulate a causal connection between being kicked and having an elevated blood
pressure. It would not be reasonable to explain being kicked as a result of
having a higher blood pressure, because we know that our coin-tossing was not
affected by the subjects' blood pressure. It would also be silly to look for a
common factor which explained both being kicked and blood pressure.
• If V1 and V2 are both observations, things are messier. Even if V2 follows V1,
and even if a lot happens in between,
• V2 could influence V1 but not conversely,
• V1 could influence V2 but not conversely,
• they could influence each other,
• or there could be some common factor which explains any statistical rela¬
tion between them.
To continue the example, suppose we took our sample of 50 people and asked a
friend to kick any of them he felt like kicking, giving us V1, and then we
measured the blood pressure, giving us V2. It could well be that he chose to
kick all the fat people! The point of randomising treatments is to eliminate unin¬
tended causation of this sort. As an example where causality might plausibly
flow either way, consider an experiment where V1 is the total number of
cigarettes smoked, and V2 is whether or not someone has cancer of the air tract
by age 50. There is no doubt at all that there is a strong link between these two
variables. Nowadays it is all but certain that smoking causes cancer. But it used
to be possible to argue that maybe people who were cancer prone had a
stronger tendency to smoke, and that perhaps smoking might even be beneficial
for these people.
• Finally if we know V1 when we measure V2, our expectations may influence the
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result. For example, we might anticipate that people whose shins have just been
kicked might be feeling aggressive. So we might have their blood pressure
measured by a male nurse, and the control group's blood pressure measured by
a female nurse. Now we cannot tell whether it is being kicked that raises blood
pressure, or having it measured by a male nurse. More subtly, educational ex¬
periments are plagued by this effect; the teacher, knowing the results of a
preliminary test, cannot help behaving differently to pupils. This may possibly be
good pedagogy but it is bad Statistics. Here temporal order does matter; we
cannot be influenced by our knowledge of V1 until we have measured it.
A sort of "causality" can flow from the identity of the subject. Your blood pressure is
determined by a number of factors, but a lot of them have the same cause, namely your
genotype. That is, what you are like depends to some extent on what has happened to you
and to some extent on who you are.
Indeed, a branch of Statistics called "randomisation tests" exists, whose basic idea is
that if subjects are assigned to treatments at random, we can tell how strongly an effect
depends on what has happened to you by pretending that it only depends on who you are,
and looking at the distribution of the effect variable over all possible assignments.
Temporal succession is generally irrelevant to identifiers. The constitution of a
household, for example, is not determined by our including it in a sample, nor is it likely to be
influenced by which brand of shampoo we talk them into using for a month. There are of
course experiments where this is not true. For example:
P. We have a random sample of dishes from one day's run of a factory making dishes.
They are heated to one of 5 different temperatures and then dropped into a cold bath.
Each of the pieces that a dish shatters into is weighed.
In this experiment, a piece is identified by (dish number, piece number within dish). It
is entirely plausible that the number of pieces a dish shatters into depends on the tempera¬
ture to which it has been heated. There are thus two kinds of processes for getting com¬
ponents of an object: those which merely locate already existing components, and those
which create new components. This has nothing to do with variables; it is a question of what
we do.
The possibility that a process may create components has unfortunate consequences
for knowledge representation. When we describe a new kind of entity to ASA, we can
reasonably be expected to list the components that can be located by various kinds of
processes. Thus a mammal has a head, eyes, four legs, various other organs, and so forth,
and we could be expected to know this in advance, and we could build up a fair bit of
knowledge about relationships between these pieces. But a butcher can cut up a beast in
many different ways, even just slice it up into 1-inch sections, and we can not be expected to
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know about all of these ways in advance. If ASA represented actions/processes explicitly, as
it has always been my intention to do, we could reasonably expect to be told that such and
such a process creates new components so and so.
So the current version of ASA can not handle experiments where components are
created rather than located (unless you lie to it). That is not because defining the relation
"follows" would be hard, or any of the other reasoning steps, but because ASA does not
explicitly represent measurement/treatment processes, and so there is currently no place to
put any information we may have about the created components.
That being the case, we can define "follows" this way.
1. No treatment follows anything.
2. No identifier follows anything. (Over-simple.)
3. Every observation follows itself.
4. If identifier I dominates observation O, O follows I.
5. If treatment T temporally precedes observation O, O follows T.
3.17. Some More Examples
This section presents several small but realistic examples to show that experiment
structure matters. They do not, of course, show that this notation is "correct:, but they do
show how it can be used. I have found that writing down the structure of an experiment in
this notation is a useful exercise even when no computer is involved, because it shows up
possible nuisance links that I might otherwise have missed. Several text-books which I have
used as sources of test cases contain examples which are so ambiguously presented that a
unique structure could not be determined; this means that a student working from such an
example can easily suppose the structure to be a very different one from that intended by the
author, and learn to use the method exhibited on the wrong structure!
3.17.1. Segregated Schools
Suppose we were interested in the question of whether white children did better in
segregated schools or in integrated schools.
One approach would be to take a sample of schools and measure for each one (a)
whether it was segregated or integrated, and (b) what was the average score of white
children on some standard examination. This would be written down as
observe[{segregated,score}]
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There are several sensible models that one might investigate. One of them would be a
classical one-way analysis of variance on 'score' with 'segregated' as the class variable. For
this model to say anything trustworthy, the schools we studied must be a random (or
exhaustive) sample from the schools of interest.
Another approach would be to take a sample of uncommitted schools (perhaps
schools which had been built but not yet staffed before the study started) and randomly make
half of them segregated and the other half integrated, and then measure the scores at the





Because of the time sequence, there is only one interesting model (try to explain 'score' in
terms of 'segregated').
For the two experiments, we would end up with the same calculations. But the
answers would mean different things. The results from the first experiment tell us what to
expect if we look at another school from the existing population which did not happen to be
included in the study. The results from the second experiment tell us what to expect if we
change things.
The two experiments also have different validity conditions. The first experiment is
only meaningful when we have a random sample. When the explanatory variables of a
model are not randomly assigned, ASA is obliged to ask the client whether he has a random
sample. The second experiment has its own internal randomisation, so ASA does not ask
about the sampling plan.
3.17.2. Rat Longevity
Suppose we are interested in testing the hypothesis that eating chemicals which bind
free radicals will prolong your life. We might decide to experiment on rats, and to try say four
different foods:
(a) an unmodified food
(b) a food containing radical-absorber 1
(c) a food containing radical-absorber 2
(d) a food which produces more free radicals
We would feed our rats on these foods, and record how long they lived. We are interested in
testing the hypotheses that
life_span(fed b) > life_span(fed a)
life_span (fed c) > life_span(fed a)
life_span(fed a) > life_span(fed d)
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One way of conducting the experiment would be to take just-weaned rats and select
a food type at random for each rat. This would be written down as
select[food_type] then
observe[{life_span}]
acting on a stream of rats.
Another approach would be to exploit the fact that rats are bom in litters. We would
take a sample of litters each containing at least four pups, and assign one pup from each
litter to each of the four treatments. This would be written down as
assign[pups; food_type;
X -> observe[{life_span}]]
acting on a stream of litters.
In the first experiment, we can compute average life-spans for each of the food types,
and look at the differences to see whether they are significant. In the second experiment, we
have matched subjects, so we can compute the differences, and look at the averages of the
differences. The second experiment is more sensitive. Both experiments have their own
internal randomisation, so make sense even when the sample is not randomly selected.
(And the sample for the second experiment is not a random sample of litters: litters with 1, 2,
or 3 pups will be ignored.)
Unlike the previous example, in this example we perform different calculations, but
the results have similar interpretations.
3.17.3. Sibling Rivalry
Suppose we are interested in studying sibling rivalry, and have a sample of 50
brother-sister pairs of much the same age. The idea of the experiment is to give one child in
each pair a shiny new toy (carefully selected to be gender-neutral) and the other child a
battered version of the same toy, and to took for aggressive behaviour. (Right-thinking
children would at once attack the psychologists.) One way of doing this would be to give the
new toy to the boy in each pair. This would be written down as
separate[boy -> identity % give new
,girl -> identity % give old
] then
observe[{aggression} ]
Note that the details of the treatment do not show up in this example, because there is no
separate "which toy" measurement.
Another approach would be to make the assignment at random, giving the new toy to







Performing the first experiment would be a profoundly silly thing to do, because we
would be completely unable to distinguish the effects of being given the new toy and the
effects of being the boy. If all boys tended to be aggressive towards their sisters, we might
think we had seen a reaction to the disparity in the toys, when we had only seen "normal"
behaviour.
3.18. Summary
Statistical experiments are planned activities. The structure of an experiment is
definitely known to a client, and is an important source of information for deciding on an
analysis. Methods copied from the study of computational structures can be adapted to the
description of experiments.
This chapter presented
• Examples to show that structure is important
• An approach to formalising the description of experiment structure -- the little
man metaphor, and its formal analogue of experiment steps as functions over
streams
• A specific notation based on this approach
• Examples of the use of the notation











Section 3.12.1 mentioned the result that a step can also be read as specifying the
structure of a data set as a collection of normalised relations. This is important for generating
commands for a statistical package, but is not important for reasoning about which calcula¬





This chapter argues for a new view of types: instead of distinguishing the class of
unary predicates as interesting, distinguish functions whose codomain is a complete lattice as
interesting. These functions I call aspects.
The ABASE knowledge representation scheme, rules aside, turns out to be basically
a form of frames, with type hierarchies, multiple inheritance, and a form of defaults. The way
it actually developed was that I started from MECHO, and then
• tried to eliminate the use of compound terms {which led to frame-like structures}
• generalised the type system {which led to multiple inheritance}
• rationalised negative rules {which led to lattice-based defaults}
• turned values into types.
Let me make this last point a little bit clearer. Suppose that once upon a time ASA had a
predicate
p(Object, Value)
where function(p(O, V), [O]).
(The "function" annotation means that for any given O, there is precisely one true instance of
p(0,V). That is, p is a function from O to V.) Now a finite set of distinct values can be turned
into a lattice by adding two points: 'unknown' (1), and 'inconsistent' (0). The type system
avoids storing 'inconsistent' type assignments, and all type-like values are assumed
'unknown' initially, so this really is not such a big change. Switching from
p(Object, Value)
form to
the p of Object is Value
or Object is a Value
form means that all the mechanisms developed for the type system described in this chapter
become available at once. Relational notation is retained for entities which are not known till
run time. A particularly important result is that we have the set of possible values available,
so that we can show them to the client in a question, do reasoning by exclusion, and so forth.
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It is common in Al to divide facts into at least two kinds: ordinary predications, and
types. Many type systems have been described, ranging from the common "simple type
trees" to NETL [Reiter 81, Schmolze 83, Fahlman 79]. These and most other well known
type systems have the property that we may regard "X belongs to type T" as a variant nota¬
tion for "T(X)". That is, types are viewed as unary predicates, and the variations between the
types systems concern which sentences of the unary predicate calculus are built into the type
machinery.
A simple type-tree is a type system where the types (unary predicates) can be ar¬
ranged as nodes in a rooted tree, where T1 is an ancestor of T2 in the tree if and only if
(VX) T2(X) => T1(X)
in the logic, and where if T1 and T2 are cousins (that is, neither is an ancestor of the other),
(VX) ~<T1(X) £ T2 (X) )
Simple type-trees are easy to understand. They are also very useful. Accordingly, they are
very popular. Chapter 7 presents an efficient data structure for simple type-trees and an
algorithm for maintaining the data structure as new types are added. Unfortunately, simple
type-trees are inadequate for many simple reasoning tasks. Consider the following state¬
ments:
[1] an animal can be male, female, sterile, or hermaphrodite
and it can be neonate, juvenile, adult, senile, or dead
and it belongs to some species.
[2] an animal and its mother belong to the same species
[3] if an animal is a vertebrate it is male or female
if an animal is an insect it is male, female, or sterile
[4] there is a classification "languages known"
a human can be classified that way,
a chimpanzee can be classified that way,
an animal which is neither a human
nor a chimpanzee cannot.
[5] if S is a sample
and X is a typical_member of S
and the type of X is T
then size(S) is a variable
and the value_space of size(S) is count(T)
Simple type-trees cannot handle statement [1]. For example, the combinations
(male&juvenile) and (juvenile&crocodile) are compatible but neither entails the other. It is
impossible to arrange them in one tree. We can set up gender, age, and species as separate
simple type-trees, but their combination is not equivalent to any tree. MECHO's type system
[Bundy et al 76b, Bundy et al 77, Bundy et al 79b] can handle statement [1], but not the
others. The collection of the simple type-trees does form a lattice, so the methods of this
chapter are applicable.
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There are two problems with statement [2], In MECHO we have the problem of
disentangling the "species" part of a type from the rest of the type. This is not an insuperable
problem; although the notation currently used provides no way of expressing statement [2],
the implementation could support it. The real problem is that while the statement is true for
"species" it is not true for "variety". The offspring of a cat are cats, but the offspring of a
Siamese cat are not always Siamese! This can again be got around by ad hoc means,
namely by labelling some of the nodes in the type system as "species" nodes, and generalis¬
ing the current type of one object up as far as a "species" node before transferring the type to
another node.
Being able to hack statement [2] in the implementation is not enough. Statements
resembling all of these examples are important in ASA, and it would be much better if the
type system were able to express them, not because it had been hacked especially to sup¬
port them, but because the ability to do so was a consequence of other, more basic, design
decisions.
Statement [3] can be handled using more than one type tree, or using a system like
MECHO. I have in mind a type tree such as
gendered_thing
We can write very simple rules that express statement [3] exactly;
vertebrate(X) -> nonsterile(X).
insect(X) -> nonhermaphrodite(X).
Despite the fact that its notation would seem to admit such rules, MECHO cannot in fact
handle type inferences of this form. That is simply because no need for them was found in
MECHO, while such a need was found in ASA. There is not the least problem with stating
type inferences this way. The logic is perfectly clear. MECHO would have no real difficulty in
using such rules in a forward chaining way; as soon as we learn that insect(jiminy) we con¬
clude that nonhermaphrodite(jiminy). Indeed, forward chaining on type rules is safe simply
because forward chaining in the unary predicate calculus is safe; there are only finitely many
propositions which can be formed from the type language.
This brings us to example [5]: for any (suitable) "type" T there is to be another type
"count(T)". Chapter 2 describes how value spaces are constructed from other value spaces.










ment in Mechanics has an associated "dimension", which is a triple of rational numbers
<M,L,T> denoting the powers to which Mass, Length, and Time are raised. For example,
force has dimensions <1,1,-2>
slope has dimensions <0,0,0>
the gravitational constant has dimensions <-l,3,-2>
Clearly, there are infinitely many such dimensions. Physical dimensions are an excellent way
of dividing measurements into incompatible classes, an Expert System for any sort of math¬
ematical modelling should be able to reason about them. (MECHO relies on its rules being
dimensionally correct so that it never introduces ill-typed entities. It doesn't use dimensional
analysis to help it select an equation.) But this destroys the finiteness property which makes
forward chaining safe. Since such infinite sets of types are so important for mathematical
modelling, it is reassuring to know, as a later section of this chapter proves, that a form of
finiteness remains, which is sufficient.
Example [4] shows that even a set of simple type trees may not be enough. The
family tree of the primates has humans, chimpanzees, and gorillas at the same level; we
want a certain property to be applicable to chimpanzees and to humans but not to gorillas.
MECHO'S type system does let us have multiple descriptions, but if two nodes in its type tree
skeleton both have another classification applicable to them, this other classification must be
attached to a common ancestor. In this particular case, we could introduce a dummy com¬
mon ancestor of humans and chimpanzees, but what if we decided to admit whales to the
family of language users?
4.2. A Richer Type System.
Many authors have suggested that simple taxonomies are too restrictive. In this
section I examine two alternatives that have been proposed. But these type systems them¬
selves have representational deficiencies, so I propose a new type system which is more
flexible.
4.2.1. MECHO
MECHO [Bundy et at 79b, Bundy et al 79a, Bundy, Byrd & Mellish 82] is an Expert
System for solving elementary Mechanics problems. MECHO's types still form a tree, but the
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T_1 T_2 T_3
represents a set of axioms
(Vx) T_i(x) <=> T_0(x)
whose point is to allow several different classifications to apply to the same class of entities.
For example,
object <-> oneof(animate, inanimate).
animate <-> oneof(human, mouse).
animate <-> oneof(male, female).
animate <-> oneof(young, old).
says that one sort of a object is an animate object, nothing novel about that, and further says
that animate objects can be classified three ways. There is a derivative of MECHO which
would insist on separate names for each of the three aspects, e.g.




species <-> oneof(human, mouse),
sex <-> oneof(male, female).
age <-> oneof(young, old).
In MECHO the type of an individual is a conjunction of nodes in the type tree, where of
course the conjunction must be permitted by the implied axioms. A cunning Prolog coding
trick due to Chris Mellish is used to represent these conjunctions. So we can easily say that
Hine-Nui-Te-Poo is "human & female & old".
Two nodes in MECHO'S tree are compatible iff one of them is an ancestor of the
other or their nearest common ancestor is an AND node. Numbering the nodes doesn't slow
down finding the nearest common ancestor, but it doesn't make it any faster either. So node
numbering doesn't help MECHO.
The representational deficiency is that we can't have nodes inside the tree which
represent conjunctions, so we can't have a classification which applies only to old humans
and not to all humans or all old things. For example, if we have a "Science Fiction"
knowledge base which contains both biological and social information, we might want human
beings to be classified under Earth-animals, and Fuzzies to be classified under Zarathustran-
animals. But we might also want to classify sapient beings as e.g. literate -vs- illiterate. In
MECHO the only way to do this is to make "animal" a conjunctive node, with "biological class"
and "literacy" as two of its aspects. This has the undesirable side-effect of accepting the
question "is this stork literate" as well-typed.
96
4.2.2. Tangled Hierarchies
A tangled hierarchy is an acyclic graph, where the nodes are interpreted much the
same as in a taxonomy, except that some nodes just represent disjunctions. That is, it is





T 1 T_2 T_3
which represents a set of axioms
(Vx) T_l(x) => T_0(x)
(Vx) T_2(x) => T_0 (x)
(Vx) T_3 (x) =* T 0 (x)
and no others.
A further difference is that a node may have more than one parent. (This immediately wrecks
the node numbering method of chapter 7. I have looked in vain for a generalisation which
applies to acyclic graphs.) If we continue to interpret arcs as implications,
p_l p_2 p_3
/1\ /1 \ /1\
I \ I /I
\ i/
T_0
just means that P_1 & P_2 & P_3 => T_0. Clearly, if this is to make sense, the nearest
common ancestor of each pair of parents must be a simple disjunction.
This gets around the problem mentioned in the previous section. We can say that
humans are both Terran-primates and possible-readers, and we can also say that Fuzzies
are both Zarathustran-pseudo-primates and possible-readers. And doing so does not
prevent us further classifying humans and Fuzzies independently.
But we still have problems. Suppose we have
thing <-> terran V zarathustran V literacy.
literacy <-> oneof(literate, illiterate).
human -> terran-primate & literacy.
fuzzy -> zarathustran-pseudo-primate & literacy.
literate <-> oneof(only-reads, reads-and-writes).
reads-and-writes <-> oneof(just-scribbles, author).
author <-> oneof(member-of-PEN, common-author).
I am sure PEN is not racist in the real world, but in the Science Fiction world we can imagine
it excluding Fuzzies. However, even in a tangled hierarchy there is no way to say that the
rest of the literacy sub-tree is applicable to Fuzzies without implying that author is as well.
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4.2.3. A Possible Solution.
What we want is a type system with at least the flexibility of tangled hierarchies and
as much of the efficiency of simple taxonomies as possible. It seems to me that the root of
the problem is the assumption that an individual has a single type. This assumption is only
made for practical reasons, so if we can treat multiple types efficiently I think we should.
Instead of a binary relation
Individual Isa Taxon,
let us consider a ternary relation
Individual qua Taxonomy Isa Taxon.
With such a relation, we can express such facts as
fred qua animal isa human.
fred qua voter Isa tory.
fred qua located_object isa in_edinburgh.
without imposing any purely implementational relation between the "animal", "voter", and
"located_object" taxonomies. The type of an individual is defined to be the conjunction of its
classifications. Since each taxonomy is a tree, the algorithm of chapter 7 is applicable.
However, just having this ternary relation would permit any conjunction, such as a
tory cockroach. So in addition to the taxonomies, we need rules to say when an object may
be classified under a given taxonomy. These rules could take the form
<taxonomy> applies_when <test>.
<test> ::= <taxonomy> isa <taxon>
| <test> and <test>
| <test> or <test>
This is to be interpreted as
(VX) {(BY) X qua <taxonomy> isa Y) <=> <test> (X)
where
(<taxonomy> Isa <taxon>)(X) = X qua <taxonomy> isa <taxon>
(<ti> and <t2>)(X) = <ti>(x) & <t2>(x)
(<ti> or <t2>)(X) = <tl>(X) I <t2>(X)
For example, we might have
literacy applies_when
animal Isa human or animal isa fuzzy,
meaning
(VX) ((BY) : X qua literacy Isa Y) <=>
(X qua animal isa human) | (X qua animal isa fuzzy)
We can take one taxonomy, say "natural_kind", as always applicable.
An important thing to note about these type applicability rules is that they are
monotone: if we obtain more specific information about an individual the set of taxonomies
under which it may be classified does not decrease.
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In the remainder of this paper I will generalise the taxonomies from trees to arbitrary
complete lattices. They are then called "aspects", and we write
the <aapect> of <entity> is <value>
rather than
<entity> qua <aspect> isa <value>
but it is the same underlying idea. The "type applicability rules" of this section are just a
special case of description-to-description rules.
4.3. On Being Vague
This section argues that uncertainties attached to predications are ambiguous, and
that the uncertainty commonly lies in some of the arguments of a predication. Descriptions,
which can be vague, are offered as an alternative approach.
Expert system tools often provide methods for "uncertain reasoning". MYCIN
[Shortliffe 76], with its "certainty factors", and Prospector [Duda et at 78], with its quasi-
Bayesian approach, are well known. Shapiro [Shapiro 83] has even shown how the logic
programming paradigm can be adapted to uncertain reasoning.
A good deal of criticism has been directed at the rules these and other systems use
for combining "certainties". Statisticians urge that the rules of probability should be followed
strictly. Proponents of "fuzzy logic" have their panaceas. Yet a major problem with this
approach goes unchallenged, and that is the ascription of uncertainties to propositions at all.
Let us consider a statement that might be made to a program like MYCIN.
Organism-1 grew in medium-2 (.7)
Or, to use a more formal notation,
C[[grew-in(organism-1, medium-2)]] - 0.7
But what does this mean? It is clear that we are assenting to the proposition that organism-1
grew in medium-2, with some reservations, but what is it that we doubt? Here are at least
some of the possibilities:
• We might be quite certain that something grew in medium 2, but we are not
completely certain that it was organism 1. (It might have been another organism
floating around the laboratory which happens to resemble organism-1 closely.)
This is a form of genuine uncertainty about what happened.
• We might be quite certain that organism 1 grew in something, but we are not
completely certain that it was medium 2. (If that glass dish had been placed
under a dripping pipe, an unknown quantity of copper salts might have con¬
taminated the medium.) Again, this is a form of genuine uncertainty about what
happened.
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• We might be quite certain that organism 1 did something in medium 2, but we
are not completely certain that whatever it did falls under the heading of
"growth". (All of the cells might have become bigger, without any of them
dividing.) We are quite sure what we saw, what we are not sure about is what to
call it. This reflects our ignorance, not of events, but of what the other party to
the dialogue wants to know.
• We might be quite certain that organism 1 divided and increased its total
biomass in medium 2, but we are not completely certain whether the amount of
growth is significant. (After all, one cell out of a thousand dividing in an hour is
pretty close to zero.) Again, we are quite sure about what we saw. Our uncer¬
tainty is a property of the dialogue; we don't know quite what the other party
means.
• We may be certain that we were watching organism 1 in medium 2, yet the
precision of our instruments may be such that we can only say that the popula¬
tion of organism 1 changed by something between -1% and +5%. This is uncer¬
tainty about what actually happened, but we know how accurate our measure¬
ments are. Note that if the important fact is whether the organism grew by +30%
or more, we can answer "no" without any doubt at all.
So there are at least five different ways that we could be uncertain about this par¬
ticular statement that organism 1 grew in medium 2.
There are three8 kinds of uncertainty in this example. They are
1. Ambiguity in the dialogue.
2. Possible mis-identification of individuals
3. Imprecise measurements
Uncertainty about whether the thing that grew in medium 2 was organism 1 is a mis-
identification problem, as is uncertainty about whether the medium was exactly medium 2.
Uncertainty about the numerical value is an imprecise measurement problem. The other
problems are ambiguity in the dialogue. In a predicate with more arguments, there are still
other ways that these basic types of uncertainty can be manifested. Assigning a single
"certainty factor" to a statement as a whole confuses these different sources of uncertainty
not only fails to identify which arguments are the introduce the uncertainty, but fails to distin¬
guish the three different kinds. This is a problem because the appropriate response to each
kind of uncertainty is different.
We now examine of of these kinds of uncertainty in turn.
eMore kinds can easily be discerned
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Ambiguity in the Dialogue
In the context of medical diagnosis, it is reasonable to expect that the client and
consultant will share a common language, so that what it means for an organism to "grow" in
a medium will be well enough understood by both parties. But when the client and consultant
come from different fields, such shared understanding is not as easy to find. Nearly every
time I consult a physician, I experience just this sort of confusion. "Do you take any drugs?"
he asks, and I wonder "should I mention aspirin?" If asked about my vision, is that with or
without glasses? Have you ever tried to describe a head-ache? My limited experience in
statistical consulting has been that a lot of time and effort has to be spent building a common
vocabulary, and that clients often tend to omit details that they do not consider to be sig¬
nificant, even when specifically asked.
The conversational interface presented to an expert system's client should include
means for reducing this kind of uncertainty. At the very least, detailed glosses for all the
technical terms should be available. Using one and the same mechanism to say either "I'm
not sure I understand the question" and "I understand the question but I'm not sure what the
answer is" seems unhelpful.
Misidentification
When an argument of a predicate ranges over entities, it is possible to misidentify the
entity. Some common causes of this are
• The entity may be discerned by making imprecise measurements and inferring
which entity is responsible. An example might be trying to distinguish the people
in a group by their heights. A way of coping with this source of misidentification
is to deal as far as possible with the measurements themselves rather than the
entity names.
• The entity may be clearly discerned, but the report may be subject to transcrip¬
tion error, as when someone measures field 1 but the measurements are read
as pertaining to field 7.
• If there is a long interval between observing an entity and recording it, the entity
may be misrecalled.
Misidentification is difficult to handle. As ASA deals mostly with abstract individuals
(such entities as samples, stages in experiments, measurements &c) misidentification is rare.
So I have ignored it. Misidentification is often resposible for gross errors, such as standard




Imprecision is another matter. This kind of uncertainty applies to predicate ar¬
guments which range over values. When we are talking about an experiment we intend to
perform, but have not yet performed, we may not have a definite sample size in mind, we
may not be sure how many categories we will divide the range of a continuous variable into,
and so on. But even when we do not know whether we will have 25 subjects or 35, we may
be perfectly sure that we will have more than 20 and fewer than 50. This is often sufficient
precision.
This kind of uncertainty is important in Statistics. We can break it down into two
subtypes: inaccuracy and unfaithfulness.
Inaccuracy applies to measurements. Here "nature" determines a value, over which
the experimenter has no direct control, and the experimenter attempts to measure it with
more or less precise instruments. Often, knowing which measuring instruments are involved
gives us a good idea of the size of error likely. When you are designing an experiment, you
can try to cope with inaccuracy by making repeated measurements or by measuring the
same value with several different kinds of instruments. (In a questionnaire, one would try to
get at the same attitude with several different questions, with scales running in opposite
directions, for example.)
Unfaithfulness applies to treatments. If we intend to apply 1cwt/acre of fertilizer to a
field, some of it may be spilled or blown away by the wind. Worse still, the significant amount
may not be the amount applied but the amount which reaches the roots of the plants in the
field, and that may depend on factors which vary all over the field. Often, knowing how the
treatment is applied gives us a good idea of the size of error likely. Also, in cases like this, it
may be possible to measure effective treatment. For example, one might analyse a sample
of the soil from the relevant depth. In a medical experiment to evaluate a drug, one would try
to measure the amount of the drug which circulates in the blood or reaches the relevant
organ, as well as recording the amount which was administered.
ABASE has no provision for uncertain reasoning, both because I disbelieve in that
approach and because ASA has no need of such reasoning. However, ASA does need to
deal with imprecise figures. It does so using the "descriptions" feature of ABASE. This is a
very important point:
By using descriptions based on lattices, it Is possible to reason with uncertain data in
first-order logic, using one mechanism for both types and imprecise values.
This is not an unexpected bonus of descriptions. The whole description mechanism
described in this chapter was deliberately designed to serve both purposes.
I use the term "vaguenessf to refer to the use of lattices to handle imprecise values.
For example, I would handle the "growth" example by giving a range:
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growth_rate (organism_l, medium_2,
0.1 to 2.0 /* per thousand per hour */).
and a rule which needed to use such a fact might be phrased as
... £
growth_rate(Organism, Medium, Rate) £
Rate is 0.5 to infinity /* per thousand per hour */ £
For any lattice, the intervals of that lattice form a lattice. When the base lattice is a total
order, as here, the lattice operations on the lattice of intervals are just set union and inter¬
section, though this is not the case in general.
A benefit of this approach is that when the client's data are too vague, an expert
system based on descriptions can ask for more information, but by asking a vague question.
Consider the previous statement and rule. The two intervals overlap, so the rule might
indeed apply, but the interval 0.1 to 2.0 is not wholly contained within the interval
0.5 to infinity, so we do not definitely know that the rule does apply. The intersection of the
two intervals is 0.5 to 2.0, so an expert system with this rule and this fact could ask
is the growth rate of Organism in Medium
between 0.5 and 2.0 per thousand per hour?
The client does not have to supply a specific value of the growth rate in order to answer this
question. Clearly, the ability to ask questions which are just specific enough to permit an
inference is important.
Oddly enough, dealing with imprecision this way reduces some of the uncertainty
which is an artefact of the conversation. Instead of the client wondering how much growth is
significant, an expert system based on descriptions tells him how much is significant.
4.4. Introducing Descriptions
We have a set E of entities. Or rather, a set of names of entities. Entity names are
constants. The distinctive characteristic of entities in ABASE is that entity names are not
known until consultation time, and that entity names have no significance other than identity
and difference:
let I be an interpretation function mapping E to
the "real" world (problem domain):
then I is one-to-one.
We have a set D of descriptions. Descriptions may be named by arbitrarily compli¬
cated terms, and very often the structure of such terms has a lot to do with what they mean.
It is up to the knowledge engineer to decide what descriptions look like; this chapter is con¬
cerned with formalising descriptions generally, not with prescribing a particular set of lattices.
So for the moment, let's remain as vague as we possibly can about what descriptions look
like.
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The fundamental question is whether a description applies to a particular entity or
not. We write
• IS d
to indicate that the description d applies to the entity (named by) e. The question of whether
a description applies to an entity (also expressed by saying that the entity satisfies the
description) has to be settled by means beyond the scope of this work: the question
is "john Is human" true?
is to be settled by checking whether the person who introduced the term "human" would
agree that the description he intended by that word does apply to the individual denoted by
the word "john". This is exactly like the Tarskian approach to semantics:
"snow is white" is true
iff "snow" is "white"
is/2 is a predicate, so we can write sentences such as
e is dl £ e is d2 £ ~ (e is d3)
But a description d is not a predicate itself, so
dl £ d2 £ ~d3
doesn't make sense. (Unless the description space D happens to be a Boolean algebra, but
that isn't a particularly interesting case.)
Now the first question we have to ask is when two descriptions are to be regarded as
equal. There are two equally natural choices: extension and intension. The intensional
view regards identity as part of the definition of the set D, so that if we took
D = Z x N (Z is the integers,
N the positive naturals)
E = Q (Q is the rationals)
x is (y, z) =def x*z = y.
then the descriptions (1,1), (2,2), and so forth would all be regarded as different. The exten-
sional view says that two descriptions are to be regarded as equal if they are satisfied by
precisely the same set of entities, so that
(dl = d2) =def ((Ve) e is dl « e is d2)
On the extensional view, (1,1), (2,2), and so forth are all the same description.
There are good arguments for both views. The question is, which is the more useful.
In ABASE we are mainly interested in the entities, and not in the descriptions. This suggests
that the extensional view is the more useful. We never in fact have occasion in ABASE to
test whether two descriptions are the same or not, so I've adopted the extensional view
mainly to keep this chapter simple. Descriptions are singled out so that some kinds of
reasoning can be done fast, so descriptions with complicated structures where checking ex¬
tensional equality is expensive are of no interest anyway.
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In summary: we have a set of entities E, a set of descriptions D, and a relation "is"
between E and D satisfying
((V® in E) (e is dl) <=> (e is d2)) Iff dl = d2.
ABASE provides you with two ways of making a statement about an entity: descrip¬
tors and predications. A predication is a familiar logical atom:
<predicate>(<argument>,...,<argument>).
A descriptor is written as
<entity> is [not] <description>.
What a description looks like is up to the knowledge engineer, though since ABASE is imple¬
mented in Prolog, descriptions have to be represented by Prolog terms.
4.5. Comparing Descriptions
After the question "are these two descriptions the same", the next simplest question
is "does everything satisfying this description also satisfy that one"? We say that description
d1 is stronger than description d2, written
dl < d2
when everything satisfying d1 also satisfies d2. In logical terms:
dl < d2 =def (Ve in E) e is dl —» e is d2.
It follows that (Vd1, d2 in D),
(1) dl < dl
(2) dl < d2 & d2 < dl => dl = d2
(3) dl < d2 & d2 < d3 => dl < d3
In other words, (D,<) is a partial order. If we adopted the intensional view, (2) might not
hold. To continue the example, (1,1) < (2,2) and (2,2) < (1,1) but (1,1) =/= (2,2).
We define maximally (1) and minimally (0) vague descriptions:
(Ve) e is 1 =def true
(Ve) e is 0 =def false
Since false implies everything and everything implies true, it follows from this definition that
(Vd) 0 < d
(Vd) d < 1
As is usual, we define a "strictly stronger" relation:
dl < d2 =def dl < d2 & dl * d2
That is,
(Vel) el is dl => el is d2
(3e2) e2 is d2 & ~(e2 is dl)
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Suppose there are two descriptions d1, d2 such that
di < d2
there is no d3 such that dl < d3 < d2
This means that d1 is only just stronger than d2. In the "gender" example, "male" is only just
stronger than "nonsterile" which is only just stronger than "nonhermaphrodite". This relation
is not transitive; "male" is stronger but not only just stronger than "nonhermaphrodite". It is
usual to call this relation covering and to say that d2 covers dl.
The relation of covering is important when we consider generalisation and specialisa¬
tion. Suppose that we had been testing whether x is d1, and we have found that this test is
too strong. In the absence of any other information about what generalisation to use, we
would consider those descriptions d2 which are only just weaker than d1. In the case of a
simple type tree, there is only one such d2, and it is the parent of d1 in the tree.
Similarly, if we want to acquire more information about an object from the client, and
have no idea what would be useful, we might ask about each description which is only just
stronger than the current description. In a simple type tree these are the children of the
current node.
4.6. Combining Descriptions




We would like to be able to combine all this information into a single description. This one
description may have different aspects, such as gender, age, species. But that is not having
multiple descriptions; the set of aspects is fixed when the knowledge base is constructed, and
the aspects of an individual are simply components of a single description.
We want "combination" to resemble conjunction (though not necessarily to be iden¬
tical to it). Clearly, the combination should not depend on the order in which the statements
are made. For we have the conjunction
(e is dl) & ... & (e is dn)
which follows from these statements. Similarly it shouldn't matter how often we are told that
e is d1, it should have the same effect as being told once. So what we want is an operation
/\ : 2d —> D
such that
[c] (Ve) (e is dl) & ... £ (e is dn) =>
e is /\{dl,...,dn)
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[m] /\{dl,...,dn) is the weakest such description.
For different tasks we shall feel free to invent whatever combination rules (A) seem useful;
but these axioms seem to be a minimal requirement of any useful combination rule. You will
search this volume in vain for any definition of A or V. That is the point; you get to pick a
description space which suits your problems.
We define d1 Ad2 =dgfA{d1 ,d2}.
It follows that
[1] dl /\ dl = dl
[2] dl /\ d2 = d2 /\ dl
[3] dl /\ (d2 /\ d3) = (dl /\ d2) /\ d3 = /\{dl,d2,d3}
[4] dl /\ d2 = dl <=> dl < d2
Now a set with a commutative associative idempotent operator A is called a lower
semilattlce, and the operation A is called a meet. These properties just fall out of our
definition; what we are not guaranteed is the existence of A. If there is a function satisfying
[c] and [m], then it enjoys these properties, but there are partial orders where such a function
does not exist.
In fact simple type trees, as I've presented them up till now, are a good example of
partial orders where there is no A function. What, for example, would femaleAhermaphrodite
be? That is why we want 0. If you take a simple type tree and add a new node 0 (the result
is of course no longer a tree) you can define
/\(dl,...,dn} =
let dx be the deepest node among dl,...,dn
If every dl is an ancestor of dx then dx else 0
and this is a satisfactory meet. The root of the type tree corresponds to 1.
One question remains. Should we require that the meet be defined on all subsets of
D, or on just the finite subsets? If D is finite, as it is in MECHO and ASA, there isn't any
question. But consider the question set of logical terms with alphabetic variants identified,
augmented by 0, where A is unification, yielding 0 if unification fails. The infinite set of terms
{X,f(X),f(f(X)),...} does not have a meet in this set. There is a "completion" of this set, dis¬
cussed in Chapter 4 of [Lloyd 84], in which meets of infinite sets do exist.




It is a standard result of lattice theory that a complete lower semilattice is a complete
lattice [Birkhoff 67], That is, any subset of D has a least upper bound as well as a greatest
lower bound. For least upper bounds we use the symbol V. We have
[1] dl \/ dl = dl
12] dl \/ d2 = d2 \/ dl
[3] dl \/ (d2 \/ d3) - (dl \/ d2) \/ d3 = \ / {dl, d2, d3}
[4] dl \/ d2 = d2 » dl < d2
[5] dl \/ (dl /\ d2) = dl /\ (dl \/ d2) = dl
For any subset S of D, we can calculate VS from
/\{d in D | (Vs in S) a < d}.
That is, the least upper bound of S is the greatest lower bound of all the upper bounds of S.
Now this is a very surprising result. All we asked for was permission to combine any
conjunction of descriptions into one. But we got in addition an analogue of d/sjunction. Note
that it is not equivalent to disjunction. It is certainly the case that
(e is dl) | (e is d2) => e is (dl\/d2)
For example, if an animal (such as a bee) is known to be either sterile or female, then it is
known to be a nonhermaphrodite. But it is not the case that
e is (dl\/d2) => (e is dl) | (e is d2)
since an animal known to be a nonhermaphrodite might be a male.
Joins are good for generalising. (See [Plotkin 69, Plotkin 71].) If we only know that
d1 is too strong, we have to consider all the descriptions just weaker than d1. But if we know
that all of the descriptions d1,d2,...,dn are at least strong enough, then there is a unique
strongest generalisation, namely V(d1 ..dn}.
4.8. Negated Descriptions
All along we have been using the notation
e is d
or
the Aspect of Entity is Value
A general problem with Horn-clause based systems such as MECHO and ABASE is
their weakness in handling negation. We would like to be able to say
e is not d
or
the Aspect of Entity is not Value
and we'd like to have it stay true once true, just like the positive version. The surprising thing
is that this can be done. The definition is that
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a is not d is trua whan d(a)/\d * 0
is falsa whan d(a)<d
is undetermined otherwise
If "e is d" is true, "e is not d" must be false. But when the description of e is still
vague, e might or might not be d. We have
e is not d
e is d True False Unknown
True | impossible possible impossible
False | possible impossible impossible
Unknown | impossible impossible possible
"e is d" and "e is not d" have similar characteristics as goals. The knowledge base is initially
consistent with either, and as more information is acquired about e, eventually one of them
may become true, whereupon the other will become false. When we are examining a rule
body deciding which conjunct to try next, a goal of this kind might be false, in which case we
can discard the rule, or true, in which case we can use the fact at once; or it might not be in a
definite state, in which case some other conjunct should be chosen.
To prove that
(e Is d) & (e is not d)
cannot be true, we expand the definitions;
(e is not d) £ (e is d)
=> d(e) /\ d = 0 £ d(e) < d
=> d(e) /\ d = 0 £ d(e) /\ d = d(e)
=> d(e) = 0
But this means that e is inconsistently described, and ABASE never accepts an inconsistent
description.
The other thing which needs proving is that once a negative description becomes
true, more information (provided ABASE does not reject it as contradictory) cannot make it
false. Suppose then that we have
aspect_val(Entity, Old) £
Old /\ Value = false
and then we are told
aspect_val(Entity, More).
The conjunction of the values yields
aspect_val(Entity, 01d/\More)
but
(01d/\More) /\Value = More/\ (OldAValue)




the Aspect of Entity is Value =>
~ (the Aspect of Entity is not Value)
the Aspect of Entity is not Value =>
- (the Aspect of Entity is Value)
and once either of these descriptions becomes true, it stays true. The only problem is that
neither of them need be true. When the lattice in question is a simple taxonomy, this can
only happen when the Value we are asking about is more specific than the Current value,
e.g. if we ask whether a statistical variable is measured on a ratio scale when all we currently
know is that it is measured on an ordinal scale. In general there is another possibility, which
is that the Current and the desired Value have a "common sub-type". An important example
of this is numeric ranges. When asked for her age, the Client might simply have said "over
21", which is the interval 21 to 100 in this example. One of the rules in the DHSS example is
(effectively)
the age_class of Client is 'prime' if
the sex of Client is female &
the age of Client is 18 to 60.
21 to 100 and 18 to 60 have 21 to 60 as their greatest lower bound in the lattice of intervals.
I designed ABASE to accept only positive information from the client. The only way
the client can tell ABASE that the sex of Client is not female is by telling ABASE that it is
some specific (but not necessarily completely specific) other thing. This turns out to be
precisely the "learning from positive examples" part of the Focussing algorithm described in
chapter 5. (The lattice used here runs in the opposite direction to that used in the Focussing
algorithm, but there is a Duality theorem for lattices.) This tells us what ABASE should do if it
were to be extended to accept negative information from the client: it should follow the
"learning from negative examples" part of the Focussing algorithm. Even accepting negative
information about a single attribute requires us to keep multiple black marks, keeping track of
information such as "it is not true that the Client is a 35-to-47-year-old male striker in part-
time education" would be a frightful task. But if we ever find a task which needs this sort of
capability, my having based descriptions on lattices means that the solution is uniquely
defined; use the Focussing algorithm.
4.9. Rules Involving Descriptions
ABASE lets you write rules in a wide variety of ways, but for the most part this is
syntactic camouflage for Horn clauses. Function-free Horn clauses at that. So we end up
with three basic forms of rule:
hypothesis -> (negative rules)
hypothesis -> predication (inference rules)
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hypothesis -> description (description rules)
The names of the first two types are copied from MECHO. One of the problems I had
with the first version of ASA, which I built on top of MECHO, was that MECHO does not
support description rules. So it was not possible to say9
dichotomy(X) <- discrete(X)lvalues(X,Set)tcard(Set,2)
where 'discrete' and 'dichotomy' are types. This is not strictly true. You couldn't say it




isadichotomy(X) <- discrete(X) & values(X, Set)
& card(Set, 2).
isadichotomy(X) <- dichotomy(X).
Then you have to use 'isadichotomy(X)' everywhere that you would have used
'dichotomy(X)', because the problem is not so much the lack of a notation for description
rules as the fact that MECHO will never use a rule to determine whether a description is
satisfied.
This hack does provide a way of inferring one or two descriptions in a MECHO rule
base, but if you want to have more than a few description rules, you find yourself duplicating
the type system in the rule base, which sort of misses the point.
So there are two questions. Can we handle description rules efficiently in an in¬
ference engine? And does basing descriptions on lattice theory actually buy us anything?
4.9.1. Negative Rules
As discussed earlier in this chapter, ABASE handles product-form descriptions. That
is, instead of saying "entity is description" we say "the attribute of e is range" for each of
several attributes. Each factor of the product is a complete lattice. But we identify the least
elements of the lattices, and say that if any aspect of an entity is 0 (i.e. is inconsistently
described) then the whole description of the entity is regarded as 0 (inconsistently described).
If we are told that
the species of felix is cat.
and the species of felix is dog.
then we conclude that
®Mecho uses x<-y where ABASE uses y->x
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the species of felix is 0 (inconsistently described)
from which the given statements do in fact follow. ABASE regards this as a contradiction,
and refuses to store such nonsense.
All the sources of contradictions in ABASE can be summarised by the logical form
Cue £ Context -> Description
Such rules act in a forward-chaining manner: when an instance of the Cue is asserted, the
Context is set up as a goal to be proven, and if/when the Context is determined, the Descrip¬
tion is asserted. The Cue may be a predication or a description.
There are several surface forms that these rules may take.
• A negative rule is
ci & ... & Cn ->
This can be viewed as
CI & (C2 & ... £ Cn) -> the f of X is 0
where each of the n conjuncts can be regarded as the Cue. (The rule is actually
stored only once.) f and X are arbitrary, but ABASE in fact uses the object
taxonomy aspect as f and the most frequently occurring variable as X.
• (Conditional) description-to-description rules have this form.
• Some of the annotations ABASE uses have negative force. (Many of them have
positive force.) Examples of such annotations are
unique(mother(M,C), [M], [C]) .
antisymmetric(bigger(X,Y), X, Y) .
These are equivalent to negative rules
mother(M,CI) £ mother(M,C2) £ C1+C2 ->
bigger(X,Y) £ bigger(Y,X) ->
MECHO incorporated such annotations as filters in its proof method. When
about to attempt a proof of Cue, it would look in the data base to check whether
Context was already known. This is an incomplete strategy, and can result in
deductions which do not satisfy the rules. ABASE uses all the rules with nega¬
tive force as filters, even ordinary DD rules: "if I assume Cue, is there an in¬
stance of Context in the data base which yields a Description which contradicts
existing descriptions?" But when a Cue passes this test (known in MECHO as
the "silly" test), ABASE also sets up the Context as a proper goal, so that a later
proof of the Context will discover the contradiction. This strategy retains com¬
pleteness. The MECHO strategy is complete when there are no rules for any of
the conjuncts in the Context, and each of them will be used to cue the same rule
when asserted.
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So descriptions play an important part in the way ABASE handles negative rules: the
only way that ABASE notices a contradiction is when some entity becomes inconsistently
described.
4.9.2. Basic Theory
The following theorem is the key to description rules in ABASE.
Let D be a lattice.
Let f:D—»D be a monotone increasing function such that
f (d) < d.
Define f0 (d) = d, fn+1(d) = f(fn(d))
Clearly, fn(d) < fm(d) whenever n > m.
We would like to talk about the fixed points of f, defining
f* (d) = •
There are two ways we can be sure that these limits exist.
1. if every sequence dO > dl > d2 > ... has a greatest lower
bound, the limits must exist. But then D is a complete
lattice.
2. if there is a function n:D—»N such that
f(fn'd'(d)) = fn<d> (d) (i.e. if each element of D is only a
finite number of "steps" away from a fixed point of f)
then the limits must exist.
Since I have chosen to demand that description spaces are complete lattices, 1) is
enough. But I will show below that description rules satisfy 2), so the requirement of com¬
pleteness could be relaxed. For finite description spaces, completeness comes free, so there
isn't any point in relaxing it.
Define Df = (f*(d) | d is in D) = {d in D | f (d) = d}
Define x /\f y = f*(x /\ y) .
Theorem: (Df,Af) is a lower semiiattice.
Proof:
let dl, d2, d3, ... be elements of Df.
[1] dl /\f dl = f*(dl /\ dl) = f*(dl) = dl.
[2] dl /\f d2 = f*(dl /\ d2) = f* (d2 /\ dl) = d2 /\f dl.
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[3] Lemma: l«t a be In Df, b be in D.
Then t*(a/\£*(b)) - f*(a/\b).
Proof.
/\ is monotone and t* is monotone, so
f*(b) < b
a /\ f*(b) < a/\b
f*(a/\f*(b)) < f*(a/\b)
f*(a/\b) < f*(a) = a
f* (a/\b) < f * (b), hence
f* (a/\b) < a/\f* (b)
f*(a/\f*(b)) < f*(a/\b) < a/\f*(b)
applying f* to all three terms,
f*(a/\f*(b)) < f*(a/\b) < f*(a/\f*(b))
End Lemma.
dl /\f (d2 /\f d3) = f* (dl /\ f* (d2 /\ d3))
= f*(dl /\ (d2 /\ d3))
= £*((dl /\ 02) /\ d3)
= (dl /\f 02) /\f d3
[4] Define dl <f 02 iff dl /\f 02 = dl.
dl = f*(dl /\ 02) < dl /\ 02 < dl.
Hence if dl <f 02 then dl < d2.
End of Proof.
We can compute in Df by doing comparisons in D, by doing lattice operations in D,
and by then applying f* to the result.
The fact that the fixed points of a complete lattice under a monotone function form a
complete lattice is a well known result of lattice theory [Birkhoff 67] The novel point of this
section is that under two additional restrictions on f, namely that f(d)<d and that all fixed
points exist, the fixed points of a lower semilattice form a lower semilattice with the same
ordering. So anyone who dislikes the requirement of completeness (e.g. anyone using finite
logical terms as descriptions) can do without it.
4.9.3. Description-to-description rules
A description-to-description rule (DD rule for short) has the form
(e is dO) & (e is not dl) & ... (e is not di) -> e is d.
where dOAdi =/= 0 for i=1 ..n. Clearly, if dOAdi = 0 for any i, it follows that (e is dO) -> (e is not
di) and that conjunct is superfluous. Any number of (e is d'j) conjunctions can be merged to
form the single (e is dO) conjunct, but negated descriptions cannot be so merged. Thus this
is the most general form of rule involving only descriptions of a single entity.
Any rule of this form is necessarily logically consistent. The worst that can happen is
that dOAd = 0. ABASE will complain about such rules, because it reacts to inconsistent (0)
descriptions as it reacts to contradictions. You might prefer to think of this as ABASE having
an implicit axiom
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- (• is 0)
If you want to write such a rule, you can write it as a negative rule. This is only a debugging
aid, as negative rules whose left hand side is made up of positive and negative descriptions
of the same entity are treated internally as DD rules whose right hand side is (e is 0).
For convenience in what follows I will abbreviate a DD rule as
<C,P,N) = (d/\d0,d0, {dl, . . . ,dn})
where C is the conclusion, and P and N the positive and negative parts of the hypothesis.
ABASE does not use this syntactic form. It is just for this section.
Given a finite set of DD rules (Ci,Pi,Ni) for i = 1..n, we define the function f as follows:
f(d) = d /\ /\{Ci | d < Pi £ d/\Nij = 0}
Since we have a finite number of rules, f(d) is well defined even when description spaces are
allowed to be incomplete. Clearly f(d) < d. Now suppose d1 < d2. Then
d2 < Pi => dl < Pi
and d2/\Nij = 0 => dl/\Nij = 0
so f(d1) = f(d2)Ad1A{some Ci's that d1 catches and d2 doesn't} < f(d2). So f is monotone.
Hence by the theorem of the previous section, Df is a description space.
So Df is a description space. What good is that? The point of this result is that we
can handle DD rules in the description machinery and keep them entirely out of the main
inference engine. The main inference engine will only ever see descriptions which are fixed
points of f. Whenever we are given new information (e is d2) when we previously believed
that (e is d1), we can at once conclude that (e is f*(d1Ad2)) rather than concluding that (e is
d1Ad2) and waiting to fire the DD rules at some later time.
Before getting too happy about this, assuming that D is a complete lattice only means
that limits exist, it doesn't mean we can find them! Now if D is finite, clearly f must converge
in some fixed number of steps. But suppose D is not finite. Once a DD rule has been
applied to a particular entity, there is never any point in applying it again. So the following
elementary strategy will compute f*(d) in finite time:
set R = {all the rules}
while there is a (Ci,Pi,{Nij}) in R such that
d < Pi and d/\Nij = 0
d := d/\Ci
delete that rule from R
end while
In fact we obtain o(n2*k) time, where n is the number of rules and k is the "difficulty" of testing
the hardest rule. Chapter 6 presents a more efficient algorithm. As ASA doesn't have many
DD rules, ABASE uses this algorithm.
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4.9.4. Conditional DD Rules
We can also have rules whose conclusion is a description, but which is contingent on
more general information. Such a rule has the form
generalPart (X) £ descriptionPart(X) -> X ia d
where generalPart is any conjunction of positive literals and descriptions of other variables
than X.
We can break such a rule into two parts. One part,
generalPart(X) -> rule_enabled(X)
is an ordinary rule whose conclusion is an ordinary fact. The other part,
rule_enabled(X) -> (descriptionPart(X) -> X is d)
is a conditional description to description rule.
What is the point of doing this? The point is to simplify dependency maintenance for
descriptions. The fact that a particular CDD rule is enabled is an ordinary fact recorded in the
data base, and its dependencies can be maintained in the same way as any other ordinary
fact. The current description of an entity is recorded in a
<aspect>(<entity>, <value>)
fact. (Notionally, there is one such fact per entity, but when the description space is a
product, it is more efficient to have one such fact per factor of the description space, here
<aspect>.) This fact, like any other, has to be justified. The justification doesn't have to
mention the DD rules, as they are timeless truths of the domain which will never go away.
The current description can only have been computed by applying the DD rules and all the
CDD rules which are currently enabled. So the justification does need to mention which of
the CDD rules actually fired. To avoid introducing a special kind of "fact name" that means
"such and such a general CDD rule was used", we use the "enabled" facts. The justification
for a description of an entity e is the set of rule_enabled(e) facts which are true and which
were used.
To compute the current description of e, given the current set of rule_enabled(e)
facts, we represent rules as
(Enabling,Conclusion,Positive,Negatives)
where Enabling is the name of the unary rule_enabled predicate (true for DD rules) and the
rest is as before, and do
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R :« {(Fi,Ci,Pi,{Nij}) |
(Ei,Ci,Pi,{Nij}) is a rule end
Ei(e) is true end
Fi is the name of the fact Ei(e)}
J O
while there is an (Fi,Ci,Pi,{Nij}) in R such that
d < Pi and d/\Nij ■ 0
if Ci < d then
d := d/\Ci
J := J u Fi
end if
delete that rule from R
end while
J := J \ {the name of "true(_)"J-
Since descriptions are so important, and since it is straightforward to keep them up to
date, there is an invariant that we want the dependency system to maintain:
The description of any entity e is always the most specific description supported by
the enabled CDD rules.
One kind of conditional description rule is so common that it is worth making a spe¬
cial case of it. MECHO demanded that every predicate be declared, and that its argument
types should be specified. So, before you can write "collision(X,Y,T)" in a MECHO rule, you
have to say e.g.
collision(X, Y, T) ->
particle(X) & particle(Y) & moment(T).
which, in the notation of this chapter, would be
collision(X, Y, T) ->
X is a particle & Y is a particle & T is a moment.
ABASE follows in MECHO's footsteps, although it is prepared to do without such a rule if you
say that the omission was deliberate.
The actual Prolog implementation of CDD rules stores them in the form
cdd(X, Testx, Pos, Neg, Cone)
where X is a Prolog variable, TestX is 'true' for a DD rule, or r_enabled(X) for a simple CDD
rule. For the declaration of "collision" above, we would get three CDD rules, stored as
cdd(X, collision(X,Y,T), any, [], particle).
cdd(Y, collision(X,Y,T), any, [], particle).
cdd(T, collision(X,Y,T), any, [], moment).
More generally, any rule whose right hand side is a conjunction of descriptions can
be broken up into a CDD rule for each entity mentioned on the right hand side, and perhaps
an ordinary rule for an rule_enabled fact for each right hand side entity if the left hand side is
not simple. For example,
p (X, Y) & X is dl & Y is d2 -> X is d3 & Y is d4
can be stored as
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p(X, Y) £ Y is d2 -> rlenabled(X).
p(X, Y) £ X is dl -> r2enabled(Y).
rlenabled(X) -> (X is dl -> X is d3).
r2enabled(Y) -> (Y is d2 -> Y is d4).
4.9.5. Using CDD rules
MECHO used the type information it had about predicates in two ways. When it was
considering whether a goal could possibly be true, it examined the types of the arguments,
and if they were not compatible with the predicate the goal was rejected. When it concluded
that some fact was true, it used the predicate type to assign types to the arguments of the
fact. But types never appeared in the hypothesis of any MECHO rule, so MECHO never had
to set "is X a d?" as a goal.
Although ABASE shares no code with MECHO, major aspects of its design are
derived from MECHO. So ABASE also uses descriptions in these two ways. When we are
considering whether a goal is worth pursuing, we check the descriptions of the arguments
against the description of the predicate. Suppose the goal is G, then if
cdd(X, G, P, N, C) £
X is P £
X is not N £
X is not C
has a solution, then the goal is not consistent with the current set of descriptions.
Whenever we conclude a goal, it may enable some CDD rules. So we have to note
which entities may need updating. The rule is that if we have concluded G, and
cdd(x, g, p, n, c) £
d(X) /\ P =\= 0 £ % X might be P
d(X) > C % X might be C but isn't yet
then X may need updating.
There is no problem keeping track of the descriptions implied by the facts that we
have deduced so far (for other reasons). If that were all, ABASE would have an easy time of
it. But descriptions can appear in the hypotheses of rules of ABASE, so ABASE does have to
set "is X a D" as a goal from time to time. In fact the division of information into descriptions
and facts in ABASE is strongly reminiscent of the division into attributes and relations in the
Entity-Relation data base model.
The Entity-Relation-Attribute approach uses
• entities, which correspond to entities in ABASE
• values, which are numbers, addresses, colour names, &c, and correspond to the
elements of description spaces in ABASE
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• attributes, which relate entities to values
• relations, which relate entities to entities, and may themselves have attributes.
For example, we might have a little data base
employee : set of entity (
attribute name : string
attribute date-hired : date
attribute pay : money
)
department : set of entity (
attribute name : string
attribute location : address
attribute sales : money
)
works-in : relation over (employee, department) (
attribute date-started : date
)















I a flat set of values
\ /
inconsistent
This pentagonal pattern is very common, and is the reason why we cannot base descriptions
on modular lattices: no lattice containing this sublattice is modular. There are some other
nice properties we can't have either.
In order to say which entities have what attributes, we would have some uncon¬
ditional DD rules. The abbreviations "X has a D" or "X has no D" stand for "the D of X is
applicable" or "the D of X is inapplicable" respectively.
X is an employee ->
X has a name &
X has a date &
X has a money &
X has no address.
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X is a department ->
X has a name £
X has no date £
X has a money £
X has an address.
X is a working ->
X has no name £
X has a date £
X has no money £
X has no address.
Although I have spelled out in detail which things have and which things do not have
each aspect, it is not really necessary to list the aspects which something doesn't have. In
any case, these rules can be mechanically generated from a simpler format.
To describe the works-in relation we need a predicate description and an existence
rule:
works_in(E,D) ->
E is an employee £
D is a department.
works_in(E,D,W) ->
E is an employee £
D is a department £
W is a working.
WAworks_in(E,D,W) <-> works_in(E,D) .
The existence rule is to be read as "if we know that works_in(E,D), then we are entitled to
create a new entity W to stand for this fact". The three-argument form of worksjn is needed
so that we have a place to hang the attributes of the two-argument form.
One advantage of the ERA model over the more familiar "flat" relational models is
that we can represent the fact that Bill works in the Complaints department but that we aren't
sure when. ABASE shares this advantage.
Descriptions subsume attributes. Many of the interesting relations in a knowledge
base are relations between entities and values, so one uses descriptions where in MECHO
one would have used an ordinary predicate. The reason that MECHO doesn't set up "is X a
D?" as a goal is that its simple type system does not subsume attributes, and the reason that
ABASE does set up "is X a D?" as a goal is that things MECHO would have said with
ordinary predicates, ABASE says with descriptions.
The great advantage of lattice-based descriptions to ABASE is that they permit
vagueness; imprecise information can easily be handled without needing a nonstandard
logic. Ordinary facts in ABASE are either true or false, never fuzzy. The notation permits us
to be vague about how many legs a particular centipede has without forcing us to be fuzzy
about whether Bill works in the Complaints department or not.
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So the third use that ABASE makes ot CDD rules is backwards chaining. Suppose
that we want to show that e satisfies description d, and that this is consistent with the current
data base but does not follow from it. Then we find the set of CDD rules which could con¬
clude this (no other kind of rule can conclude a description), and set up their enabling con¬
ditions as goals.
if cdd(e,G,P,N,C) &
C < d t % e is C implies e is d
P/\d(e) =\= 0 & % e might be P
~(3n in N) d(e)<n
then G is a useful goal.
These goals are set up just like other goals. In particular, it may be the case that no
rule can help, in which case we have to ask the client whether one of his entities satisfies a
description or not. Note that we cannot get away with asking the client about the descriptions
of entities that ABASE has invented for its own use, only about entities the client named.
As a general rule, it is better to ask the client about the description of a single entity
than to ask about relations between several entities. There are several reasons for this
heuristic. One of them is that the question is either a yes/no question "is X a D or not?" or, if
we wait until several questions have accumulated, a multiple-choice question "is X (1) a D1,
..., (4) a D4, or (5) something else?". So the amount of information the client has to supply is
minimised. Our nett ignorance is decreased by the answer to such a question, whereas if a
question involving a relation between several entities were asked the client might be able to
name new entities in his answer, which would increase our nett ignorance. This is actually a
general heuristic: prefer the question with the fewest variables. Another reason is to try to
keep the conversation focussed: we try to pick a question about the same entity as the
previous question, so that the user can keep the fewest entities in mind.
4.10. Handling Inheritance Exceptions
One of the reasons we want a type system in the first place is so that we can write








and use this to avoid having to state for each type of animal the number of legs it has by
inheriting from animal:
vertebrate(X) -> leg_count(X, 4)
But what about humans (2) and snakes (0)? The general tendency in Al has been to intro-
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duce a meta-principle, which says that you chase your way up the inheritance hierarchy and
pick the first answer you find. Properties attached at higher nodes are regarded as defaults
which can be over-ridden by information attached to lower nodes. Now this doesn't work too
well when you have vague information: a marker chasing system such as NETL, told that
monty_python is a vertebrate, assumes that this is all the information that will ever be avail¬
able about monty_python, and will happily announce that he definitely has 4 legs, not realis¬
ing that its information is not sufficient to determine which default should apply. Now in
ABASE, thanks to negative type tests, we can explicitly state the rules
A: the species of X is vertebrate and
the species of X is not snake and
the species of X is not human
-> leg_count(X, 4)
B: the species of X is snake
-> leg_count(X, 0)
C: the species of X is human
-> leg_count(X, 2)
Given an explicit lattice, and a set of defaults, we can easily construct these explicit
rules, so the burden of listing the exceptions can be taken over by the system, and the
knowledge engineer need not bother. The method for doing this is straightforward:
for each stated rule "X is DO -> p(X)"
locate all the rules "X is Di -> q(X)"
for which Di < DO and q(X) & p(X) is inconsistent.
rewrite the rule as
"X is DO & X is not DI £ ... -> p(X)"
This method, applied to
function(leg_count(X,N), [X]).
A: the species of X is vertebrate -> leg_count(X,4)
B: the species of X is snake -> leg_count(X,0)
C: the species of X is human -> leg_count(X,2)
yields the three fuller, consistent, rules stated above.
This process of taking a set of "default" rules and expanding them into ordinary
description to description rules with the exceptions explicitly listed is entirely mechanical. The
computer can do it, the "knowledge engineer" doesn't have to. Also, it is always possible.
We can even add new descriptions to the description space provided that the existing rela¬
tions in the lattice are not disturbed, and the translation will still be valid. What we cannot do
freely is add new "default" rules. It is easy enough to update the existing rules when we add
new ones. The trouble is that adding new rules can invalidate existing conclusions. For
example, if we knew that Tweety was a canary, the rules A,B,C would have told us that
Tweety has four legs. (According to "Animal Farm", this is the right answer.) Suppose we
decided to add a new rule,
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D: X is a bird -> lag_count(X,2)
We would then have to repair any rule whose left hand side is more general than "bird" and
whose right hand side is incompatible with this one by listing "X is not a bird" as one of the
exceptions. But we would be left with an incorrect inference about Tweety. Even if we hadn't
known that Tweety was a bird, we might have known that he was a dinosaur (which birds are
now classified as being) so rule A would have fired. So the fact that there are no known
entities to which the new rule applies is not sufficient to ensure that there are no conclusions
which now lack a justification.
There are two possible cures for this problem. One is to prohibit the addition of new
"default" rules at run time. That is what ABASE does. This hasn't been a problem in ABASE.
The other is to keep track of which DD rules have been used to derive a description, and
when a "default" rule is invalidated by a new default rule, to retract all the conclusions which
were justified by the old rule and try to rederive them. ABASE exploits the fact that for
descriptions it is sufficient to keep track of which facts justify a description and not which
rules, regarding the whole type system as a single rule. Since I had no need to add new
"default" rules at run time, the simpler cure was appropriate. It is important in the Statistics
domain to be able to add new taxonomical information at run time, but that poses no problem.
What is the advantage of using rules like this instead of having defaults? The advan¬
tage is that if there is insufficient information to decide which rule to apply, no mle will fire,
and the system will not apply a "default" that it will later have to retract. So, when we learn
that monty_python is an animal, none of the three rules A,B,C succeeds and none fails.
Then, when we learn that he is a reptile, rule C definitely drops out, but the other two pos¬
sibilities remain. Finally, when we learn that he is a snake, rule A drops out and rule B fires.
Because descriptions are monotone, no further information can disturb this conclusion.
Of course the great advantage of default rules is that in common sense reasoning
there are times when you have to make a decision based on incomplete information, and the
fact that "defaults" handled this way won't jump to conclusions may be a disadvantage. But
the great attraction of basing descriptions on lattices rather than unstructured unary predi¬
cates is that we do not have to remain completely silent when we have incomplete infor¬
mation. The point is this: we can draw vague conclusions. Let's consider the "legs" example
yet again. We introduce a new aspect of an animal: the leg_count. The lattice it is based on
is the lattice of intervals of non-negative integers. We write rules
A: the species of X is vertebrate ->
the leg_count of X is 4 to 4
B: the species of X is snake ->
the leg_count of X is 0 to 0
C: the species of X is human ->
the leg_count of X is 2 to 2
from which we get, as before,
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A: the species of X is vertebrate £
the species of X is not snake £
the species of X is not human ->
the leg_count of X is 4 to 4
But when the conclusion of these rules is a description, we can do one more thing.
for each stated rule "X is DO -> X is EO"
locate all the rules "X is Di -> X is Ei"
for which Di < DO.
rewrite the rule as
"X is DO -> X is E0\/E1\/. . ."
In this case, we arrive at the additional rule
A' : the species of X is vertebrate ->
the leg_count of X is 0 to 4
If we are searching for a six-legged creature, A' is enough to tell us that monty_python will
not do, as soon as we learn that he is a vertebrate. This is yet another illustration of the fact
that vague information is often enough.
We can in fact extend this quite generally: let
lhs__i (X) -> X is Ei
be a family of rules, and let
lhs (X) => lhs_l (X) | ... | lhs_n (X)
be true. Then we can add a rule
lhs(X) -> X is (El\/...\/En)
I do not claim that lattice-based inheritance rules are a general replacement for
default rules. They are not. Programs which have to deal with the real world cannot always
afford to wait until the vagueness has been resolved. But expert consultation programs
which can always ask another question if they have to, those programs can benefit from this
approach.
This method of handling "defaults" applies only to binary relations between entities
and attributes, it does not apply to relations between entities and entities. Consider a rule
such as
if X is an adult female human being
and Y is a human child
and X and Y are travelling together
and X and Y have the same surname
then X is probably Y's mother
The conclusion of this rule is a relation between two entities. As such, the lattice-based
approach is completely inapplicable. ABASE has a simple mechanism for handling this kind
of default rule as well. The implication arrow is written "-?->" instead of "->" to indicate that
the rule is not certain, so we would write
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X is a human £ X is female £ X is adult £
Y is a human £ Y is a child £
travelling_together(X, Y) £
surname (X, S) £
surname(Y, S)
-?-> mother (X, Y)
MECHO also has such rules. The way MECHO handles them is to try to solve its goals
without using default rules, but if it can't, then to try the default rules. The only real difference
is this reluctance to use defaults; once MECHO has applied a default rule the conclusion is
regarded as being completely certain. The real use of this is for a form of negation: you
might have a default rule that two particles are not connected which fires unless you can
prove that they are connected. ABASE does something different. Default rules are used just
like ordinary inference rules. When a default rule fires, the same data are recorded as when
an ordinary rule fires, so that the explanation subsystem will be able to say where the conclu¬
sion came from, but the justification is called an "excuse" rather than a "justification" so that
when the dependency subsystem wants to knock out the conclusion of a default rule, it can
do so even when the hypotheses of the rule are still believed. The conclusions of default
rules are thus regarded as unjustified.
So ABASE has two mechanisms for handling two kinds of defaults. Defaults con¬
cerning relations between entities have to be handled in the conventional way, and the
dependency subsystem is needed so that default conclusions can be retracted. (It is mainly
needed so that the client can retract his answers.) Defaults concerning relations between
entities and attributes (qualities, types, numbers, &c) are handled by a lattice-based
mechanism which draws conclusions only when they are safe.
A recent paper [Brachman 85] criticises the approach to frames and inheritance
found in many present systems. In that paper, Brachman says
Q: What's big and grey, has a trunk, and lives in the trees?
A: An elephant --1 lied about the trees.
... some common forms of representation in Al give us the uniform ability to "lie about the
trees". These forms then force us to interpret all properties as default properties - a regime,
as it turns out, under which it is not possible to represent genuine universal truths. ... without
some sort of definitional force, even the simplest composite descriptions cannot be formed --
and every description in the language is doomed to be a primitive....
Given the default interpretation of frames, and the realisation that ISA links do not represent
even the simple contingent universals that they seem to, one would suspect that even
stronger statements like honest-to-goodness definitions are totally out of the question in
standard frame systems. One might also suspect that that's no big deal. Well, the first
suspicion is right on the money; but the second is dead wrong. ...
In fact, it is strongly believed that no combination of properties is sufficient to capture what it
means to be an elephant -- in other words "natural kind" concepts cannot be defined. In
contrast, there is nothing more to the story of quadrilaterals than four-sidedness on top of
"polygonicity". ...
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Thus, we have most Al representation languages strongly favouring the nonmathematical
cases. And with good reason: Why worry about definition if, at best, only quadrilaterals and
the like can be defined? Well, consider this: Once we have the concept of an elephant --
natural kind, primitive, or whatever - from it we can construct an indefinite number of com¬
posite concepts, each of which is in a relation to ELEPHANT that is surely definitional. For
example, the concept of an elephant with three legs - call our frame for it "ELEPHANT-WITH-
THREE-LEGS" - is a simple composition of two attributes, each of which is necessary, and
the pair of which is sufficient. That is, it is impossible to have an elephant with three legs that
wasn't an elephant, and it should be impossible for an object that troth was an elephant and
had (exactly) three legs to fail to fall under ELEPHANT-WITH-THREE-LEGS. ...
There is a great deal more in that paper, and anyone interested in the design of
knowledge representation notations should certainly read it. What is of interest here is that
the approach to descriptions and defaults presented here is not subject to Brachman's
criticisms.
One would take a suitable set of "natural kinds" as "object taxonomy" referred to in
chapter 2, or as one of the aspects used here. ABASE permits the definition of properties
such as three_legged_elephant by means of logical equivalences:
three_legged_elephant(X) <->
X is an elephant &
the leg_count of X is 3.
This is actually stored as the rules
three_legged_elephant(X) ->
X is an elephant.
three_legged_elephant(X) ->
the leg_count of X is 3.
three_legged_elephant(X) <-
X is an elephant &
the leg_count of X is 3.
of which the first two are CDD rules and the last is an ordinary Horn clause. It would also be
possible to treat definitions where the right hand side is a description as macros. The point
here is that such definitions are allowed and do express both necessity and sufficiency.
This is still compatible with having defaults which can be over-ridden by more specific
descriptions, because the general case is not applied until the specific description is known
not to be satisfied.
Where my approach is weaker than frame systems is that if we have a DD rule that
says that every elephant has 4 legs, there is no way at all of over-riding that for a specific
elephant. We can indeed introduce a class of 3-legged elephants, in which case no elephant
will be assumed to have 4 legs until he is proven not to have 3. But if we do not have such a
class, my approach cannot handle exceptional individuals.
There is a sense in which it is rather strange to say that all dogs have four legs. We
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know that as stated it simply isn't true. But, barring monsters, a dog which now has three
legs once had four, and most "three-legged" dogs actually have three legs and a stump. This
suggests to me that an appropriate way of handling defaults may be to distinguish between
two kinds of exception.
Exceptional Classes.
This covers cases such as snakes, birds, and human beings. Normally, all ver¬
tebrates have four legs, no arms, and no wings. Snakes have no legs. Birds and bats have
two legs and two wings. Human beings have two legs and two arms.
This kind of defaulting is fundamentally nothing more than a convenience of notation.
It can be very important in practice, because stating that each of thousands of species of
vertebrates is not exceptional is a time-consuming and error-prone task.
Exceptional Individuals.
Once we have a description of an object, there are many deductions about its
properties and components which usually follow. For example, a piece of granite normally
has a very small amount of gold in it. But this particular piece may have been gold-plated. A
human being normally has two legs. But this particular human being may have been in an
industrial accident.
This kind of defaulting is very different from class-level exceptions. The distinction is
in part between what a thing is and what has happened to it. If we learn that this animal is a
primate, we will expect to find two forward-pointing eyes on it. But if one eye has been lost in
an accident, we still don't know whether to expect the other one to have been lost as well.
I suspect that the best way to handle exceptional individuals may be some form of
circumscription [McCarthy 80].
4.11. Reiter's Typed Data Bases
The abstract of [Reiter 81] says "A typed first order data base is a set of first order
formulae, each quantified variable of which is constrained to range over some type. For¬
mally, a type is simply a distinguished monadic relation, or some Boolean combination of
these. Assume that with each data base relation other than the types is associated an
integrity constraint which specifies which types of individuals are permitted to fill the argument
positions of that relation. The problem addressed in this paper is the detection of violations of
these integrity constraints in the case of data base updates with universally quantified
formulae."
This is obviously very close indeed to both MECHO and ABASE. All three require
that each relation specify a type for each of its arguments. All three essentially regard types
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as some sort of distinguished relation, rather than as "sorts" in the algebraic sense: connec¬
tions between types are logical rather than algebraic. (This is mainly a matter of emphasis.)
However, MECHO and ABASE are Expert Systems, while Reiter is considering deductive
data bases. It is interesting to see what difference this makes.
Reiter introduces his type system by observing that it "appears to be a universal
characteristic of such argument constraints on relations ... that each such constraint is itself
either a simple unary relation ... or a Boolean combination of such simple unary relations."
MECHO's type system is based on exactly this observation: there is a set of base
types organised in an and/or tree, and there are derived types which are consistent conjunc¬
tions of base types. The restriction on the relations between base types (inclusion and
exclusion) and the way derived types are specified is for efficiency: there is a lovely represen¬
tation of expressible types in MECHO as logical terms so that the lattice structure of the types
is isomorphic to the lattice structure of their representations.
Reiter, however, is concerned with generality rather than efficiency, so places no
restriction on the formulae that relate types. As in MECHO, he splits the data base into two
parts: the type data base and the rest. "The type data base is where all information about
types resides. Formally, we define a type data base to be any finite set of closed first order
formulas all of whose predicate signs are base types and which satisfies the ... T-
completeness property." I'll discuss the T-completeness property later. "Formally, the TDB is
a set of formulae of the monadic predicate calculus. As is well known (Hilbert and Ack-
ermann, 1950, Principles of Mathematical Logic), the monadic predicate calculus is decid-
able, i.e. there exists an algorithm which determines, for any formula W, whether or not TDB
|- W. This must remain true regardless of how the TDB is represented. Henceforth, we shall
assume the availability of such a decision procedure for the TDB. An efficient decision proce¬
dure for a large and natural class of TDBs is described in (Bishop and Reiter, "On
Taxonomies", UCB CS report 1980)." "We are not seriously proposing that ... the TDB be
represented as a set of first order formulae. There are far more efficient and perspicuous
representations of the same facts."
So far, everything that he says looks extremely relevant to MECHO, and indeed, to
this work. I do need some excuse for not using his methods for checking the consistency of
updates, apart from the fact that the updates I allow are so simple that simpler methods will
suffice.
There are two difficulties. One is that I have already shown that there are ad¬
vantages to be gained by rejecting the view that a type is a unary predicate. Indeed, my
approach permits and easily handles an infinite number of 'types", provided that the lattice
operations on them are computable.
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The other difficulty is his T-completeness requirement:
"For each base type t and each constant c,
either TDB |- t(c) or TDB | t(c)."
That is, whenever there is any constant c anywhere in the data base, we must know exactly
which simple types it belongs to and which it does not belong to.
The first problem here is that if we start off with a data base about family relation¬
ships, with the obvious types, and try to add the assertion father(frank, jim) MECHO and
ABASE will deduce human(frank) & male(frank) & human(jim), and will only reject the update
if this is inconsistent with earlier assertions, while Reiter's proposed deductive data base
would reject the assertion as ill-typed, since it cannot demonstrate that it is well typed.
This seems odd. After all, Reiter says "we begin by noting that
p(Xl,...,Xn) => tl(Xl) tn(Xn)
I-
p (Al, . . ., An) «=> P(A1, . . .,An) & tl(Al) & . . . & tn (Ail) "
and defines INT(formula) to be the result of expanding every non-type predicate in the for¬
mula this way. He then says "Our approach to data base integrity will be to consider the
effects of updating the data base with INT(update)." But he then goes on to show that "an
update with INT(C) is equivalent to one in which all literals in INT(C) of the form t(c) have
been deleted." (Assuming that it satisfies the integrity constraints.) That is, the types of any
constants that appear in an update are checked, and no new information about constants can
be derived from an update. Type information about variables in the update is preserved, and
this has some interesting consequences.
The result is that before you add a fact to one of Reiter's data base, you may have to
separately provide complete information about the constants in the fact to the type data base.
Let's look at ABASE again. ABASE does not regard types as unary predicates.
"Type" has been dethroned, and instead of an object having a single type or belonging to a
set of boolean types, an object may have any number of attributes, each ranging over a
lattice. Now suppose we wanted to use a type system like Rieter's. For each type t(X) we






The description of an object thus belongs to a product of these lattices, where as usual we
collapse the "inconsistent" values onto one. This has much the same expressiveness as
Reiter's system. We can express a type rule such as (VX) (male(X) v female(X)) as
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mal* of X is falsa -> faznala of X is true
femala of X is false -> male of X is true
or a rule such as (VX)~(male(X) & female(X)) as
male of X is true -> female of X is false
female of X is true -> male of X is false
When a formula of the monadic predicate calculus is a natural expression of the relations
between your types, using DD rules is very clumsy. The reward you gain by paying this price
is that ABASE is perfectly happy with partial information about "types", even if not about
anything else.
ABASE shares with MECHO the idea that it is natural to start out in ignorance about
an object and to acquire more specific knowledge about it as time goes on. This is the case
in any data base for ordinary relations. At one time we don't know who Jim's father is, and
then after a consistent update we do know. Why should knowledge about Jim's sex be any
different? ABASE goes further than MECHO in exploiting this: one of the ideas in ABASE is
that we should leave the description of everything as vague as we can as long as we can, so
that we don't demand information from the client that we don't need.
Reiter's requirement is natural enough in a deductive data base. But it would be
absurd in an Expert System.
4.12. Summary
This chapter argued that there are several tasks (including ones important to ASA)
for which simple type-trees are inadequate. I also suggested that type systems based on
unary predicates were not well suited to handling vague information, and that certainty factors
attached to predications are not a good way of handling vague information either.
An alternative approach based on complete lattices was presented. This approach
lends itself to efficient implementation (see chapters 6 and 7). It provides forms of negation
and defaulting.
Most importantly, the lattice-based approach allowed me to treat physical dimen¬
sions, statistical variable types, and intervals of numbers, all as descriptions using a uniform
mechanism. It was designed to satisfy the needs of ASA, and does so. I believe that any





It is sometimes said that the bottle-neck in Knowledge Engineering is in Knowledge
Acquisition, that is, in the process of getting the rules out of the human expert and into the
computer. My experience with ASA has been the direct opposite of this. I have never had
the slightest difficulty in acquiring rules from textbooks or examples. The difficulty has been
in finding a suitable vocabulary in which to express them, and it is for that reason that so
much of this volume describes the way I represent statistical knowledge. The actual rules
themselves were very easy to come by. It is worth noting that people using Quinlan's learn¬
ing algorithm [Quinlan 79] have had much the same experience: 2 months to develop a
suitable set of attributes and then 5 minutes for the computer to learn are typical.
Even so, it can be a help if the program can learn. One of the principles adopted in
the design of ABASE was that the rule language and type system should demonstrably sup¬
port learning. It is a sad fact of life that [Plotkin 70] has shown that function-free rule sets are
leamable while rules with functions are not. This provides yet another motive for ABASE's
using function-free Horn clauses as the rule language. Plotkin has also shown that descrip¬
tions are learnable, and that algorithm is the topic of this chapter.
The focussing algorithm is a learning algorithm described in [Bundy & Silver
82, Bundy et al 84, Plummer 83]. The original description is [Young et al 77], but that is a
1-page extended abstract. [Young et al 77] is a reconstruction of [Winston 75]. [Bundy & Sil¬
ver 82, Bundy et al 84, Plummer 83] do not bring out the fact that the focussing algorithm is
based on lattices, but describe it for a particular family of lattices, namely products of simple
type trees.
Two other papers, [Plotkin 69, Plotkin 71] are useful.
The presentation of the focussing algorithm in this chapter is based on unpublished
notes by Gordon Plotkin. The rest of the chapter is original. In particular, I show that when
the description space is a product of simple type trees (as [Bundy & Silver 82, Bundy et al
84, Plummer 83] assume) a simple active learner can identify the intended concept in a
logarithmic number of questions, and this is optimal. Active learners are possible in more
general lattices, but that algorithm is not as efficient. Perhaps more importantly, I show that
the focussing algorithm (and the active learners) can incorporate DD rules.
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5.1. The Task of the Focussing Algorithm.
Definition: A description space (d-space) is a finite upper semi-lattice with a greatest ele¬
ment: <D,1,V>. That is,
Greatest: (Vx) x \/ 1 = 1
Idempotent: (Vx) x \/ x = x
Total: (Vx y) x \/ y is defined
Commutative: (Vx y) x \/ y = y \/ x
Associative: (Vx y z) x \/ (y \/ z) = (x \/ y) \/ z
Defn of < (Vx y) x < y means (x \/ y) = y
Defn of < (Vx y) x < y means x < y and x + y
Covering: (Vx y) x covers y means y < x and
not (3z) (y < z < x)
Theorem: If <D1,11,V1> and <D2,12,V2> are d-spaces, their product ^xD^I 1t12),V> is a
d-space when V is defined by
(a,b) \/ (c,d) = (aX/^bX/id)
This is a standard result, so the proof is omitted.
The focussing algorithm is given a d-space D, and a sequence of examples
(e1,c1),...,(en,cn),... where each ej is an element of D and each Cj is either + meaning that the
corresponding et is a positive instance of the concept to be learned or is - meaning that the
corresponding ej is a negative instance of the concept to be learned. The task is to find an
element E of D such that
(Vx) "x is a positive instance" <=> x < E.
or to report that the sequence of examples is inconsistent if it can be established that no such
element exists.
5.2. The Focussing Algorithm.
The algorithm maintains two markers: a black marker B and a white marker W. The
invariant maintained is
w < E < B
where W and B are the tightest bounds supported by the examples so far. The idea is that if
e < W it is definitely in the concept and that if ~(e < B) it is definitely not in the concept. The
W and B markers divide the D-space into three partitions:
• the White partition = {w in D | w < W}
• the Black partition = {b in D | ~(b < B)}
• the Grey partition = {g in D | g < B and ~(g < W)}
Clearly, these sets are disjoint and together cover D.
The first example must be a positive instance so that we can initialise the white





# process the rest of the training set #
for i from 2 to infinity while W t B do
if Cj ■ + then
# positive instance #
if e1 < B then
W := w \/ e±
else
fall as no E can exist
fi
else
# negative instance #
if ejL < W then
fail as no E can exist
else
B := any maximal element of A where




E := W # = B #




\ / I \ /
a c (n) < negative instance
/ \ I / \
\ I /
w < W
Then either a or c would be acceptable as a new value for B. It is only negative instances that
create choice points, and then only when B covers more than one d-value > W. If D is such
that this cannot happen, the algorithm is deterministic.
Definition: A description space is a description tree if it satisfies the unique genealogy
constraint:
(Vx yz) x<y&x<z=>y<z | z < y
In the language of trees, if y and z are both ancestors of x, one of them must be an
ancestor of the other. Learning in a single description tree is completely deterministic.
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5.3. Learning with a Product of Simple Type Trees
The description in [Bundy & Silver 82, Bundy et al 84, Plummer 83] is much more
concrete. In those papers, the description space is a product of simple type trees
D = T1x...xTn, each with its own black and white markers so that W = (W1 Wn) and
B = Bn). As in the previous subsection, a positive example moves all the white
markers up. A distinction is made between nearmisses and far misses.
Definition: A near miss is a negative example (x1t...,xn) such that there is a single index i
such that
wi < < Bi
xj < Wj for j + i
That is, all of the features are in the white parts of their description trees except for
one grey one. The significance of near misses is that they uniquely determine a black marker
to be lowered. We can generalise this definition to lattices: a near miss in a lattice is when
the lattice interval [W,B] contains only one place that the black marker can be moved to, i.e.
when
/\ {b in [w,b] | ~(ei < b)} < b
Definition: A far miss is a negative example (x1 xn) such that
x^ < for j = 1.,n
but (X1 xn) is not a near miss.
That is, all the features lie in the grey or white partitions of their description trees, but
at least two of them are grey. The significance of far misses is that they indicate that at least
one of the black markers must be lowered, but they do not determine a unique marker to
lower. In the general setting, we can have far misses even when there is a single simple
feature. In the general lattice setting, a far miss is when
/\ (b in [W,B] | no(e± < b) ) = B
[Bundy et al 84] identify five options for dealing with far misses.
• The depth first option is to pick an arbitrary black marker and move it. If later
examples are inconsistent with this choice, the depth first option backs up, picks
another marker, and restarts. This requires storing all the negative examples
(but not the positive examples) since the first far miss.
• The breadth first option makes each possible choice. This requires storing
what may be a very large number of different black marker configurations (|D| of
them are possible).
• The teacher option asks the source of examples which choice to make. This
option cannot be used by a program which is conducting its own investigations,
and if the teacher and the program have the same representation (as this
requires) the teacher might as well supply the concept in one step.
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• The zero option is to ignore far misses completely and only leam from positive
examples and near misses.
• The avoidance option is to order the examples so that the problem never arises.
It is not clear from [Bundy et al 84] whether the authors mean that the teacher is
to order the examples or the program.
There is another possibility, and that is to delay far misses. This requires storing a set of
pairs {(i,Xj)|Xj is grey] for each far miss. Then, when we move white marker Wk, we do
for each grey set G do
if (*,20 is in G and xk < W. then
if |G| ■ 2 then
let (j,x^) be the other element of G
move down to exclude x^
delete G from the grey sets
else




and when we move black marker Bj, we do
for each grey set G do
if (j,Xj) is in G & ~(x^ < B^) then
delete G from the grey sets
fi
od
By maintaining a set of grey marks in each tree (a value being marked grey if there is an
example in the grey set with that value), we can avoid scanning the grey set except when we
know that at least one grey set will change. Note that the delay option does not require us to
store complete far misses, just the grey set. As far as I know the delay option is original to
me.
With the exception of the zero option, these options are applicable to most nondeter-
ministic algorithms. The delay option is a special case of the general heuristic: postpone
decisions as long as possible and when you have to make a choice make the choice with the
fewest alternatives.
5.4. The Two Concepts.
At any stage of the learning process, there are two forms of the concept. The most
general form of the concept is "it is an instance if none of the features are black". This is the
weakest form of the concept permitted by the negative examples. The most specialised form
of the concept is "it is an instance if all the features are white". This is the strongest form of
the concept permitted by the positive examples. (A rule is strong when it has few instances.)
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If one has to use a concept which has not yet been completely learned, whether one
uses the weakest form or the strongest form depends on whether one prefers errors of com¬
mission (the weakest form may accept non-instances) or omission (the strongest form may
reject instances). In the case of an Expert System giving advice in a domain where alter¬
native sources of advice (such as human consultants) are available, it is better for the
program to admit that it does not know than for it to give unreliable advice.
A program like ASA should thus use the strongest form of the concept. If we are
going to learn rules from a statistician ("method X is relevant to data Y when Y has the
following properties") all we really need is the positive examples. Why should we bother with
negative examples? There are four reasons.
• The "correct" form of the concept may not be representable in terms of a single
bound. If so, the Focussing algorithm will eventually over-generalise. Negative
examples are needed to detect this.
• Teachers make mistakes. With both positive and negative examples being sup¬
plied, we stand a chance of detecting this.
• A program can actively invent near misses and ask the teacher to classify them.
• In effect, when ABASE accepts information about the type of an object from the
client, it is learning a concept from a teacher. Section 4.8 points out that if
negative information were supplied (e.g. if the client could answer "no" to a ques¬
tion like "is X a D" rather than "I don't know") we would be in exactly the situation
of a learner given positive and negative examples.
5.5. Active Learning
The third reason is worth exploring further. Suppose we have a description space
which is a product of description trees: D = TjX.-.xT,,. Then an active learner can determine
E by asking 0(lg(d(D)) questions, where d(D) is the depth of D considered as a lattice.
Definition: an interval[L,U] in a lattice is the set (x | L < x < U}. This is a standard notion.
In a description tree, the unique genealogy constraint has the consequence that
(Vw b) w < b => [w,b] is a total order
In terms of the tree, [w,b] is w and all its ancestors, excluding the proper ancestors of b, so it
is not surprising that this list is a total order. The exciting thing is that this means that we can
do binary search.
Definition: for any w < b,
midptt,w,b) is that x in [w,b] for which
#(x,b] < #[w,x] < #[x,b]+l
This is the analogue of ceil((w+b)/2) in ordinary binary search.
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Definition: for any w < b,
pred{b;w) is that x in [w,b] for which b covers x
In tree language, pred(b;w) is the unique son of b which has w as a descendant. This is the
analogue of b-1 in ordinary binary search.
We arrive at the following algorithm:
get an initial positive example (xx,...,xR) .
set each WA to x±
set each to the root of
while there is an i such that 4 Bi do
while WA + do
set each to for j + i
set to midpt (Wif
# (y) is either an example or a near miss #
if (yx, . ..,yn) is an example then
set to y±
else




For each aspect i, the inner loop is performed at most ceil(lg(d(Ti))) times, so the
maximum number of questions that can be asked is
ceil(lg(d(Tl))) + ... + ceil(lg(d(Tn)))
which is clearly optimal. The very first positive example converts the problem from searching
in a space with #T1x...x#Tn elements to search in a space with at most d(T1)x...xd(Tn) ele¬
ments, and given that each question yields only one bit of information, the optimality of this
algorithm follows from information theory.
Indeed, this approach can be applied in the general setting where the Ts are semi-
lattices and not just trees. Unfortunately, the intervals are no longer total orders, so we do
not obtain a binary search algorithm. Instead we obtain
get an initial positive example (xlf... ,xn) .
set each W± to xL
set each Bj^ to 1
while there is an i such that + Bj^ do
while WA + Bj^ do
set each y^ to for j + i
Z := W±
for each z | z covers W± and z < B± do
y± := z
if (yx,...,yn) is an example then











The cost of this can be as high as #T 1 +...+#Tn questions.
The surprising fact is that for this particular type of concept, an active learner is
simpler than a passive learner, and what is more can proceed deterministically, without ever
making any mistakes. This is because we can avoid far misses entirely. Whether this ap¬
plies to other problems, or whether it is possible only because of the extreme simplicity of the
task I know not.
The fact that an active learner can be simpler, and can learn faster than a passive
one is surprising. The general attitude in the learning literature seems to be that supervised
learning is the right thing to study right now because it is simpler than active learning. The
active lattice learner has not, to my knowledge, been described before.
5.6. Lattices.
Chapter 4 argues for product-of-lattices description spaces as a replacement for type
hierarchies. While it is true that a lattice is a semilattice, and hence the Focussing algorithm
can be used, it may look as though I am asking for more than I need. Why demand that
d-spaces should be lattices when semi-lattices (such as type hierarchies) will do? Indeed,
one of my arguments for removing the privileged role of types is that we may then be able to
replace one hard-to-manipulate DAG by several simple trees. Asking for lattices may seem
inconsistent.
The first answer to this question is that we need something that corresponds to con¬
junction within a single d-space. The join operation V tells us what to conclude if we are told
that "fred is an elephant OR fred is a weasel", namely to conclude the upper bound "fred is a
mammal". But what are we to do if we are told that "fred is an elephant and fred is a
weasel"? Or less obviously, "x is divisible by 2 and x is divisible by 7"? The meet operation
(greatest lower bound) tells us what.
The second answer to this question is that any finite semi-lattice is very nearly a
lattice already. If D does not have an element 0 which is smaller than all the other elements,
adjoin a new element 0 and give it this property. So
(Vx) 0 < x
Now we define
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(Vx y) x /\ y « \/{x | z < x £ z < y)
Since there is a least element, the set above is non-empty, and since D is finite, it is finite, so
V{z...} is defined. The proof that this definition of A satisfies the lattice axioms is straightfor¬
ward. Furthermore, any finite lattice with a minimum (0) and a maximum (1) element is
necessarily complete, so a finite description space in the sense of this chapter is also a
description space in the sense of the previous chapter.
When D was a tree, it turns out that
x /\ y - if x < y then x else
if y < x then y else 0.
This means that all the nodes in a tree-like d-space are to be regarded as exclusions, which
is exactly the way simple type trees are normally intended.
It is a standard result of lattice theory [Birkhoff 67] that a partial order P can be
embedded in a lattice. The lattice is the set of all subsets of P which are closed below. A
subset Q is closed below when
(Vx y) xinQ£y<x=>yinQ
Any lattice which embeds P has a sublattice isomorphic to this one. Applying the focussing
algorithm to this derived lattice turns out to be equivalent to maintaining two sets of markers
W, and B. Given this derivation of the algorithm for learning in a partial order, coding the
algorithm is straightforward. In an early draft of this section a couple of years ago, the
algorithm was presented in full, because I thought I had found a generalisation of the focuss¬
ing algorithm. In fact, of course, it is a specialisation. This illustrates the power of lattice
theory.
5.6.1. DD rules and Learning
Chapter 4 proved that adding DD rules to a lattice leaves you with a lattice. We can
compute in the new description space (the quotient of the base description space under the
equivalence "d1 and d2 are rewritten to the same result by the DD rules") easily enough:
to compute dl /\ d2:
set x = dl /\ d2 in the base space
apply DD rules to x until convergence
result is x'
to compute dl \/ d2
apply DD rules to dl until convergence
apply DD rules to d2 until convergence
result is dl' \/ d2'
Chapter 6 shows that computing in the quotient description space can be done efficiently.
This goes some way towards solving a problem which the focussing algorithm ap-
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peared to have. As described in [Bundy et al 84], the focussing algorithm just works from a
set of trees, and is capable of coming up with silly answers because it cannot be told about
any relations between the types other than those implicit in the trees. But we now see that
this is only true of that particular instance of the algorithm.
The result that the focussing algorithm needs no extension at all to handle DD rules
(which is to say, most interesting rules relating descriptions) is new. Given chapter 4, it
appears obvious, but that is the point: Lattices are Good For You.
This result is briefly stated, but it is very important. Learning algorithms in general
have a tendency to find rules which cover the training set but are intrinsically silly. Very
simple systems such as Expert-Ease are particularly subject to this failing. To obtain sen¬
sible rules, it helps if we can provide rules about the concept description language, saying
that some combinations are forced and others are impossible. The significant feature of the
focussing algorithm is that because it is based on lattices, there is a useful class of rules
which the (abstract) algorithm can already handle.
DD rules can be combined with an active learner. Before asking any question, the
DD rules are applied to it, so that the question asked is a fixed point. Since each question is
a generalisation of the current white marker, the fixed point it is mapped to cannot be below
the fixed point the current white marker is mapped to. Hence by induction we can show that
no question will ever be mapped to "contradiction". No question will ask about the status of
an impossible object.
5.7. Conclusion
The focussing algorithm (or rather, family of algorithms) is a method of learning con¬
cepts which can be viewed as elements of a lattice. A wide variety of problems can be cast
in this form.
The result that the method can used to derive an active learner which asks relatively
few questions and never needs to backtrack appears to be new. A simple active learner can
identify a concept in a product of trees in an optimal number of questions.
An important new result is that the focussing algorithm, because it is based on lat¬
tices, can easily accommodate description-to-description rules. In particular, DD rules can
serve as negative constraints (this combination of attributes can never occur -- is mapped to
0) so that if the learner wanders into an "impossible" region of the description space it can
backtrack out instead of failing to converge for lack of counter-examples.
In the Expert System world, I wanted to handle conjunction. In the Learning world,




This chapter presents an algorithm for solving a class of fixed-point problems in linear
time. This is an important result for this work, because it applies to DD rules. For a given
lattice, the total time taken for all updates to the description of an entity is at worst propor¬
tional to the total size of the DD rule-set. It is also shown how this algorithm can be applied
to forward chaining in sets of function-free Horn clauses.
When specialised to sets of prepositional Horn clauses, the algorithm reduces to the
well known LINCLOSURE algorithm [Beeri 79], The fact that models for sets of prepositional
Horn clauses can be found in linear time has been known since 1979; that is not a new result.
However, it too is significant for ABASE. ABASE keeps a record of every inference step.
Each such record is a labelled prepositional Horn clause:
{according to rule so and so)
fact_l & ... & fact_n -> conclusion
This is used for providing explanations, and for belief revision. A client can retract any
answer he has given and any information he has volunteered (except additions to the
description system). When this happens, all the conclusions which depended on the
retracted statements are withdrawn. As LINCLOSURE is used to propagate conclusions
along existing paths, the cost of rederiving all the conclusions which are still valid is at worst
linear in the size of the inference records which were invalidated.
The algorithm described in section 6.2 can be viewed as a variant of LINCLOSURE.
Its actual historical development was as a generalisation of a variant of topological sort for
hyper-graphs. The fact that this algorithm has a large number of relatives is testimony to the
ubiquity of fixed-point problems: it is even possible to compute transitive closures this way.
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6.1. The Problem to be Solved.
We are given a set of variables (x[1] x[n]}.
Each variable x[i] ranges over a lattice L[i] having finite depth d[i]. The depth of a
lattice is the length of the longest chain
eo < ei < ®2 < • • . < ed.pth
which can be formed from elements of the lattice. Different variables may range over dif¬
ferent lattices. All the lattices are required to have a least element (0) and a greatest element
(1). Note that any of the lattices may have infinitely many elements; what matters is the
length of the longest chain.
The depth of the problem, d, is defined as d[1]+...+d[n].
We are given a set of monotone increasing functions
f[j] : Mj,D x ... x L[j,a[j]] -> L[j,0]
Definition: a finite fixed-point problem is a set of inequalities
x[k] > e[k]
where the right hand side of each inequality is a well-typed expression constructed from the
given variables and monotone functions. We are to find a minimal model (or fixed point) of
this set of inequalities, where
Definition: a model for a set of inequalities is an assignment of lattice elements to variables
which makes the inequalities true,
Definition: given that M1 and M2 are models for a set of inequalities, M1 is said to be a
proper submodel of M2 if
(VI < i < n) Ml (x (i]) < M2 (x[i])
& (31 < j < a) Ml (x[ j]) < M2 (x[j]) .
Definition: a model is said to be a minimalmodel iff it has no proper submodels.
Definition: the problem lattice is the product
l = l [l] x ... x l [n],
and on this lattice we have a monotone function F defined by
F(<x[l], . . .,x[n]» = <x[l]\/e[l,l]\/e[l,2]\/. . .
|X[2] \/e [2,1] \/.. .
'
x[n] \/e [n, 1] \/e [n, 2] \/ . . .
>
where e[i,k] is the right hand side of the kth inequality with left hand side x[i]. Here is an






F(<x,y,z>) ■ <x\/(x/\y),y\/0, z\/x>
■ <x,y,s/\x>
In this example, <0,0,0> is a fixed point of F. We want a method for finding such fixed points
in general.
Now a lattice of finite depth is complete, and a product of finite lattices is complete,
so L is complete. It is a standard result of lattice theory [Birkhoff 67] that the fixed points of a
monotone function over a complete lattice form a complete lattice. Hence the fixed points of
F over L form a complete lattice. In particular, there is a unique minimal fixed point, and this
fixed point is a minimal model of the set of inequalities.
Definition: A lattice equation problem is a finite fixed-point problem where some or all of the
inequalities are equalities, and the task is to find a minimal model or to show that there are no
models.
It is easy to show that if a lattice equation problem has a solution it is the least fixed
point of the corresponding finite fixed-point problem. So we can solve lattice equation
problems (or determine that they have no solution) in linear time and space.
Definition: a monotone function f(x1,...,xn) is top-preserving if f(1,...,1) = 1.
If all the monotone functions in a lattice equation problem are top-preserving, then
the interpretation which assigns the maximum element of its lattice to each variable is a
model, and the problem is equivalent to the corresponding finite fixed point problem.
6.2. The Algorithm
To improve the performance of the algorithm, it is useful to reduce the inequalities to
a normal form where every inequality has one of two forms:
1. x[i] > k
for some k in L[i]
2. x[i] > f(x1 xp,k1 kq)
where x1...xp are not necessarily distinct variables, k1...kq are not
necessarily distinct constants, and f is one of the monotone functions
(including the identity function).
This is done by evaluating constant expressions, and replacing each nested expres¬
sion by a new variable and adding a new inequality. Normalisation can clearly be done in
linear time and space. Inequalities of form (1) can be handled by initialising each variable to
the least upper bound of all its constant lower bounds.
The algorithm uses the following data structures:
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for j = 1..E
lhatj]
expr[j]
the current value of variable x[i]
a list of all the simplified right-hand-
sides in which x[i] appears
points to the next element in the stack,
is NIL for the bottom element, or is OUT
when x[i] is not on the stack.
index of a variable
x[lhs[j]] > expr[j] is jth inequality
We use auxiliary variables
s : top of stack pointer
i : index of variable being processed
c : points to (a tail of) chain[i]
j : index of inequality being processed
t : a lattice value
The algorithm has two phases, an initialisation phase, and a closure phase. The
initialisation phase computes the initial value of each variable, and adds it to the stack if it is
non-zero.
for i from 1 to N do
value[i], link[i] := 0, OUT
od
s := NIL
for j from 1 to E do
i := lhs[j]
t := value[i] \/ eval(expr[j])
if t > value[i] then
value[i], link[i], s := t, s, i
fi
od
The cost of the initialisation phase is proportional to the size of the problem; the loop
on j dominates the loop on i.
After the initialisation phase is complete, all variables have assigned values, and the
stack contains all the variables with non-zero values. Applied to the example from [Mellish
85], the initialisation phase terminates with all variables 0 and s NIL.
The closure phase keeps propagating the changed variables until no further changes
occur.
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while s / NIL do
i, 8 := 8, link[s]
link[i], c :» OUT, chain[i]
while c / NIL do
j, c : = head[c], tailtc]
i : = lhstj]
t : = value[i] \/ eval(expr[j])
if t > value[i] then
value[i] := t
if link[i] = OUT then





The significance of finite depth is that each iteration of the outer loop corresponds to
a change in an x[i]. So the depth of the whole problem bounds the number of iterations of the
outer loop. The body of the inner loop takes constant time. So the next question is the
number of iterations of the inner loop. Each chain is traversed in its entirety once for every
time that the corresponding variable is stacked. Letting dmax be the maximum depth of any
of the lattices, each variable can be stacked at most dmax times. So a bound on the number
of iterations is
dmax x sum {1=1..N} length(chain[i])
sum {1=1..N} length(chain[1])
is just the number of variable occurrences in right hand sides, which is bounded by the size of
the problem.
Accordingly, the total complexity of the algorithm is
O(d + E + N + dmax x size of problem)
But d < dmax x N, and E + N < size of problem, so the cost is
O(dmax x size of problem)
For a fixed set of lattices, the computational cost is proportional to the size of the set of
inequalities.
We have just proved
Theorem: any finite fixed point problem can be solved in linear time and linear space.
Theorem: any lattice equation problem can be solved in linear time and linear space.
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6.3. Applications
This section describes some of the applications this algorithm is useful for, drawn
from knowledge representation, logic programming, and graph theory.
6.3.1. Functional Dependencies
The original LINCLOSURE algorithm was developed to handle functional
dependencies in relational data bases. See [Maier 83] chapter 4 for a good explanation.
Given a relation such as
assign(Pilot, Flight, Date, Departs)
a functional dependency such as
(Flight, Date) -> Pilot
means that
for all Flight, Date
there is at most one Pilot such that
there is a Departs such that
assign(Pilot, Flight, Date, Departs)
That is, if we just look at the Pilot, Flight, and Date arguments, 'assign' is a partial function
from Flight and Date to Pilot.
It is possible to state functional dependencies in ABASE. This feature was copied
from MECHO, though the syntax is different. One would write
unique(assign(P,F,D,T), [F,D], [P]).
But despite the different syntax, it is just an ordinary functional dependency. Given a set of
functional dependencies, it is useful to find all the functional dependencies which they logi¬
cally entail. The LINCLOSURE algorithm is useful for doing this efficiently.
6.3.2. Belief Revision
Whenever ABASE completes an inference, it records a justification. The use of
prepositional Horn clauses for belief revision was described at the beginning of this chapter.
6.3.3. Logic Programs With Uncertainties
If, despite the fundamental problems with attaching uncertainties to predications
described in chapter 4, you decide to use that approach anyway, the methods of [Shapiro
83] can usefully be generalised to complete lattices. (So can "Fuzzy Set Theory". See
[Erceg 76].)
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Any instance of an "uncertain Horn clause"
f: C <- HI t ... & Hn
corresponds to an inequality relating the uncertainties associated with the hypotheses and
conclusion:
cf(C') > f(cf<Hl'),...,cf(Hn'))
If the certainty space we are using has finite depth, we can propagate changes in the cer¬
tainty factors of facts and rules in time linear in the size of the proof so far. Or, if we are
interested only in the certainty of one conclusion, linear in the size of the proof of that conclu¬
sion. Note that [Shapiro 83] uses the interval (0,1] as certainty space, which is not of finite
depth.
If all the rules in a logic program with uncertainties are in fact prepositional, then the
cost of propagating uncertainties is at worst linear in the size of the rule base.
It is possible to extend the logic programs with uncertainties approach to include
"negated" hypotheses, where a negated hypothesis has the form
cf(H) < k
where k is a lattice element. Such a subgoal is either absolutely true, absolutely false, or
undetermined, and is not itself uncertain. This is analogous to the use of finite failure as a
substitute for negation in ordinary logic programming, and is subject to similar limitations. In
particular, the addition of new facts or the increase of a certainty may falsify a negated
hypothesis, so the modified LINCLOSURE does not apply directly to logic programs with both
uncertainties and negation.
6.3.4. Description-to-Descrlption Rules
A conditional description to description rule (CDD rule) has the logical form
if rule_enabled(X) and
description(X) < D and
D < dO and
D /\ dl = 0 & ... & D/\dn = 0
then
description(X) < f(D)
where f is a monotone function. For a particular X at a particular time, the set of enabled
CDD rules forms a finite fixed point problem.
If, as is usually the case, the description space we are using is a product of several
aspects, we can treat each of these aspects as a separate variable in the finite fixed point
problem. (That is in fact how ABASE stores aspects.) An interesting result of this section is
that the cost of completing a description depends on the depth of the deepest aspect lattice,
rather than on the depth of the product lattice as a whole.
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More importantly, the form of CDD rules in ABASE was restricted to what I thought
could be implemented efficiently. But the fact that finite fixed point problems can be solved in
linear time means that I was unduly pessimistic. Consider the following generalised schema
(for Generalised DD rules):
if rule_enabled(Xl, . . . ,Xn) and
description(XI) < D1 and D1 < dl and ...
. . . and
description(Xn) < Dn and Dn < dn and ...
then
description(Xi) < f(Dl,...,Dn)
An example of such a rule is
mother(Parent, Child) &
the variety of Parent is S
-> the variety of Child is weaken_to_species (S) .
where weaken_to_species is a function which maps varieties (such as Dachshund or
Samoyed or Siamese or Manx) to species (such as canis familiaris or felis domesticus), and
leaves classifications at or above the species level alone.
We can handle rules like this by constructing a finite fixed-point problem dynamically.
Whenever we learn about a new individual, we create a variable for each of its aspects.
Whenever an enabling condition is proven, we add the corresponding instance of the GDD
rule as an inequality. For example, when we first hear of Samuel, we might create the
variable
variety_o f_samue1
among others. When it is proven that mother(hannah,samuel), we add the inequality
variety_of_samuel <
weaken_to_species (variety_of_hannah)
If we update many descriptions at once, the cost of propagating the consequences of
these through the instantiated and enabled GDD rules is proportional to the total bulk of the
rules. This really pays off when combined with belief revision: we can economically revise
the descriptions by setting all the variables to their initial values and re-running the finite fixed
point algorithm.
6.3.5. Transitive Closure
Suppose we are given an NxN matrix M whose elements come from a lattice of finite
depth, and we want to compute the generalised transitive closure
limJc->infinity
where M0 = M
where (X*Y) ^ „f (Xlp, Ypj)
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f being any monotone increasing function. For the ordinary transitive closure, the lattice is
{0,1}, and f is A.
Letting C be the desired solution matrix, we can convert this to a finite fixed-point
problem as follows:
for i = 1..N, j = l..N
cij >= Mij
for i = 1..N, J «= 1..N, p = 1..N
cij >=
Clearly, the size of this finite fixed-point problem is proportional to N3, regardless of the value
of M. Whatever the function f, we can solve this problem in cubic time.
For the ordinary transitive closure, this algorithm can be coded in C [Harbison &
Steele 84, Kernighan 78] as follows:





register int i, j;
for (i = n; i > 0; i—)
for (j = n; j > 0; j—)
C[i][j].v = 0;
}
void arc(i, j, n)




register int si, sj;
if <!C[i][j].v) {
C[i][j].v = 1,
C[i] [j] .r = 0, C[i] tj] -c = 0;
for (; i != 0; i = si, j = sj) {
si = C[i][j].r, sj = C[i][j].c;
for (k = n; k > 0; k—) {
if <C[j][k].v && !C[i][kj.v)
C [i] [k] .v = 1,
C[i][k].r = si, C[i][k].c = sj,
si = ir sj = k;
if (C[k][i].v && !C[k][j].v)
C[k] [j] -v = 1,
C [k] [j] .r = si, C [k] [j] .c = sj,






Algorithms for computing the transitive closure in cubic time are already known, most
notably Warshall's algorithm [Warshall 62]:
for j from 1 to N do
for i from 1 to H do
C[i,j] M[i,j]
for j from 1 to K do
for i from 1 to N do
if C[i,j] then
for p from 1 to N do
if C[j,p] then
C[i,p] := true
Warshall's algorithm can be implemented very efficiently indeed. But this new
method has an advantage: it is incremental. That is, suppose we start with a particular M and
compute C. Now, we can add new arcs to M (by setting some M[i,j] to a higher value than rt
previously had), and update C by resuming the closure phase of my algorithm, and the total
time for computing the closure is still cubic in N.
Transitive closure is actually a useful operation for expert systems which can have
recursive rules. In ASA, for example, "is contained in" is a transitive relation between experi¬
ment stages. There are a number of base relations (such as one step being the first sub-step
of a sequence step) which act as M, and the derived relation acts as C. Suppose that we
have a relation
c(X,Y) <- m(X,Y)
c (X, Y) <- c (X, Z) & c(Z,Y)
There are several ways we could handle this. One way is to use a general deduction
method. ABASE uses Eartey deduction [Pereira & Warren 83] which can easily handle such
rules. If there are N entities of the appropriate type, this can cost 0(N2) per query of c. An
improvement on this approach is to cache the results of queries of c. Since there are at most
N2 distinct queries, this yields a total cost of 0(N4). The implementation of Earley deduction
in ABASE caches all results, so computing a transitive closure this way in ABASE costs
0(N4) inference steps. Separating transitive relations out and using this algorithm on them
yields an incremental method (of importance because the base relation is incrementally
acquired) with total cost 0(N3), and the constant factor is smaller too.
ABASE does not use this algorithm, for the simple reason that I didn't invent it in
time. For the small problems that ASA tackled, the use of Earley deduction with caching was
satisfactory. But almost any technique will work on small problems, and having a fast algo¬
rithm for transitive closure is important if we are to cope with large problems.
Even if ABASE used this algorithm, it would not be the best way to handle the "is
contained in" relation in ASA. The reason for that is that experiment steps in ASA's represen¬
tation cannot overlap, so "is contained in" is a tree. Accordingly, the fast tree algorithm
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presented for type trees in chapter 7 can be adapted to yield an O(N) algorithm for this case,
which is much better than 0(N3). For acyclic graphs in general, we can compute transitive
closures in 0(N2) time.
6.3.6. Optimising Logic Programs
Finally, Chris Mellish has shown in [Mellish 85] that several interesting properties of
Prolog predicates can be derived by forming a finite fixed point problem (whose size is
roughly proportional to the size of the original program) and solving it.
After preprocessing, all of the rules that ABASE can handle are either special annota¬
tions (handled at "compile time" by special purpose closure methods such as LINCLOSURE),
or generalised DD rules, or else Horn clauses. Methods for analysing sets of Horn clauses
are therefore relevant to analysing Knowledge Bases written in first order logic.
6.4. Function-Free Horn Clauses
The family of algorithms I have described so far in this chapter is derived from the
LINCLOSURE for solving sets of propositional Horn clauses. It would be pleasant indeed if
we could use this basic idea in a more general setting.
The basic knowledge representation language used by ABASE is function-free Horn
clauses. The inference method used by ABASE is Earley Deduction [Pereira & Warren 83].
Earley Deduction is a family of proof procedures for sets of Horn clauses; it includes Prolog
as an extreme member. The variant used by ABASE can be regarded as a blend of back¬
ward chaining, deciding which goals are "interesting", and forward chaining, deciding which
"interesting" facts are true. There are in fact several top level goals: one is to prove that the
client can be satisfied, and the others are checking for inconsistencies. Eariey deduction was
chosen as the inference method so that this blend of backward chaining and forward chaining
could be used: as soon as a fact was asserted by the client (whether the backward chaining
procedure was ready for it or not) it will be forward chained from, so that "obvious" inconsis¬
tencies will be spotted promptly. Also, the variant of Earley Deduction used can easily ac¬
commodate non-chronological backtracking. Earley Deduction was not chosen to make in¬
ference easier, but because it provides a much better basis for managing a "conversation"
than pure backward chaining.
It is possible to regard the ABASE inference engine as consisting of three levels:
• The backward chaining level works backwards from the top level goals, deciding
which goals are interesting, and creating "dotted rules". This level decides when
to ask questions, when to switch off goals because they are no longer inter-
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esting, what question to ask next, when an assumption can be made, and when
to create a new entity.
• The forward chaining level works forwards from the facts asserted by the client
or guessed by the default mechanism, chaining not with the original rules, but
with the "dotted rules" created by the backward chaining level.
• The dependency maintenance level uses the propositional clauses
(dependencies) created by the forward chaining level to keep track of which facts
are still supported by the client's current assertions.
We have already seen how to handle the propositional Horn clauses belonging to the
third level efficiently. Is there an efficient way to handle the function-free Horn clauses
belonging to the second level?
Suppose we have a set of function-free Horn clauses in which K distinct constants
appear. Let the maximum number of distinct variables in any clause be V, and let the size of
the set by N symbols. Let the query
<- gi & ... & Gn
be included as the only rule defining 'ANSWER':
ANSWER(vara...) <- Gl £ ... & Gn
and let this clause be included in the K, V, N figures. Then there are at most KAV different
ground instances of any rule, so the entire set of clauses is equivalent to set of propositional
Horn clauses (treating each different ground instance of a logical atom as a different proposi¬
tional letter) of size at worst (KAV)*N. We can solve that set in time 0((KAV)*N).




q(X, Y) <- p(X, Y)
q(X, Y) <- q(X, Z) & q(Z, Y)
This is precisely the transitive closure problem we studied earlier, and we saw that it takes
0(KA3) time where K is the number of distinct cij, and here V=3.10
One reason why this example takes a lot of work is that it has a tot of solutions. What
we are looking for is a forward chaining method which takes time proportional to the number
of solutions found, or not too much worse than that.
10The transitive closure problem can be solved in 0(KA2.5ish) time, so this doesn't prove that we can't do better
than 0((KAV)*N).
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Now a predicate symbol of arity N can be regarded as a variable ranging over the
lattice 2A(KAN), K being the set of constants. This is a lattice of finite (but very large) depth.
A function-free Horn clause
p(xl,...,xn) <-
ql(yll,...,ylkl) £ ... &
qm(yml, , ymkm)
can be regarded as an inequality
P > f(qif••.,qm)
for a suitable monotone function f. If the cost of evaluating f(q1 qm) were proportional to
the size of the rule in question, which it is not, we would then have a simple finite fixed-point
problem. Each rule will be fired when one of its qi has been changed, and this can only
happen when at least one new solutions has been found for that qi, and the cost would then
be 0(size of rule set x number of solutions).
The trouble is the fact that evaluating the right hand side of a rule can be very costly
indeed. The point of OPS5 [— 82], for example, is that it has an efficient method for doing
this.
A normal form for the set of clauses has each clause in one of three forms:
0. h <-
1. H <- 61
2. H <- G1 & G2
This can be done without increasing the number of conjunctions in the clauses, and with only
a linear increase in the number of predicate letters. For example,
says_knave(PI, P2, YNl) <-
believes_knave(PI, P2, YN2) &
is_knave(PI, YN3) &
combine(YN2, YN3, YNl).
believes_knave(PI, PI, YNl) <-
is_knave(PI, YNl)
believes_knave(PI, P2, YNl) <-
says_knave(P3, P2, YN2) &
believes_knave(PI, P3, YN3) &
combine(YN2, YN3, YN1)
might be normalised as
says_knave(Pi, P2, YNl) <-
believes_knave(PI, P2, YN2) &
says 1(P1, 1TN2, YN1)
says 1(P1, YN2, YN1) <-
is_lcnave (PI, YN3) &
combine(YN2, YN3, YNl)
believes_knave(Pi, PI, YNl) <-
is knave(PI, YNl)
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believes_knave(PI, P2, YN1) <-
says_knave(P3, P2, YN2) £
believes l(Pl, P3, YN2, YN1)
believes 1(P1, P3, YN2, YN1) <-
believes_Jcnave (PI, P3, YN3) &
combine(YN2, YN3, YN1)
There are several other possible normalisations of these three clauses.
Determining the best normalisation of a set of clauses requires additional information
about the expected sizes of projections of the predicates. Given that information, it is a
generalisation of the well known "matrix chain product" problem (see [Sedgwick 83], pp
486-489). That is, deciding whether to normalise
p(A, D) <- ql(Bf A) & q3(C, D) & q2(B, C)
as
P (A, D) <- p 1 (A, C) & q3 (C, D)
p 1 (A, C) <- ql (B, A) & q2(B, C)
or as
p(A, D) <- p 2(B, D) & ql(A, B)
p 2 (B, D) <- q3(C, D) £ q2 (B, C)






This is known to be a very hard problem (there are 0(4AN.N"3/2) bracketings to try), but
fortunately we only have to do it once, and typically there aren't many goals in a rule. The
dynamic programming algorithm given in [Sedgwick 83] takes 0(N3) time. Exploiting func¬
tional dependencies is very important here!
6.4.1. Unit Clauses
Rules of the form
0. H <-
are taken care of by the initialisation phase.
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6.4.2. Doublet Clauses
Rules of the form
1. H <- G1
introduce the first difficulty: finding them. Having proved or been given a new function-free
fact G, how do we find which rules of this form it is relevant to (which G1 unify with G)?
When we considered prepositional Horn clauses, all the clauses containing the same predi¬
cate letter were relevant, but this is no longer the case. (At least, it is no longer the case for
the original predicate symbols. The predicate symbols introduced by normalisation are
relevant to all the rules they appear in, as the atoms in which they appear have only variables
as arguments.)
The problem is this: we are given a fixed set S of function-free atoms - the atoms
which appear in rule bodies. We have another function-free atom A with the same predicate
symbol - the fact which has just been proven or volunteered by the client. We want to
identify the members of S which unify with A, and we want to do this rapidly.
The first thing to note is that the predicate symbol is known for each of the atoms in
S. So in unit time (using a hash table) we can locate the atoms in S with the same predicate
letter as A. Now we are considering
a = p(Al,...,An)
Sp = {- • p(Sl,...,Sn), ...}
We can determine whether p(A1 ,...,An) and p(Sl ,...,Sn) unify in o(n) time. So we can find all
the relevant members of S in time at worst o(n.|Sp|). If R is the subset of Sp containing all
the atoms which unify with A, we have to inspect every member of R, so the best we can do
is o(n.|R|). A good method for searching the table is that in [Ramamohanorao 86]. Other
indexing methods are available. ABASE doesn't try to be clever for the simple reason that
virtually all the goals in ASA's rules have all the arguments unbound, so that Sp is typically a
singleton set.
6.4.3. Triplet Clauses
Rules of the form
2. H <- Gi & G2
have also to be found. For simplicity, suppose we store each such rule twice, as
2a. H <- G1 & G2
2b. H <- G2 & Gl
We now have rules of the form
Conclusion <- Cue & Context
Given a new fact, we want to find rules with a unifying Cue. We can do this using
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[Ramamohanorao 86] or any other such scheme. We now have an instance of Context, say
Context', and for every fact matching Context' we want to derive the corresponding instance
of Conclusion.
This searching for a Context in the data base of facts is logically the same as the
problem of finding the relevant members of S given A. However, the data base is typically
large and growing. Fortunately, [Ramamohanorao 86] is a dynamic method, so can still be
used.
A cruder method was devised for ABASE but not installed. The data base was to be
broken into two subsets: the ground facts and the non-ground facts. (In practice there are no
non-ground facts, but there is nothing in the problem specification to exclude them.) Non-
ground facts were to be handled by the brute-force method. Ground facts were to be handled
by having 2n hash tables for each predicate symbol of arity n. Each index 0..2n-1 specifies a
subset of the arguments: for each fact and index the appropriate subset of the arguments of
the fact were to be used as the key for inserting the fact in that table. When an instance of
Context was to be looked up, the hash table corresponding to the bound arguments would be
used. [Ramamohanorao 86] has superceded this method.
6.4.4. Overall Performance
Roughly speaking, the work which this method performs is (with optimal indexing) at
least proportional to the sum of sizes of all true instances of rules. For example, in the
transitive closure problem
ancestor(ci, cj) <-
ancestor(X, X) <- ancestor(X, Z) & ancestor(Z, Y)
the sum of the sizes of all true rule instances can be cubic in the number of facts.
6.4.5. Relevance to ABASE
ABASE doesn't quite do this. As backwards chaining proceeds, "dotted" rules are
produced. A dotted rule has the form
(Conclusion <- {Done} & Cue & Context)theta
where Done is a conjunction of the goals which have already been solved, theta is the sub¬
stitution which resulted from their solution, Cue is the goal which has been selected, and
Context is the remaining goals. (Cue)theta is set up as a subgoal. A dotted rule with empty
Context (or rather, whose context consists entirely of built in predicates, type tests, and
Prolog escapes) corresponds to a doublet clause. A dotted rule with nonempty Context
corresponds to a triplet clause. Thus the forward-chaining rule set grows as backward-
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chaining proceeds. If the knowledge base contains N negative rules, the state of the Earley
Deduction engine is a merge of the parallel execution of N+1 processes, one for each nega¬
tive rule and one for the consultation.
The benefit of working from the dotted rules rather than the original rules is that
backward chaining focusses forward chaining: only "interesting" conclusions are drawn. The
price is that we don't get the opportunity to optimise the bracketing of general clauses into
triplet form.
6.5. Summary
In this chapter I have presented an algorithm which finds the solution of a finite
fixed-point problem in linear time and space. The algorithm has many applications in logic-
based expert systems. It is related to the LINCLOSURE algorithm, but appears to be new.
From it one can derive an incremental transitive closure algorithm which also appears to be
new.
If we let the size of a problem be S, and the number of variables be V, it is straightfor¬
ward to program the algorithm in Prolog so as to take O(S) space and O(S.lgV) time. This is
optimal in a pointer machine model.
The LINCLOSURE idea was applied to forward chaining on function-free Horn
clauses. Given an efficient method of locating function-free atoms in a dynamic data base
which unify with a given atom, this yields a method whose cost is proportional to the sum of
the sizes of all true instances of (normalised) rules.
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Chapter 7
A New Data-Structure for Type Trees
7.1. Introduction.
Type trees are easy to understand, they encode a lot of information in a compact
way, and type information can be used both to check that rules and new facts make sense
and to reduce the size of the search space. Making them even more efficient is therefore a
Good Thing.
A taxonomy is an arrangement of classes (types, unary predicates) into a tree. A





represents a set of axioms
(Vx) T_l(x) =* T_0(x)
(Vx) T_2(x) => T_0(x)
(Vx) T_3 (x) => T_0(x)
(Vx) T_1 (x) => ~T_2 (x) £ ~T_3 (x) £
(Vx) T_2 (x) =» ~T_3 (x) £
For convenience we may call these XOR nodes, though the relation is not strictly an ex¬
clusive or.
We typically want to use such a set of axioms to do prepositional reasoning about the
type of a known individual. So we want to ask questions like
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Given T 1 (x), is T_2(x)
(a) certain?
That is, is T_1 a sub-type of T_2?
(b) possible?
That is, is T_1 a super-type of T_2?
(c) impossible?
That is, are T_1 and T_2 incompatible?
(neither of the above)
Given T_1 (x),
(d) which T(x) follow?
That is, find the super-types of T_1.
(e) which T(x) are still possible?
That is, find the sub-types of T_l.
Given T_1 and T_2,
(f) what is their nearest common supertype?
The data structure presented in this chapter implements these operations in asymptotically
optimal time and space. The only operation which is slowed down is adding a new type to
the tree, and that remains constant expected time.
7.2. Numbering the nodes.
The key idea is that we can number the nodes of the type tree so that the numbers














































The successor of the root is a dummy node. The successor of any other node is its
right brother if it has one, otherwise its father's successor. Successor links are related to
threaded trees [Knuth 73] but are not the same. The node numbers are just the numbers
assigned by a depth-first pre-order traversal. How do these numbers help?
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If T1 and T2 are nodes in the tree representing types, then
(*) T1 is a subtype of 12 Iff
ord(T2) < ord(Tl) < ord(suc(T2)).
That's all there is to the idea. This directly answers questions (a), (b), and (c). Question (e)
can be answered by linking a node to its sons, but another way is to link each node to the
node with the next higher number, and to use (*) to stop at the first non-descendant. (See
the function appBelow below.) Question (d) is easily answered by linking each node to its
father (see the function appAbove). Father links also let us answer question (f) cheaply. To
find the common super-type of types T_1 and T_2, we just scan the ancestors of one node to
find the first one which is an ancestor of the other:
while not (subtype (T_2, T_l)) do T_1 := father(T_1);
If T_1, T_2 are at depths D1, D2 in the tree, and the common super-type is at depth D, the
cost of finding the super-type is thus proportional to D1-D. The function comtype below
saves one of the comparisons in each subtype test but has cost proportional to max(D1,D2)-
D. We could store the depth of each node and make the cost proportional to min(D1 ,D2)-D.
7.3. The Complete Method.
The scheme presented in the previous section requires a fixed set of nodes. It can
be useful for an Expert System to acquire new taxonomic information from its client during a
consultation, but adding a node to the tree as presented so far means renumbering most of
the nodes. The question is whether we can relax the numbering system to make it easier to
update, without losing its other properties. The answer is that we can. All we need from the
numbers is their order, so we can leave gaps between the numbers of successive nodes.
New nodes can then go in the gaps. Only rarely do we need to renumber a subtree.
I have chosen to present the complete method in the form of working code in the
language C. Providing these algorithms to the community is the major point of this chapter.
Those unfamiliar with C should consult [Kernighan 78, Harbison & Steele 84]. Failing that,
here is a summary. C is a Pascal-like language, "struct" declares a record type, "int" means
"integer", and is also used for boolean (0 = false, anything else = true). "{" and "}" are used
for "begin" and "end", "test ? if_true : if_false" is a conditional expression, whose value is
rf_true if test is non-zero(true) or if_false if test is O(false). The "for" statement is a disguised
"while":
for (Init; Test; Step) Body
means
{ Init; while (Test) { Body; Step; } }
The most idiosyncratic aspect of C is the way it handles pointers. If V is a variable of type T,
then &V is a pointer value of type *T, pointing to the variable. If P is a pointer variable of type
*T, then *P is the variable that P points to. If P is a pointer to a record(struct) with a com-
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ponent f, P->f is the f component of the record P points to (in Pascal, P\f). 0 is the null
pointer value. With this sketchy background, let's get on with the program.










A node is represented by a record. All the nodes in a tree are linked together by their
Nxt fields, in the same order as that given by the Ord numbers. The Ord numbers do not
necessarily go up in steps of 1; but their relative order is the same depth-first pre-order
traversal order. Having gaps in this order is what lets us insert new nodes without updating
all the numbers.
The youngest descendant of a node is the descendant with the highest number, and
is the most recently added one. As such, it must be a leaf. It turns out that we do not need to
store a successor link, as the successor of a node (oldest younger brother if there is one,
otherwise father's successor) is always N->Yds->Nxt. When we add a new son to a node N,
it will be inserted between N->Yds and N->Yds->Nxt, and will become N's youngest descen¬
dant.
Here is how the animals tree might be represented.
Node Dad Yds Nxt Ord
animal - man herbivore 1
herbivore animal cow horse 2
horse herbivore horse cow 3
cow herbivore cow carnivore 501
carnivore animal dog cat 750
cat carnivore cat dog 751
dog carnivore dog primate 875
primate animal man gorilla 937
gorilla primate gorilla man 938
man primate man DUMMY 969
DUMMY - - - 1000
The same dummy node can be used for all trees, so it is predeclared.
/* node with next higher number */
/* the father of this node */
/* this node's Youngest Descendant*/
/* the magic ordering number */
/* the label, for external use */
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The links enable us to find all the ancestors and all the descendants of a node.
Although we do not store son links, the fact that the Youngest Descendant links let us find
younger brothers means that we can actually find all the sons of a node quite easily. It turns
out that
N is a leaf Iff N->Yds = N
if N is not a leaf, N->Nxt is N's oldest son.
So we have three routines:
void appAbove(N, p) /* apply P to all ancestors of N */
nodep N; /* including N itself */
void (*P)(); /* P is a procedure */
(
while (N != Nil) (*P)(N), N = N->Dad;
)




nodep S = N->Yds->Nxt; /* successor of N */
N = nxt(N); /* oldest son */
while (N != S) (*P) (N) , N = N->Yds->Nxt;
)
void appBelow(N, P) /* apply P to all N's descendants */
nodep N; /* including N itself */
void (*P)();
{
nodep S = N->Yds->Nxt;
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whila (N !- S) (*P)(N), N ■ N->Nxt;
>
These routines traverse the required sections of the tree with constant extra storage (at most
one pointer), and at cost a+b|Examined|, where Examined is the set of nodes inspected, and
a,b are small constants. Their correctness is less obvious, and depends largely on the defini¬
tion of Youngest Descendant and successor.
Exhibiting these routines merely shows that this data structure is no worse than a
threaded tree (which also requires either 3 pointers or 2 pointers and a "leaf?" flag per node).
The real point of this data structure is to make type comparison fast. The next three routines
do this. They all assume that T1 and T2 belong to the same tree.
int subtype(Tl, T2)
/* is Tl a subtype of T2 (includes Tl=T2)? */
nodep Tl, T2;
{
return T2-X>rd <= Tl-X)rd
&& Tl->Ord < T2->Yds->Nxt->Ord;
)
/* reltype(Tl, t2) returns
'=' if Tl and T2 are the sane;
'<' if Tl is a proper subtype of T2;
'>' if Tl is a proper supertype of T2;
'#' if Tl and T2 are incompatible.
*/
char reltype(Tl, T2)
/* works out what relation holds between Tl and T2 */
nodep Tl, T2 ;
{
return
Tl->Ord < T2-X)rd ?
(T2->Ord < T1->Yds->Nxt-X)rd ? '>' : '#')
: Tl-X>rd > T2-X)rd ?
(Tl->Ord < T2->Yds->Nxt-X)rd ? '<' : '#')




/* returns the smallest common supertype of Tl & T2 */
nodep Tl, T2;
{
int 02 = T2->Ord;
if (Tl->Ord >02) 02 = Tl->Ord, Tl = T2;
while (Tl->Yds->Nxt->Ord <= 02) Tl = Tl->Dad;
}
This is all very pretty, but if it is to be any use, building the tree has to be affordable.
Suppose we want to add a new node S as a son of node D. The first thing to do is to maintain
the links. The point of the Youngest Descendant link is that it points to the node after which
the new node is to be inserted. So doing
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S->Nxt - D->Yds->Nxt, D->Yds->Nxt « S;
is sufficient to insert S into the Nxt chain. But we also have to maintain the Youngest Des¬
cendant links themselves. We thus arrive at




nodep S = (nodep)malloc(sizeof (struct node));





while (D != Nil £& D->Yds = Y)




The body of the while loop must be executed at least once. Thereafter it will be
executed as long as D is its father's youngest son. If the tree has branching factor B > 1, the
average number of times the loop is executed will thus be 1 + 1/B + 1/BA2 + ... = B/(B-1).
Thus if B = 2, which is the smallest branching factor that makes sense for a type tree, the
loop will be executed an average of twice. The worst case is when every node is the
rightmost node in the tree at the time it is added, when all its ancestors will be visited. The
worst way to build a tree is thus depth-first, when the cost per node is o(lgN) for a tree of N
nodes, and the best way is breadth-first, when the cost is 0(1) per node.
If Y->Nxt->Ord > 1+Y->0rd in the algorithm above, there is no difficulty in assigning a
new number. ((Y->Nxt->0rd)+(Y->0rd))/2 will do fine. When S is D's first son, Y=D, and
Y->0rd+1 will do even better. The animals tree showed this numbering at work. It has an
unpleasant tendency to bunch the numbers up at the right. Renumbering removes this bias,
and so reduces the likelihood of future renumbering.
If Y->Nxt->Ord = 1+Y->0rd, we have to renumber part of the tree. The general
scheme is
while (D is infeasible) D = D->Dad;
renumber the tree rooted at D;
Let's look at the latter operation first, as it is easier, and it will tell us when a node is feasible.
To renumber the tree rooted at a particular node, we simply walk down the Nxt list as
we do in appsubs, storing a number and incrementing it. We could use the same increment
for all the nodes, but we can do slightly better. Because we always insert after D->Yds, and
D->Yds is always a leaf, we will never have to insert anything immediately after an internal
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node. So after internal nodes we can increment by 1, while after leaves (which can have new
things inserted after them) we want to increment by as big a number as possible. So we
have
void renumber(D, I)
nodep D; /* top of subtree to renumber */
int I; /* increment for leaf nodes */
{
nodep S = D->Yds->Nrt; /* as in appBelow */
int O = D->Ord; /* D->Ord will not change */
while (D != S) {
D-X>rd = O;




The condition for feasibility is thus that there should be an integer I > 0 for which
D->Yds->Ord will end up less than D->Yds->Nxt->Ord. The easy way to test this is to deter¬
mine the largest possible value of I and see if it is positive. So we get
int feasible(D, I)
nodep D; /* top of subtree to be tested */
int *1; /* the increment returned here */
{
nodep S = D->Yds->Nxt;
int G = S->Ord - D->Ord;
int L = 0; /* number of leaves */
while (D != S) {
if (D->Yds — D) L = L+l; else G = G-l;
D = D->Nxt;
}
/* G is the amount to distribute among leaves */
return (*I = G/L) > 0;
}
Since the new node is a descendant of D, and is a leaf, L must be non-zero when the division
is done.





nodep S = (nodep)malloc(sizeof (struct node));







for (A ■ D; A !« Nil ££ A->Yda «= Y;
A->Yds «S, A« A->Dad) ;
Y->Nxt « S;
if (Y->Nxt->Ord - Y-X)rd =1) {
int I;
for (A = D; !feaaible(A, £I); A = A->Dad) ;
renumber(A, I);
} else {
S->Ord = Y = D ? 1+Y-X0rd




If we have to go up several generations before finding a feasible ancestor, the work
testing the intermediate ancestors will have been wasted. For large branching factors this is
negligible, while for small branching factors most of the nodes are only children and little
renumbering is needed anyway.
The analysis of addSon is beyond my skill, so I generated lots of random trees rang¬
ing from 100 to 70,000 nodes, with a variety of branching factors. It proved extraordinarily
difficult to provoke renumbering. Lest this seem surprising, recall that the total range avail¬
able to the Ord numbers was 1000,000,000, which is very much bigger than 70,000. Without
renumbering, a tightly coded version of addSon took about 0.2 ms per node on a
VAX-11/750, exclusive of malloc() time. Even when renumbering occurred, the time didn't
change much. Obviously, this method only works well when dummy.Ord is much bigger than
N, but it is certainly practical for 100,000 nodes.
7.4. Multiple Context Data Bases
A multiple context data base is essentially a function
db : Key x Context -> Value
We are not concerned with the nature of Keys here. It is assumed that a fast data structure
mapping keys to values exists, so that we can implement a multiple context data base as
Key -> (Context -> Value)
i.e. if we want to know the value associated with key K in context C we can use the key data
structure to locate a context data structure:
db(K,C) = context_lookup(key_lookup(K),C).
The idea behind multiple context data bases is that keys and contexts are very dif¬
ferent things: keys are associated with many fewer values than there are contexts, so it is
worthwhile trying to store the data base in a compressed form.
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Multiple context data bases differ according to the structure of the context space.
Here I consider only tree-structured context spaces, where the operations are
root : Context
returns the root of the context tree
addSon : Context -> Context
adds a new subcontext to the given context,
and returns the new context.
change : Key x Context x Value ->
changes the value associated with a key in a
specific context.
lookup : Key x Context -> Value
returns the value associated with a key
Notionally, we maintain a set of (Context,Value) pairs for each key. So
change(K, C, V)
pairs[K] := {(c,v) in pairs[K] | c * C}
u {(C,V)>
lookup(K, C)
let (c,v) be the pair in
{(cl,vl) in pairs[K] | cl is an ancestor of C)
with deepest c component
return v
We could actually implement these operations in exactly this way. The trouble with
that is that the cost of a change or lookup is proportional to the number of contexts in which
the key has been assigned a value. A heuristic which has been used in some implemen¬
tations is to number the nodes of the context tree as they are created; this is a topological
ordering of the tree. The set of changes is then kept in decreasing order of context. That
may allow the use of binary search in "change", but "lookup" is still sequential.
With the node numbering scheme presented in this chapter, a sub-tree corresponds
to an interval of node numbers. Indeed, to each node there corresponds an interval [l,u). So
we could regard the set of (Context,Value) pairs as a set of (Interval,Value) pairs. In this
view,
lookup (K, c)
let n be the node number of C
let ([1,u),v) be the pair in
{([11,ul),vl) in pairs[K] | 11 < n < ul}
with maximal 11
return v
In [McCreight 82], McCreight presents a data structure, called a balanced priority




add (x,y) to the set D
0(lg n)
DeletePair(x,y):
remove (x,y) from the set D
0(lg n)
MinXInRectangle(xO,xl, yl):
find a pair in {(x,y) in D | xO<x<xl £ y<yl)
whose x component is minimal
0(lg n)
MaxXInRectangle(xO,xl,y1):
find a pair in {(x,y) in D | xO<x<xl £ y<yl)
whose x component is maximal
0(lg n)
MinYInRange (xO,xl) :
find a pair in {(x,y) in D | xO<x<xl}
whose y component is minimal
0(lg n)
EnumerateRectangle{xO, xl,y1):
enumerate all {(x,y) in D | xO<x<xl £ y<yl}
0(|result| + Ig n)
Now the data structure we want is a set of [L,U] intervals, with operations
Addlnterval(L,U):
add an interval [L,U] to the set
Getlnterval(x):
find an interval in {[L,U] | L<x<U}
with maximal L




[-u,-v] where (u,v) = MinXInRectangle(-x,oo,-x)
To see that this does what we want,
MinXInRectangle(-x,oo,-x)
the (-L,-U) in {(-L,-U) in D | -x<-L<oo £ -U<-x}
with minimal -L




the [L,U] | x in [L,U] with maximal L, as required.
A fortunate consequence of this definition is that the pairs stored in the priority search
tree have distinct first components, which simplifies the algorithms.
McCreight presents two versions of priority search trees, radix priority search trees,
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which depend on the fact that the pairs are pairs of integers, and do arithmetic on the num¬
bers, and balanced priority search trees, which depend only on the order of the keys. We
cannot use radix trees, because we want to change the numbers.









where Pair is the data type of a pair of keys. The data structure of this chapter associates the
numbers with a node in the context tree, so we can implement Pair simply as a pointer to a
context tree node. While the associated numbers do change, the ordering between nodes
does not.
The combination of these two data structures yields a representation for tree-
structured multiple context data bases with the following important properties:
• The cost of a change or lookup does not depend on what has happened to any
other key or on the total number of contexts.
• The cost of creating a new context is 0(1).
• The cost of change(K,C,V) or lookup(K,C) is O(lgN) where N is the number of
contexts in which K has been explicitly defined.
7.5. Nearest Common Ancestors
McCreight's priority search trees can also be used to solve the "nearest common
ancestor" problem in logarithmic time. The <x,y> pair we store for a node n in the tree is
<Ord(Yds(n)),Ord(n)>.
Suppose we are given two nodes dl and d2. Without loss of generality, suppose that
Ord(d1) < Ord(d2). We want to find the If we are given two nodes d1 and d2, we want to find
that node n in the tree such that
Ord(d2) < Ord(Yds(n)) &
Ord(n) < Ord(dl)
with minimal Ord(Yds(n)). But this is precisely
MinXInRectangle(0rd(d2), oo, Ord(dl))
As before, the actual Ord() values don't matter, only the relative ordering of the
nodes, so the priority search tree is not disturbed by dynamic renumbering.
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The price of being able to implement comtype() in logarithmic time is that it takes
logarithmic time to add a node to the tree, whereas the basic data structure takes unit ex¬
pected time.
7.6. Summary.
I have described an efficient method for handling simple type trees. This method
does not generalise to tangled hierarchies, but chapter 4 described how multiple type sys¬
tems can be used.
The ability to extend the object taxonomy during a consultation is important for a
program like ASA. I was able to produce a dynamic version of MECHO's type system, but
updates were very expensive, and MECHO's type system does not provide unit cost subtype
tests.
The type system can be combined with a data structure due to McCreight to yield an




8.1. Main Contributions of this Work.
The immediate goals of my research were
• to discover what kinds of knowledge
• and what kinds of reasoning are needed to work out valid analyses for simple
statistical experiments,
• to determine what Al techniques are needed if a computer program is to perform
this task,
• and to explore techniques for efficient logic-based expert systems generally.
This volume concentrates on knowledge representation issues. The main points of the text
are:
• Chapter 2 presented an approach to classifying measurements. This approach
is related to dimensional analysis, but goes further. I maintain that this clas¬
sification is new and is better suited for non-statisticians than other classifica¬
tions now in use. For statisticians, the importance of this chapter is that the
approach is new, and the catalogue of value spaces can easily be extended
without modifying the foundational ideas.
• Chapter 3 presented a notation for simple experiments. Perhaps more impor¬
tantly, it presented a methodology for extending the notation. Both are new.
The notation needs to be extended to handle sampling methods; some work on
this has been done but is not reported here for reasons of space. It also needs
to be extended to handle time series; that will require extending the methodol¬
ogy. The notation is useful for computers. For statisticians, the importance may
be that the notation is usable by people. Trying to write down the formula for an
experiment is an extremely useful way of ensuring that you haven't forgotten to
ask the right "silly questions".
• Chapter 4 presented a new kind of type system, called "descriptions". I argued
that vague descriptions are a better way to handle some kinds of uncertain
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reasoning than certainty factors. The chapter explained how descriptions can
support negation and inheritance. The whole of the chapter is original.
• Chapter 5 presented Plotkin's learning algorithm. This has been known for
years. Its relevance to this work is that Plotkin found that the use of lattices as
description spaces followed naturally from a desire that descriptions should be
learnable. There is original material in this chapter too: although the incor¬
poration of DD rules into the task does not change the formal nature of the
learning algorithm, it does change its appearance, and the fact that the focussing
algorithm can take background information into account has not been reported
before. Other authors than Plotkin have presented the algorithm as working with
sets of trees: while attention was directed to this special case the represen¬
tational power of lattices went un-noticed.
• Chapter 6 presented a fast algorithm for finding fixed points. Although this algo¬
rithm is closely related to the LINCLOSURE algorithm and to McAllester's
propositional constraint propagation (which I believe were independently
derived), the generalised algorithm and the demonstration of its linearity are
original. This algorithm is relevant to descriptions, to belief revision, and to the
analysis of logic programs.
• Chapter 7 presented a dynamic data structure for simple type trees which en¬
ables type inferences to be reached rapidly. A version of this data structure was
developed at UBC, but that was a static structure. If a client is to be allowed to
extend the description space during the consultation, a dynamic system is
needed. While chapter 5 argued that a simple type tree is inadequate in general
(and chapter 2 showed that it is inadequate for Statistics), a product of simple
type trees is often useful. When this data structure is combined with McCreight's
BSTs, a fast data structure for Conniver-style data bases results. Both the type
tree and the multiple context data base data structures are original.
The basic assumption behind all of this research is that first order predicate calculus
is a good tool for developing Expert Systems, and that a good approach is to split off special
kinds of axioms which can be processed with particular efficiency (such as descriptions and
dependencies), but to retain their logical semantics. For an explanation of how this splitting
can be done while retaining completeness, see [Stickel 83]. Thus the language of first order
logic does not entail a commitment to the machinery of resolution.
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8.2. ABASE
This volume does not describe the ASA program in full. It omits, for example, any
discussion of goals or statistical methods. Nor does it describe the ABASE shell in full.
There are many interesting topics, such as the variant of Earley deduction I use, the way
negation is handled, the relation between the "meta-level" annotations I copied from MECHO
and relational data base theory, dependency maintenance/belief revision, natural language
output, and rules with uncertainties which could have been discussed.
Each of the topics summarised in this section was actually studied as part of my
research. They are not described in the main body of the text because they are not directly
relevant to the "knowledge representation and efficient algorithms for it" theme.
8.2.1. Earley Deduction
In 1975, David Warren described a family of proof procedures for Horn clauses which
he called "Earley Deduction", as the proof procedures were explicitly modelled on Jay
Earley's [Earley 70] famous parsing algorithm. The most recent description of the family is in
[Pereira & Warren 83].
What attracted me to this method was that it was not a chronological backtracking
procedure such as is built into the programming language Prolog. That approach is fine for
programming, but very bad for interactive Expert Systems. The data structures of the Earley
Deduction family seemed well suited to dependency maintenance, and the fact that a set of
goals is explicitly maintained opened up the possibility of having a "conversation manager"
module which would pick questions to ask the client so as to keep the conversation coherent.
My version of the method uses "silly" filtering [Bundy, Byrd & Mellish 82] and dynamic
goal ordering, and builds in several predicate properties such as functional dependencies.
The current "conversation manager" is very simple: the Earley Deduction chains along until it
can't get any further without asking a question. At this point it has a pool of questions which it
would be useful to ask. The conversation manager tries to stick to the same topic. For
example, if we have been asking about the description, properties, or components of a par¬
ticular entity, it prefers to ask another question about the same entity. The usual "how" and
"why" questions are supported, as are "help" questions to ask about words in ABASE's ques¬
tions. The client can volunteer information.
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8.2.2. Negation
Negation is handled four ways.
• First, de Morgan's laws are used to push negation down to the goal level.
• Second, it is often possible to rename a set of clauses (by moving the negation
sign into the predicate name, as it were) so that the resulting set is Horn. See
[Lewis 78, Meltzer 66], I have developed a fast algorithm for this.
• Third, the description system can be used. We can show that an entity does not
satisfy one description by showing that the description it is known to satisfy is
incompatible with the first one. A special case of this is the practice of adding an
extra argument to a predicate. For example, instead of having a predicate
british_citizen(Whoever)
we might have a two-place predicate
brit±sh_citizen(Whoever, yes/no)
which is declared to be functional in its first argument. Adding a yes/no ar¬
gument to a predicate is something of a hack, but one can often turn such a
predicate into a perfectly respectable description. Assuming that no-one can be
a citizen of two countries (yes, I know this is false) we could have a citizenship
aspect and ask whether
the citizenship of Whoever is british
• Finally, it is sometimes appropriate to make the closed world assumption. This
is particularly appropriate for tables which are built into the rule set. ABASE
does permit the client to say that a question has no more answers. But that
facility is not currently used to support negation as failure, just to stop ABASE
asking the same question again. The reason why the closed world assumption
is not allowed for user-supplied data is that allowing it would make dependency
maintenance much more complicated. With the other methods, ASA did not
need negation on ordinary predicates.
8.2.3. Annotations and Dependencies
An important feature of MECHO was that the inference engine was basically just a
depth-first backwards-chaining interpreter like Prolog. But it was controlled by annotations
stating that this predicate satisfied such a functional dependency, that predicate was sym¬
metric, another predicate always had a solution, and so on.
Many of these annotations were equivalent to ordinary first-order sentences which
MECHO was otherwise unable to express. Most of them, indeed, are embedded implica-
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tional dependencies (see [Maier 83]). ABASE can express the dependencies whose trans¬
lations do not involve equality directly, and because it uses Earley deduction, such rules
cause it no special difficulties. Rules (such as functional dependencies) whose translations
do involve equality cannot be expressed directly in ABASE, as ABASE does not handle
equality at all.
A lot is known about various kinds of dependencies, including methods for computing
closures (all the dependencies in a certain family which follow from the ones the knowledge
engineer supplied), and methods for finding so-called Armstrong relations. An Armstrong
relation for a set of dependencies is an instance of that relation which satisfies all the depen¬
dencies in the given family which are logically entailed by the given set, and no others.
Armstrong relations are useful for debugging one's annotations.
The availability of methods for computing closures means that all the dependencies a
given predicate satisfies can be computed at "compile time". So the inference engine only
has to be able to check or exploit single dependencies, and need not do any inference at
"run" time to decide which dependencies to check. We can do this without losing complete¬
ness, because the closure methods are complete in their own clearly delimited domains.
A failing of MECHO was that it neither precomputed all dependencies nor inferred
dependencies at run time, but only checked and exploited the dependencies explicitly stated
by the knowledge engineer, and didn't always check or exploit them.
8.2.4. Dependency Maintenance
Dependency maintenance in ABASE is based on [McAllester 78]'s "Prepositional
Constraint Propagation" restricted to prepositional Horn clauses (because the logical rules
ABASE works with are translated to Horn clauses). The reason for that is that McAllester's
was the first paper on dependency maintenance that I could understand.
In fact the restriction of McAllester's method to prepositional Horn clauses is precisely
the linear time algorithm for finding minimal models presented in Chapter 5. I did not realise
that until I designed the generalised LINCLOSURE algorithm presented there, which was
consciously based on LINCLOSURE. It is easy to show (though McAllester does not do this)
that the sets of prepositional clauses on which his algorithm terminates are precisely the sets
which are renamable-Horn.
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8.2.5. Natural Language Output
Natural language input is a good idea when the client and consultant share a com¬
mon jargon. But in Statistics consulting, this is rarely the case. It is also a good idea when
the client has a good enough understanding of the problem to volunteer useful information.
Again, in Statistics consulting the client's idea of what is important/relevant information and
the statistician's idea all too seldom coincide.
When I started work on ASA, Rob Milne was working on the Marcus-style parser
used in MECHO [Milne 80a, Milne 80b, Milne 83], an early version of CHAT [Dahl & Sambuc
76] was running, and CHAT-80 [Warren & Pereira 81] was under development. Also, I was
familiar with Definite Clause Grammars [Pereira & Warren 78]. So I expected that if I found a
use for natural language input, I would either be able to use someone else's parser, or to
write an application-specific parser without too much effort. Since then, Michael McCord has
published a comparable parser in the Al journal [McCord 82], and I have developed a variant
of Definite Clause Grammars based on Generalised Phrase Structure Grammars [Gazdar &
Pullum 85]. So my failure to include natural language input in ABASE was not for lack of
opportunity.
Having used these parsers, I am convinced that for the ordinary client a computer-
directed dialogue with short answers from the client (names of entities, some descriptions,
menu selections) is less confusing than natural language input. When a parser fails to
handle your sentences, it is very difficult to work out what went wrong. Also, many potential
clients these days are unlikely to be used to thinking of language as something that can be
manipulated, and to have difficulty with the very idea of paraphrasing a statement using
different syntax.
None of these objections applies to natural language output. The knowledge
representation language of ABASE is very simple, there are
• entities - if the user or knowledge engineer created them, they correspond to
proper nouns, otherwise they correspond to definite noun phrases
• descriptions - these come out as adjectives and so on.
• predications - these correspond to simple sentences in the basic form
subject verb [indirect] [direct] pp...
Simple sentences are transformed to bring the most interesting entities to the front.
If the knowledge engineer provides a set of templates for the predicates and descrip¬
tions, there is a module NEWSAY which is able to generate simple natural language output.
For example, if asked to describe Hannah, NEWSAY might report
Hannah is a Samoyed.
It is the mother of Samuel.
If asked to describe Samuel, NEWSAY might report that
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Samuel is a dog.
Its mother Is Hannah.
Note that the same mother(Hannah,Samuel) fact was expressed differently depending on
which one we are most interested in. There is a small set of rules for bringing a particular
noun phrase to the front, that is all.
NEWSAY does not handle gender. That shows up in this example, but in the actual
Statistics consulting domain all the entities we are talking about are abstract and gender is
not an issue.
A conjunction feature, which would have combined sentences which differed only in
the last noun phrase, was designed but never coded. Relative clauses are generated, but
only for entities which were created by inference rules. They are not created by combining
sentences, but are generated directly as noun phrases from the facts the nameless entities
were created for. No other method of combining or nesting sentences was written or in¬
tended.
Indeed, the whole sentence generation process was so simplified and constrained by
ABASE's knowledge representation scheme that it was possible to implement NEWSAY as a
definite clause grammar running "backwards".
This approach is glaringly inadequate for generating coherent paragraphs. But for a
simple conversational interface it works quite well.
8.2.6. Uncertainties
My research on logic programs with uncertainties was inspired by [Shapiro 83]. That
paper takes uncertainties as elements of the total order (0,1]. My approach took uncer¬
tainties as elements of any specified complete lattice.
If the lattice used as a certainty space has finite depth, the finite fixed point method
developed in Chapter 4 can be used to compute or update certainties in time linear in the size
of the current partial proof.
ASA does not use certainty factors at all, so ABASE has no provision for them.
Indeed, in Chapter 2, I argue that ascribing certainty factors to whole predications is unwise,
and that if anything, uncertainty belongs with the arguments of predications.
Since the logic programs with uncertainties study is not relevant to ASA, it is not
included in this volume.
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8.3. Directions for Future Research
Recall that the goals of my research were to explore representational and inference
issues, and to look for efficient algorithms and data structures. It would have been nice to
build all the ideas into one program, but since the production of a deliverable program was
not the point, I never let this interfere with exploring a new idea.
At no time have all the pieces of ABASE worked together. There is a version of
ABASE which really does run rule bases stated in Horn clauses, using Earley Deduction, but
it does not use the current description system. The conversation manager and the explana¬
tion and help systems work in it. There is an implementation of the current description sys¬
tem, but it doesn't work with anything else. There is a version of NEWSAY, but it works with
the previous type system. There is a program which computes closures of annotations, and
its results can be fed back into ABASE, but ABASE doesn't understand all the annotations
that this program can handle. There is a dependency system in the running ABASE, but it
doesn't use my new algorithm, though that has been tested.
As ABASE has never all worked at once, many of the rules in ASA have only been
exercised in hand simulations, mainly the model selection rules and some of the transfor¬
mation selection rules. All of the method description rules have been exercised and work.
But ASA has never been in a state where real clients could use it, and has only been tried on
textbook examples.
So one direction for future research would be to produce a new version of ABASE
with all of the components working together, and to extend the ASA rule-base.
One of the principal reasons why ABASE was developed as several incompatible
pieces was that there was never a statistician involved, nor any likely client. It was always
more rewarding to look for a better algorithm than to integrate the existing algorithms into a
complete program. Statisticians do not need a consulting program such as ASA was in¬
tended to be. But the craft of Statistics is not the craft of running statistical packages, but the
craft of designing experiments and explaining the results to people.
Accordingly, another direction for future research would be to produce an "Animated
CodeBook". That is, to produce a statistical computing environment where the "package" is
told the structure of the experiment and the nature of the measurements. This would be
useful when
• several statisticians are working on the same experiment. With an Animated
CodeBook it would be easier to keep track of what several hundred variables
mean. For example, a CodeBook user could ask "which variables measure
political affiliations", and the CodeBook could answer.
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• a report is being written. The CodeBook could keep track of how variables were
derived, what the terms in a model meant, and could maintain cross references
to related experiments.
• a statistician is exploring the data. The CodeBook could suggest graphs which
might be interesting, transformations which might be useful, and could warn
when a method is about to be used inappropriately. The point of the CodeBook
would be to ensure that the obvious was not overlooked.
The Animated CodeBook project would have to extend the structural notation to
handle sampling, to explicitly record which processes were used to take measurements, and
to handle classical experiment structures, but this would fit very well into the framework I
have presented, and some of it has already been thought about.
It would be interesting to build the fast data structure for multiple context data bases
outlined in chapter 7 into a logic programming language; Prolog/KR and LM-Prolog have
multiple world data bases, but this would be better.
Can the fast type-tree algorithm be extended to handle partial orders? Or is it pos¬
sible to prove that it cannot? Either would be a useful result.
In section 1.1.2 I presented an "algorithm" for doing science. Step [10], "use the
collected data to refine the model, or to suggest a replacement for it", was not part of this
research. It should be possible to do something here. For example, here are some heuris¬
tics:
• look for a correlation between the discrepancies and some other factor which
has not entered the model yet. For example, check for a temporal trend.
• test whether it is possible that the level of some factor at the active site is dif¬
ferent from the level measured or applied. For example, in an agricultural ex¬
periment, it is worth measuring the amount of fertiliser which reaches root level
as well as reporting the amount which was applied.
• consider breaking a monomial (c.XAa.YAb) into a polynomial (c1.XAa1.YAb1 +
c2.XAa2.YAb2)
This obviously ties back into Machine Learning. What do you do when the rule you have
learned perfectly fits the training set but turns out to be wrong?
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8.4. Conclusion
I believe that a knowledge representation language should have firm semantic foun¬
dations. For if there is no objective way of determining what a notation means, how can I tell
whether what I have written says what I think it does, and how can it make sense to ask
whether a program intended to support the notation is functioning correctly?
First-order logic is a good place to start. When one identifies common patterns of
reasoning such as types, part/whole, ordering, and so on, one can call on work such as
[Stickel 83] to handle these specialised inferences without destroying the advantages of
logic.
A particularly important advantage of first-order logic which has been largely over¬
looked by the Al community is that for many years people in the data processing community
have been trying to model large real-world systems. The data base community is as deeply
concerned with "knowledge representation" as the Al community, and their methods [Maier
83] are intimately related to first-order logic. The modelling disciplines developed by the data
base community can be applied to Al problems.
One common pattern of reasoning concerns descriptions. I have developed a lattice-
based approach to descriptions which is reasonably general and has a firm mathematical
basis.
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Appendix A
Experiment Structure in ASA.
Chapter 3 described a notation for experiment structure which I have found con¬
venient when writing experiment descriptions out by hand. It is not convenient to use that
notation in ASA.
Instead of using a formula, each sub-formula is given a name and represented as an
"entity" (of type "step"). This allows us to represent steps about which we have as yet little
information (vague steps), and avoids the problems associated with compound names.
There are several closely related entities we could represent: an experiment step,
the stream of subjects which enter it, a typical member of that stream. Because streams are
set-like objects, and because ABASE does not handle set-like objects well (this has proven to
be a limitation in several areas), I chose not to represent streams at all, but to distribute their
properties over the corresponding steps and typical subjects.
There is no automatic connection between the typical subject of one step and the
typical subject of another step, though the rule that introduces a step can of course state that
it has the same typical subject as another step. The reason for this is that a typical subject
really represents a subject plus his history: so that identifying "the typical subject before he
has had his tonsils removed" and "the typical subject after he has had his tonsils removed" is
not always a good idea. Conditional description-to-description rules provide the means
whereby properties can be transferred from one typical subject to another, and a typical
subject in this representation is little more than a bundle of properties anyway.



















Every step has the following attributes:
size(Step, Size) Size is an interval, which starts out at the unknown value for intervals of
OJnfinity. It is the number of subjects which passed through this step, or
which are to pass through it if the experiment has yet to be performed.
typical_subject(Step, Subject)
Subject is a (prototypical) physical object name. The D that appears in the
signatures described in chapter 3 is actually the description of this individual.
Many steps may have the same typical subject, but it is up to the rule which
creates a step whether it has a new typical subject or not.
known_at(Step, Variable)
Variable is one of the variables that have been applied or measured by the
time we get to this step. The B set that appears in a signature is the set of
these. It is in fact calculated from the determinedjn attribute.
determined_in(Step, Variable)
Variable is one of the variables that are applied or measured in this step.
This fact is automatically deduced for component identifiers and such.
Indeed, if we had the complete experiment structure to start with, we could
deduce this from the substeps of this step. But as we start with the vaguest
structure we can use, this information has to be obtained initially from the
client and then "pushed in" as far as possible.
I am not satisfied with the way that the sets of known and determined variables are
represented. The problem is illustrated by "then" steps. Suppose we have (s1 then s2),
where the combined step is known to determine variables U,V,W. If we could ask "what
subset of {U,V,W} is determined in s1", then we could compute the complement of that and
assign it to s2. Instead, we have to ask for each of U,V,W, which step it is determined in. In
fact, in order to get a type-like value to discriminate on, it was necessary to break up the
notion of which substep a variable is measured in into two predicates:
which_substep(Step, Variable, Which) ->
Step is a then_step &
Variable is a variable &
Which is first or second.
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£irst_or_second = {first, second}.
determined_in(Step, Variable) £




which_substep(Step, Variable, second) £
part_two(Step, SubStage2) ->
determined_in(SubStage2, Variable).
Clumsy as this may be, there is one good outcome: if the client discovers that he has
forgotten a variable, we can simply add a fact recording that the variable is measured some¬
where in the experiment, and track it to its lair only when we need to. This means that the
representation ASA uses is actually more flexible than the notation presented in chapter 3.
We do not refine a vague step into a sequence of treatments and observations all at once,
but can leave each variable separately vague until we need to know where that variable is
determined. If ABASE supported sets of entities as values of properties, the notation of
chapter 3 could have been represented more concisely and faithfully, but this flexibility would
have been lost. In fact, clients often do forget variables, especially when designing an experi¬
ment.
The predicates we have for each of the refinements are
part_one(ThenStage, SubStagel)
part_two(ThenStage, SubStage2)
These are the first and second steps of a sequence. The step names are
invented by ABASE, not by the client, so we have a rule like
ThenStage is a then_step ->
S1A part_one(ThenStage, SI) £
S2A part_two(ThenStage, S2).
part_one (TS, SI) £ known_at (TS, V)-> Jcnown_at (SI, V) .
part_two (TS,S2) £ known_at (TS, V) -> )cnown_at (S2, V) .
part_one(TS,SI) £ part_two(TS,S2) £
determined_in(SI,V) -> known_at(S2,V).
separate_part(Step, Component, SubStage)
Step is a "separate" step. Component is a "field name", that is, the selector
of a class of components, not the name of a typical individual. SubStage is







manl is ths male of couplel.
woman1 is the female of couplel.
assign_component(AssignStage, Component)
Component is a selector name tor a has_set component.
assign_var(AssignState, Identifier)
Identifier is an identifier variable, which indicates which branch a particular
component went down. It has the status of a treatment in some respects.
assign_part(AssignStage, Value, SubStage)
SubStage is the substep of the 'assign' step corresponding to the specified
value of the variable.
select_var(SelectStage, Treatment)
note that each object coming into a 'select* step is routed in its entirety to one
of the substeps, so there is no need to relate things in different substeps to a
common parent.
select_part(SelectStage, Value, SubStage)
SubStage is the substep of the 'assign' step corresponding to the specified
value of the variable.
disperse_component(DisperseStage, Component)
Component is the name of a "has_set" component.
disperse_var( DisperseStage, Identifier)
disperse_part(DisperseStage, SubStage)
a 'disperse' step has only one substep.
group_level(GroupStage, LevelVariable)
LevelVariable is a measurement (it must not be a treatment or identifier)
which has already been made on the units. The units will be ranked on that
variable.
group_size(GroupStage, Size)
Size is an integer, at least 2. Having been ranked, the units are divided into
successive blocks of this size.
group_var(GroupStage, GroupVar)




A 'group' step has only one substep. Note that the group step Itself is fed a
stream of units, and it feeds its substep a stream of sets of units.
With these predicates, we can completely describe the structure of any experiment
ASA was designed to handle. This is very far from being all statistical experiments of inter¬
est, but it covers a wide range of simple experiments, which people often get wrong. Indeed,
many experiments don't need refining past a single vague step, as the variable descriptions
are enough to guide the analysis.
A.1. Example
The examples in this section comes from pp 163-165 of [Siegel 56]. That book was
the main source of test cases for ASA. The first prototype of ASA was able to tackle 25 of
the examples in [Siegel 56], The discovery of lattice-based descriptions opened the door to
tackling them all. One of the things which the first prototype could not represent was com¬
posite entities, particularly entities which are really just aggregations (matched samples).
The example illustrates how this is done now.
Suppose we were interested in the influence of interviewer friendliness upon housewives'
responses in an opinion survey. We might train an interviewer to conduct three types of
interviews:
• interview 1, showing interest, friendliness, and enthusiasm
• interview 2, showing formality, reserve, and courtesy
• interview 3, showing disinterest, abruptness, and harsh formality.
The interviewer would be assigned to visit 3 groups of 18 houses, and told to use interview 1
with one group, interview 2 with another, and interview 3 with the third. That is, we would
have obtained 18 sets of housewives with 3 matched housewives (equated on relevant
variables) in each set. For each set, the 3 members would be randomly assigned to the three
conditions (types of interviews). Thus we would have 3 matched samples (k-3) with 18
members in each (N=18). We could then test whether the gross differences between the
three styles of interviews influenced the number of "yes" responses given to a particular item
by the three matched groups. Using artificial data, a test of this hypothesis follows.
The first thing to note about this is that such an experiment should not be performed.
The subjects would have given their consent to the ostensible purpose of the experiment
(finding out their opinion) but not to the covert purposes, of which they would not have been
informed. Deception of this sort is a regrettable feature of many psychological experiments.
The second thing to note is that I have not altered this text. Yes, a textbook used by
generations of social scientists is in fact that confused, and that confusing. This example
supports my claim that natural language input is not particularly useful in this area: if a statis¬
tician can confuse 18 groups of 3 with 3 groups of 18, what hope is there that a naive client
will get it right?
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It is important to realise that each group of 3 is cohesive in a way that the the groups
of 18 are not.
The third thing to note about this experiment is that we don't really have enough
information to do a proper job. We cannot represent the sampling phase, because we do not
know what the "relevant" variables were. The text is reasonably clear that the housewives
didn't come already grouped in neat sets of 3, but that a sample of 54 housewives was drawn
in some fashion and grouped into similar triples. In trying to draw the diagram for this experi¬
ment, I found that (a) we aren't told how the set of 54 were chosen, (b) we are not told what
the "relevant" variables are, and (c) we are not told how the matching is done. In fact I have
never found in any textbook a description of how to form matched groups. Discovering these
information gaps is one of the most valuable things about trying to draw experiment
diagrams.
For argument's sake, let's suppose that the "relevant variables" were just "age", and
that the method of grouping was to sort the housewives by age and take successive blocks of
3. Then we end up with the following formula:
1. {sample[54] then
2. observe['age'] then
3. group['age'; 3; 'group';
4. assign[self; style;
5. 1 -> observe['answer'],
6. 2 -> observe['answer'],
7. 3 -> observe['answer']]]
}(study_population).
That is,
1. a sample of 54 housewives is drawn.
2. the age of each housewife is measured.
3. the subjects are grouped into triples of similar age.
4. the triples are broken up again, with each member of a triple being assigned to
a different interview style.
5. the subjects assigned to style 1 have their answer recorded. A richer notation
than ASA's would indicate the measuring instructments. The apparent identity
of the three substeps is due to the suppression of such relevant detail.
6. the subjects assigned to style 2 have their answer recorded.
7. the subjects assigned to style 3 have their answer recorded.
The structure of the data set implied by this formula is
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I Case number | Age I Group | Style I Answer |
I 1 I 42 | 13 | 3| 0|
I 54 I 27 | 2 | 1| 1|
(The left-to-right order of the columns is the order in which the variables are determined.)
This is, for example, how one would present the data to SPSS. A common source of con¬
fusion to users of such packages is the discrepancy between a data set structure like this and
the tabular forms used in their textbooks. For example, Siegel presents his artificial data in
the form
| Triple | Answerl | Answer2 | Answer3 I
I II 0| 0| 0|
I 18 | 1| 1| 0|
Such a restructuring of the data is useful for calculation, but it is not directly related to the
structure of the experiment.
The representation in ASA is
experiment(step2).
stepl is a sampling. % line 1.
size(stepl, 54..54).
typical_subject(stepl, unitl).
unitl is a housewife.












agel is an observable_jproperty.
the value_space of agel is physprop(time,housewife).
measures(age, agel).
age is an observation.
the value_space of age is physprop(time,housewife).
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group is an identifier.
the value_space of group is count(unit2).
group_part(step5, step6).
unit2 is a set(housewife, 3..3).





style is an identifier.







unit3 is a housewife,
unit4 is a housewife.
unit5 is a housewife.
step7 is an observe_step. % line 5.
typical_subject(step7, unit3).
determined_in(step7, answer),
answer is a class(question, reply,[yes,no]).
step8 is an observe_step. % line 6.
typical_subject(step8, unit4).
determined_in(step8, answer).
step9 is an observe_step. % line 7.
typical_subject(step9, unit5).
determined_in(step9, answer).
This is the basic skeleton. A lot of these facts are "inherited" from one node to another. For
example, steps 7, 8, and 9 inherit the size 18 from step6.
The breakthrough was being able to say that unit2 is a set of between 3 and 3
housewives. This hasn't been discussed before, as it is an object type, not a value space or
step type. Basically, if D is any object description, and [L,U] is any interval of integers,
set (D, [L, U])
is an object description, describing all sets of between L and U objects comprised of objects
satisfying description D. The lattice rules are




"element" is like "component", except that It refers to sets. The "unique name
assumption" means that ABASE assumes that units 3, 4, and 5 are distinct elements of unit
2. In ASA, this true by construction. Some of the details have been omitted.
For programmed inference, the representation as ABASE facts and types is superior.




As a result of my work on ASA, I have identified a new member of the family of
partially ordered scales. It appears that many variables which are customarily analysed as if
they were measured on an ordinal scale actually belong to this new scale. I propose a
method for analysing data belonging to multi-metic scales.
B.1. Partially Ordered Scales.
A partially ordered scale is a set of values and a binary relation "<" which is a partial
order. When there are few values, it can be useful to draw a graph showing the structure of
the scale, with a node for each value in the set and an arc directed from node X to node Y
precisely when X < Y and there is no Z such that X < Z and Z < Y. I have found it useful to
adopt the following convention: a node with no arcs leaving it (a maximal value) is drawn as a
triangle, others as circles, a node with no arcs entering it (a minimal value) is an outline,
others are solid. Figure 1 shows a typical partial order.
Figure 1. A Nondescript Partial Order.
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B.2. Bimetic and Multimetic Scales.




Figure 2. A Nominal Scale.
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Figure 5. A Multimetic Scale.
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Figures 4 and 5, however, will be unfamiliar. They represent the case where there is
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a common "don't know" or neutral value (0), and a number of extreme positions, the mefae11,
with perhaps some intermediate values.
I have been trying to write an Expert System for Statistics, which would elicit a
description of an experiment from a client who is ignorant of Statistics, and automatically
work out a valid (though very likely suboptimal) way of analysing the data when and if they
become available. Amongst other benefits, this has forced me to look hard at how measure¬
ments are described. The common classification into nominal, partially ordered, ordinal, or¬
dered metric, interval, and ratio, will almost certainly be unfamiliar to a naive client. This
turns out to be no great loss, as it is inadequate to support automatic method selection.
(Such distinctions as "ordinal but with an underlying continuous scale" and "strictly positive"
are also needed.) More precise descriptions of measurement scales are not only needed by
an Expert System, but are easier for the client to provide.
One of the questions I had to consider was dichotomising an ordinal variable. In
general, the best we can do is to dichotomise around a (possibly pooled) median, but some
ordinal scales come with a built in zero. I have found three kinds of ordinal scale with a zero:
1. Scales resulting from the comparison of two objects or sensations.
2. Approximations to ratio scales (often differences).
3. Others.
In the first two kinds of scale, there is a single property being tested, and when one of the
objects has (or is judged by the subject to have) more of "it" the outcome is "positive", and
when it has less the outcome is "negative".
But we often see questions like this: "Do you vote for
1. the Conservative Party all the time
2. the Conservative Party some of the time
3. neither party
4. the Labour Party some of the time
5. the Labour Party all the time ?"
This is a multimetic scale, with two major parties and a number of small ones omitted to
produce a bimetic scale. We very often see questions like this analysed as if the answers
formed a simple ordinal scale.
Another example is "Are you
1. Strongly in favour of Capital Punishment
11The pyramidal columns at the end of the Roman circus, hence the triangular shapes
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2. Moderately in favour of Capital Punishment
3. No opinion
4. Moderately opposed to Capital Punishment
5. Strongly opposed to Capital Punishment?"
At first sight this looks like a straightforward comparison, with the two objects being two
opinions and the property being compared being the degree to which the subject holds each.
But is it really the case that the same phenomenon explains subject A's strong opposition
rather than moderate opposition and subject B's uncertainty rather than moderate support?
Indeed, can we not have a subject who says "I think murderers deserve to die, but that the
State has no right to kill them" and so wants to tick two boxes?
B.3. Dealing with Multimeties.
It is best to avoid them in the first place by having a separate question for each goal.
This of course leads to extra work in the survey design and in its analysis, but the reward is
more meaningful data.
An easy way of coping is to collapse the scale to a simple nominal scale, with one
value for the zero point and one for each of the extremes, with intermediate stages mapped
to either the zero or the appropriate extreme as seems fit to the investigator. This is like
dichotomising. If a scale is truly multimetic, it seldom makes sense to group the zero point
with any of the other cases.
My limited experience suggests to me that bimeties are always the result of poor
design, and that disentangling the metae into separate scales always gets closer to what the
client really wants to know. Others with more experience may know of genuine uses for
muitimeties, and if so, we should develop methods for them.
Suppose we have a sample of N subjects, with an interval variable Yj and a mul¬
timetic variable X( measured on each subject. Suppose X has M metae, and meta j has Mj
stages. (Thus in figure 5M = 4 and Mj = 2 for j=1 ...4.) We define M0 = 0. After regrouping Y
by the values of X, an attractive model is
Yjki = mu + theta . alpha^ + epsilon^
for j = k =
where
0 < theta^ < . . . < theta^ = 1
epsilonjkl are i.i.d. with E[epsilon^] = 0
Solving this by least squares leads to a nonlinear problem, but it is reasonably well
behaved, and good starting values for mu and alphaj are available from the group means.
